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are making one of the best contributions to world’ 
 (Watts, 1957: 155) 
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INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM DEFINITION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This study is an inquiry into the development of trust between partners in 
international joint ventures. This inquiry leads to several introductory 
questions. These are: 
 What are international joint ventures and why are they the focus of this 
study? 
 What is trust and why is the focus on trust in international joint ventures? 
 Why does this thesis focus on the development of trust between partners in 
international joint ventures?  
The order of these three questions yields the limitations of this study. Our basic 
object of study is international joint ventures. Within international joint 
ventures, we focus on trust. Moreover, we are especially interested in the 
development of trust between partners. Figure 1-1 presents this demarcation 
schematically. 
Figure 1-1. Object definition of this study 
INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES (IJVS) 
 
TRUST BETWEEN  
PARTNERS IN IJVS  
 
DEVELOPMENT OF TRUST  
BETWEEN PARTNERS IN IJVS 
 
 
 
The following three sections will elaborate on these three questions. 
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1.1 INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES: WHAT AND WHY 
What are joint ventures? To answer this question, assume the following: you are 
member of the Board of Directors of company X that needs additional raw 
materials for its product. The production of this raw material is your 
responsibility. What can you do? Williamson (1975, 1985), based on Coase 
(1937), presents three main options (or governance structures) for obtaining the 
extra raw material. These three structures are markets, hierarchies, and 
intermediate or hybrid forms. In other words, you can buy the raw material from 
a third supplier, you can extend your own production capacity, or you can co-
operate with another company. In order to choose between the different 
structures, managers have to weigh costs of production (including costs of 
organising and controlling) against costs of transacting. The latter costs include 
costs of drafting, negotiating and safeguarding an agreement (ex ante costs), in 
addition to costs of monitoring, settling disputes, renegotiating, arbitration, and 
litigation (ex post costs). International joint ventures belong to hybrid forms of 
governance (Lorange and Roos, 1992; Lu and Björkman, 1997). Resources are 
obtained neither via arm‟s length contract nor through full ownership of the 
activity, but through co-operation with other companies. Besides, both 
companies create a third, new legal entity to shape their co-operation. This 
distinguishes equity joint ventures from joint ventures. Whereas the latter refers 
to all contractual relationships between companies, such as license or supply 
agreements and contracts about technical assistance (Hennart, 1988), equity 
joint ventures are co-operative relationships between at least two firms that 
contribute resources to a newly formed, legally independent, joint subsidiary 
(Bell, 1996; Hennart, 1988). Joint ventures are called international when at least 
one of the partners is headquartered outside the venture‟s country of operation 
(Geringer, 1991). The focus of this thesis is on international equity joint 
ventures, from now on referred to as joint ventures or IJVs. The above 
discussion suggests that efficiency is the sole reason for creating IJVs (Hennart, 
1988; Kogut, 1988). However, some studies mention other motives for forming 
IJVs. Lin, Yu and Seetoo (1997) propose two other main reasons, based on –
amongst other things– Kogut (1988), Vernon (1983), Contractor and Lorange 
(1988), Killing (1983), and Hamel (1991). These motives are competition and 
learning. In other words, a joint venture can reduce competition or enhance 
market power, or it may give access to a partner‟s expertise or resources. 
CHAPTER ONE     3 
 
Efficiency reasons include, in addition to reducing transaction costs (compared 
to transaction through the market), gaining economies of scale and overcoming 
governmental restrictions or trade barriers. 
 Why are joint ventures an interesting research object? The strategic 
importance of joint ventures and other hybrid or network forms (Thorelli, 1986; 
Ouchi, 1980) is growing (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). Two current trends, 
internationalisation (Ghauri and Usunier, 1996) and focusing on core 
competencies, have impelled companies to enter strategic alliances. The last few 
decades foreign business exchange has accelerated. Although companies have 
always traded with other countries, advanced communication possibilities like 
fax, e-mail, and video conferencing have reduced our world to a „global village‟. 
Such communication means facilitate fast interaction, and hence ease the 
management of foreign subsidiaries. Internationalisation has also increased 
competition. Small local firms have to face foreign companies that enter new 
markets. Focusing on core competencies has influenced the way in which 
companies enter new markets or try to face stronger competition. Because firms 
try to specialise on activities, outsourcing other activities has become more 
important. Joint ventures offer the advantage of controlling particular activities 
without merging completely. 
 The question arises why companies may choose an equity joint venture 
rather than a contractual relationship. The distinctive characteristic of equity 
joint ventures is that each company is partly owner of the subsidiary. This 
ownership means that the companies are interested in the joint venture‟s 
performance, because profits will directly contribute to total profits. Such direct 
self-interest is not present in contractual joint ventures. For example, a supplier 
will not notice the effect of bad supply on its profits directly, since the company 
to which they supply is not under their control. Therefore, firms may prefer an 
equity joint venture, as it increases the commitment of the partner. 
 Empirical evidence shows that the amount of international joint 
ventures increases at a rapid speed, especially in countries that have been 
inaccessible for a long period. For example, data show that the number of joint 
ventures in Central and Eastern Europe increased from 165 in 1988 to 25,845 in 
1991 (Dunning, 1994). In China foreign investors created about 54,000 equity 
joint ventures in 1993 and 27,858 in 1994 – accounting for 52% of total FDI in 
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1994 (Luo and Chen, 1997). In other words, equity joint ventures are a popular 
means to penetrate foreign markets. 
 Hence, joint ventures are an interesting research object because of their 
popularity and also because they yield advantages that other co-operative 
structures cannot offer. Nevertheless, joint ventures also have certain 
drawbacks, which brings us to the following section. 
1.2 TRUST IN IJVS: WHAT AND WHY 
The distinctive characteristic of joint ventures, shared ownership, is at the same 
time its main obstacle (Killing, 1982; Geringer and Herbert, 1989). Shared 
control implies two or more companies instead of one deciding about the 
strategic direction and operational issues of the joint subsidiary. Shared control 
causes transaction costs. Transaction costs occur in joint ventures because the 
partner may behave opportunistically. Therefore, partners search for a suitable 
partner, negotiate the joint venture deal, write contracts, monitor, renegotiate, 
and deliberate. However, transaction costs do not occur in joint ventures only 
because of possible opportunistic behaviour. Transaction costs stem 
automatically from a joint venture structure: due to shared ownership, partners 
have to interact to set the direction for the joint venture.  Numerous studies have 
been conducted on how to reduce these transaction costs in joint ventures. These 
are studies of the success or performance of a joint venture (see e.g. Contractor 
and Lorange, 1988; Special Issue of JIBS No.5, 1996; Beamish and Killing, 
1997). For example, Killing (1982) made out a case for dominant parent control. 
Dominant parent control reduces costs of settling disputes and renegotiating, as 
one parent can enforce a decision. Other researchers show that a fit of strategy 
will have a positive effect on joint venture performance (Hamill and Hunt, 1994; 
Shamdasani and Sheth, 1995; Franko, 1971; Parkhe, 1991). After all, it leads to 
partners agreeing on the strategic direction of the joint venture, thereby reducing 
ex post costs. Beamish (1988), Lane and Beamish (1990) and Madhok (1995b) 
have stressed the importance of long-term mutual need, which is the raison 
d’être of any joint venture (Parkhe, 1991). If both partners need the joint 
venture, the perceived chance of opportunistic behaviour is reduced, resulting in 
less contracting and monitoring costs.  
 Trust has received special attention in research on inter-organisational 
exchange in general (Gabarro, 1978; Ganesan, 1994; Nooteboom, 1996, 1998; 
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Parkhe, 1993a; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). Trust is defined as the expectation 
that the other will behave co-operatively. In other words, trust takes away the 
fear of possible opportunistic behaviour of the partner. When this perceived 
chance of opportunism diminishes or is even eliminated, contracts will be 
redundant. “Contract, in this context, reduces to a world of promise” 
(Williamson, 1985: 31). Trust receives little attention in transaction costs 
economics, because the emphasis is mainly on opportunism. Because some 
people might behave opportunistically and because it is too costly to find out 
who will and who will not, the risk of opportunism rules economic life and trust 
is only reserved for social relationships (Williamson, 1993). However, some 
scholars have a different opinion on this, and their studies yield great insight 
into the role of trust. For example, Zucker (1986: 56) claims that trust “is vital 
for the maintenance of co-operation in society and necessary as grounds for 
even the most routine, everyday interaction”. Ganesan (1994: 1) states that trust 
“is necessary for the perception of a fair division of the pie of resources in the 
future”. Buckley and Casson (1988) argue that trust reduces transaction costs 
and facilitates open and honest interaction. Sullivan and Peterson (1982, in 
Dwyer et al., 1987: 23) finds that when trust is present, parties will find “ways 
by which the two parties can work out difficulties such as power conflict, low 
profitability and so forth”. Zand (1972) shows that managerial problem-solving 
effectiveness is much lower when trust is non-existent. In addition, empirical 
evidence shows that trust reduces search costs. Doney and Cannon (1997: 45) 
show that “trust of the selling firm plays an important role in anticipated future 
interaction with the supplier”. Nooteboom (1996: 990) also concludes that “trust 
and opportunism are likely to arise in transaction relations” and that trust mainly 
reduces the perceived propensity towards opportunism. In other words, trust 
plays an essential role in the reduction of transaction costs in joint ventures, 
hence contributes to the performance of the joint venture.  
 Moreover, it is argued that when trust is present all other factors that 
contribute to IJV performance become less important, except for mutual need 
(this is the raison d’être of the joint venture). For example, Hamill and Hunt 
(1994) state that a strategic fit positively contributes to IJVs‟ performance. 
However, when partners trust each other, they will find ways to solve problems 
that arise due to strategic divergence. 
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 Sociologists (e.g. Powell, 1990; Granovetter, 1992; Larson, 1992; Uzzi, 
1997) state that embedded relations, characterised by trust, fine-grained 
information exchange, and joint problem-solving arrangements, are essential for 
the formation and maintenance of economic relationships between firms. They 
argue that embedded relations offer sufficient social overlay to solve 
governance problems in other ways than by internalising the activity. Moreover, 
they argue that without trust economic relationships between firms would not 
even exist. Empirical evidence shows that „business relations are mixed up with 
social ones‟ (Granovetter, 1992: 65). This thesis takes this view as a starting 
point. Hence, it acknowledges trust as an essential feature of IJV relationships. 
It is therefore worthwhile to investigate this concept in more detail. To this end, 
we follow Parkhe (1993a: 1), who “strongly endorses Kaplan‟s (1964) position 
that no phenomena – soft or otherwise – are inherently beyond the reach of 
rigorous scientific investigation”.  
1.3 WHY STUDY THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRUST 
With trust being so essential in IJV relationships, building and sustaining trust 
becomes a main activity for partners in IJV relationships. After all, trust is 
person- and time-dependent and parties have to make a long-term effort to 
develop it. No person can be trusted right from the beginning; there is always a 
possibility of opportunism. Studies on trust have shed insufficient light on the 
question of how partners can develop trust. This means that much insight has 
been given in how trust affects IJV performance, but that less is known about 
how trust evolves over time. Although some researchers advocate a longitudinal 
approach to IJV research (Hyder and Ghauri, 1991; Parkhe, 1993b; Stafford, 
1995), until now only limited work has been done in this direction (cf. Ring and 
Van de Ven, 1994; Madhok, 1995a; Spekman et al., 1996; Ariño and De la 
Torre, 1996). Hence, research should focus more on this process dimension. 
Ring and Van de Ven (1994: 113) state: 
As the uncertainty, complexity, and duration of economic transactions within and 
between firms increase, it becomes increasingly important for scholars and 
managers to understand developmental processes of how equity, trust, conflict-
resolution procedures, and internal governance structures emerge, evolve and 
dissolve over time. 
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Consequently, there is a need for longitudinal research that will provide greater 
insight into the development of trust between partners in IJVs. The word 
„partners‟ refers to the delegates who are on the board of directors of the joint 
venture. In other words, the main research question of this thesis is: 
 
How does trust between partners in international joint venture relationships 
develop? 
 
 This question has two main subquestions. The first one is how partners 
in IJVs can build and sustain trust. The answer to this question will contribute to 
earlier literature about factors affecting trust. Our contribution is that we put 
these factors in a temporal dimension. The second subquestion relates to 
literature about sources of trust. Discussions in this context focus on whether 
trust is trust when there is a belief in the other party acting trustworthy for other 
reasons than moral ones, bonds of friendship, and/or emotions (cf. Hardin, 1990; 
Nooteboom, 1998). This study will investigate the sources of trust and find out 
if these sources change over time. If they change, this study will also examine 
the causes for this change. In order to answer these two subquestions, this study 
examines literature on IJVs and trust. In addition, it adds an empirical study to 
expand existing knowledge. In sum, this study will answer the following 
questions (Table 1-1): 
Table 1-1. Subquestions of this thesis 
Subquestion Sources to answer the question 
1. How can partners in IJVs build and 
sustain trust? 
LITERATURE REVIEW + EMPIRICAL 
STUDY 
2. How do perceived sources of trust 
in IJVs change over time? 
EMPIRICAL STUDY 
3. What is trust? LITERATURE REVIEW  
4. What are major sources of trust? 
LITERATURE REVIEW + EMPIRICAL 
STUDY 
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1.4 PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY 
As mentioned in the above section, there is only little known about how trust 
develops in IJVs. A more solid theory on trust development in IJVs is needed, 
based on empirical data. Therefore, the aim of this study is to contribute to a 
theory on trust in IJVs by way of a qualitative, empirical study. In addition, this 
study may be helpful to managers, involved in IJVs. As stated in the above 
section, the main problem in IJVs is shared control. Shared control gives rise to 
transaction costs that would not have occurred when a company could decide on 
its own. Trust makes the relationship between people not only more efficient but 
also more pleasant. This study may be helpful for managers in that it yields 
insight into how trust may be build and sustained in IJVs.  
 To summarise this chapter, Table 1-2 recapitulates the major key terms 
of this chapter. 
Table 1-2. Key concepts of chapter 1 
Key concept Explanation 
International 
Equity Joint 
Ventures 
co-operative relationships between at least two firms that contribute 
resources to a newly formed, legally independent, joint subsidiary. 
They are called international when at least one of the partners is 
headquartered outside the venture‟s country of operation 
Partners the companies that co-operate by way of a joint venture 
Board members 
the delegates of the partner companies who are on the board of 
directors of the joint venture 
Trust 
the expectation that the delegates of the other partner who are on 
the board of directors will act co-operatively 
Development of 
trust 
factors that build and sustain trust and a change in perceived 
foundations of trust 
1.5 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 summarises the IJV literature. It 
shows that trust is an important factor that affects IJV performance. The chapter 
ends with a dynamic framework of trust development, thus indicating which 
factors directly influence trust. Hence, chapter 2 addresses our first subquestion. 
Chapter 3 elaborates on trust and two additional factors that are assumed to 
affect trust. These two variables emerge from the dynamic framework presented 
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in chapter 2. Chapter 3 addresses subquestion 3 and 4. Chapter 4 provides the 
methodology of this research. It elaborates on the case study approach, presents 
the design of this study and discusses the method of analysis. Chapter 5 presents 
the results of this study and provides a background description of our four cases. 
Because of the explorative approach, it again addresses subquestions 1 and 4, in 
addition to question 2. Chapter 6 contains conclusions and recommendations for 
further research. The answers to the subquestions can be found in the following 
sections (see Table 1-3). 
Table 1-3. Subquestions related to the structure of this thesis 
Subquestion Discussed in chapter/section 
1. What is trust? Chapter 3, section 3.1.1 & 3.1.2 
2. What are major sources of trust? 
Chapter 3, section 3.1.3, Chapter 5, 
section 5.3 
3. How can partners in IJVs build 
and sustain trust? 
Chapter 2; chapter 5, section 5.2; 
chapter 6, section 6.2.2.2 & section 
6.5 
4. How do perceived sources of 
trust in IJVs change over time? 
Chapter 5, section 5.3; chapter 6, 
section 6.2.2.1 
 
 
 2  
A REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURE 
LITERATURE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Numerous studies have been conducted on factors affecting IJV performance 
(see e.g. Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Special Issue of JIBS No.5, 1996; 
Beamish and Killing, 1997). These studies give managers an insight into how 
they can improve their joint venture‟s performance. This research is rather 
static. To elevate IJV research to a higher level, researchers have advocated a 
longitudinal approach to IJV research (Hyder and Ghauri, 1991; Parkhe, 1993b; 
Stafford, 1995). This longitudinal approach is important, because some factors 
do not just appear, they have to be build up. Hence, in order to understand how 
factors evolve we have to follow their development over time. 
 In order to initiate a more process oriented research, it is important that 
there is a clear understanding of factors affecting IJV performance. Only in this 
way, longitudinal research can build on former IJV research. However, gaining 
insight into the factors affecting IJV performance has been problematic, 
because, among other reasons, the literature on this subject has been very 
fragmented (Parkhe, 1993b). The use of different performance measures and the 
many variables put forward as affecting performance has not resulted in a 
proportionately greater understanding of IJVs. Therefore, this chapter provides a 
structured survey of the literature on IJVs. It devises a comprehensive review of 
performance indicators in order to come to an overall, synthesising overview of 
the IJV literature. Second, this chapter elaborates on the factors affecting IJV 
performance. This will then be the starting point of our study on trust in IJVs. 
Trust appears to be a central contributing factor to the performance of IJVs. 
Moreover, it shows that especially trust requires a process dimension, because 
trust not just emerges; it takes a long-term effort of partners to develop it. 
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 This chapter is structured as follows. First, it elaborates on the method 
of this qualitative review. Next, it considers the different constructs and 
definitions of IJV performance employed in major contributions to the academic 
literature. Finally, an overview is provided of the variables that affect these 
different performance indicators, and a framework is presented that introduces a 
dynamic component to the investigation of IJVs in which trust plays an 
important role. To integrate the factors found into this framework, three 
paradigms will be used: the resource-based view of the firm (Penrose, 1959; 
Wernerfelt, 1984; Hamel, 1991); the transaction costs approach (Williamson, 
1975, 1985; Hennart, 1988; Kogut, 1988); and economic sociology 
(Granovetter, 1985; Madhok, 1995b).  
2.1 METHOD 
The Online Contents (OLC) database was searched for articles containing the 
keyword „joint ventures‟, in addition to words like „performance‟, „success‟, and 
other relevant words. The OLC database contains about 12,500 scientific and 
popular-scientific articles that are stored in Dutch libraries. Moreover, important 
references in other articles were added to the collection. The articles had to be 
quantitative in order to have generic results, and they should address the 
question of improving performance of IJVs. In the end, I was left with 30 major 
articles on IJVs and their performance that were useful for this study.  
 I first summarised the performance labels and their operationalisations. 
Next, I looked for similarities between these operationalisations. I rearranged 
the operationalisations in such a way that they referred to a same meaning. 
Finally, I labelled this common meaning. For an overview of factors affecting 
performance I collected all factors mentioned in the studied literature. The 
factors that appeared to be similar were grouped together after which I gave 
these factors an overlapping label. Such a method is also proposed by Hunter 
and Schmidt (1990). 
2.2 INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURE PERFORMANCE: A REVIEW 
2.2.1 Performance indicators 
Only a few authors have attempted to devise an appropriate measure of IJV 
performance (Anderson, 1990; Geringer and Herbert, 1991). However, for 
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several reasons these studies do not adequately address the task of presenting an 
accurate measure of IJV performance. Fragmentation in the IJV literature is 
caused by three reasons. First, authors use the same constructs, however they 
operationalise them differently. Take, for example, the construct „success‟. 
While Geringer and Herbert (1991), Blodgett (1992) and Barkema et al., (1997) 
look at the time the joint venture has existed, Beamish (1988), Lee and Beamish 
(1995), Madhok (1995 a&b) and Hamill and Hunt (1993) take a managerial 
perception of success. Thus, although both groups say to investigate „success‟, 
they use different operationalisations. Second, authors use different constructs 
which, on deeper analysis, have the same meaning. For example, while Beamish 
and Banks (1987) define „performance‟ as managerial satisfaction, Inkpen and 
Birkinshaw (1994) call managerial satisfaction „satisfaction‟. Third, some 
authors have used an indicator to measure a (latent) variable (for example, 
longevity as an indicator for the latent variable success), whereas others have 
used the variable itself. More examples can be found in Table 2-1, which 
summarises the literature on IJV performance.  
Table 2-1. Performance measures used in IJV literature  
Performance 
indicators 
Operationalisations used Authors 
continuity 
 the degree of a partner firm‟s expectation of 
continued co-operation in the future 
(longevity)1 
Madhok (1995 a&b), 
Shamdasani and Sheth 
(1995) 
effectiveness 
 meeting initial objectives (effectiveness)  
 perceived performance rating of the joint 
venture management (achievement) 
 overall effectiveness (effectiveness) 
 achievement of goals as specified in the 
documents of incorporation (effectivity) 
Lyles and Baird (1994), 
Zeira, Newburry and 
Yeheskel (1995) 
evolution/ 
dissolution 
 continuance and ending of the co-operative 
relationship (longevity) 
Ring and Van de Ven 
(1994) 
longevity 
 numbers of years the venture persisted 
(longevity) 
Barkema, Shenkar, 
Vermeulen and Bell 
(1997), Parkhe (1991) 
(potential) 
failure 
 foreign general managers consideration 
about closing down the joint venture 
(longevity) 
 age of the joint venture, duration (longevity) 
Pan, Vanhonacker and Pitts 
(1995), Park and Russo 
(1996) 
 
                                                     
1
 the notion between brackets indicates one of the five new categories 
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(Table 2-1 continued) 
Performance 
indicators 
Operationalisations used Authors 
(financial) 
performance 
 managers‟ overall satisfaction with the joint 
venture (achievement) 
 return of investment, 2. return on assets 3. 
domestic sales growth, 4. export growth 
(achievement) 
 managers‟ perception of profitability, pay-
back period, customer service and market 
share (achievement) 
Beamish and Banks 
(1987) Geringer and 
Herbert (1989), Lee and 
Beamish (1995), Luo 
(1995) 
satisfaction 
 foreign partner‟s satisfaction with the IJV 
(achievement)  
 meeting of objectives (effectiveness) 
 the degree of a partner‟s affective evaluation 
of the alliance relationship (achievement) 
Inkpen and Birkinshaw 
(1994), Shamdasani and 
Sheth (1995) 
stability 
 unplanned equity changes or major 
reorganisations (stability) 
 increase in ownership for party which 
contributes technology  (stability) 
 revision of contract (stability) 
 total liquidation (stability) 
 buy-out of one partner by the other (longevity) 
 selling to an outsider (longevity) 
 change in ownership  (stability) 
 liquidation or major changes in equity 
(longevity/stability) 
Beamish and Inkpen 
(1995), Blodgett (1991, 
1992), Franko (1971), 
Gomes-Casseres (1987), 
Madhok (1995a&b), 
Stopford and Wells (1972) 
success 
 managerial assessment of success (satisfaction 
of both sides about performance) 
(achievement) 
 long-term viability (longevity) 
 satisfaction and dyadic sales (achievement) 
 endurance (longevity) 
Beamish (1988), Beamish 
and Banks (1987), Hamill 
and Hunt (1993), Lane 
and Beamish (1990), 
Madhok 1995a &b, Mohr 
and Spekman (1994) , 
Spekman et al. (1996) 
trust 
 a belief that the other person will act sincerely 
in future dealings (quality relationship) 
 the desire to work hard in the future to 
establish a close relationship (quality 
relationship) 
 reliance on the other person in their future 
dealings (quality relationship) 
 the expectation that the future relationship 
with the other person will be good (quality 
relationship) 
 the belief that the future behaviour of the other 
person will be consistent with past behaviour 
(quality relationship) 
Sullivan et al. (1981) 
Buckley and Casson 
(1988) 
Column 1 presents the label that was used by the authors, mentioned in column 
3, column 2 presents the operationalisation of the concept. A rearrangement is 
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given between brackets after the operationalisation. Table 2-1 illustrates that, 
although some overlap is evident, several concepts have been used in the 
literature to measure the performance of an IJV. This indicates that performance 
is seen as an overlapping concept, that is, a latent variable, encompassing 
several indicators. In the following discussion these indicators are classified into 
five groups, referring to the latent variable „performance‟. It may be helpful to 
keep in mind that the labels introduced are deducted from existing literature. 
The words have been chosen in such a way that they, in my view, reflect the 
definitions found best. Due to this, however, a duplication may arise of words 
found and the concepts introduced.  
 The first indicator of performance obtains the label „longevity‟. 
Longevity is a combination of the constructs, that authors have labelled 
„continuity‟, „evolution/dissolution‟, „longevity‟, „failure and the potential for 
failure‟, and some of the definitions of „success‟. Each of these variables is 
linked to the duration of the IJV. Some authors have measured these variables 
using perceptual data on the expected duration of the IJV (obtained, for 
example, from the managers of the IJV or the parent firms) or hard data such as 
the time the IJV has been operational. 
 The second indicator of performance proposed is the „quality of the 
working relationship‟ between the partner firms in an IJV. This indicator 
encompasses the constructs, labelled as „trust‟, „harmony‟, „morale‟ (Anderson, 
1990), and co-operativeness (Deutsch, 1973). Naturally, only perceptual data 
can be used to quantify these indicators. Such interpartner relations may be 
treated as a long-term performance measure (Anderson, 1990).  
 The third indicator of performance is compiled from the constructs of 
„performance‟, and part of the definitions of „satisfaction‟ and „success‟. The 
similarity between these indicators is that they both infer something about the 
business performance of the IJV itself, as perceived by the partner firms or 
derived from hard data. Examples of such hard data may include financial 
indicators such as profitability or return on investment, as well as data on 
technology transfer flows and the productivity of human resources. As our latent 
variable is already labelled as „performance‟, we call this third indicator of 
performance „IJV achievement‟, thus distinguishing it from the latent variable 
„performance‟.  
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 The fourth indicator of performance is „effectiveness‟, which consists of 
the two constructs „effectiveness‟ and „satisfaction‟. This indicator is often 
operationalised by measuring the partners‟ perception of whether or not their 
goals for entering the IJV have been achieved. The advantage of using this 
indicator is that the performance measure is coupled to goals characteristic of a 
particular joint venture. It therefore bypasses the problems inherent in using 
hard data as a measure of IJV performance. For example, profitability may not 
accurately quantify IJV success since firms are motivated to enter into joint 
venture agreements for other reasons, such as learning about the customs of 
other countries (Anderson, 1990) rather than generating short-term profit. When 
such knowledge about a country is obtained, a joint venture may be called 
effective and thus have a high performance, although it may not be profitable.  
 The final indicator incorporated is the often used measure of „stability‟. 
Most authors operationalise this as a change in equity shares. However, 
Blodgett (1992) also uses a change in contract but without a necessary change in 
equity. We include the case of a total buy-out of one partner by the other in our 
first indicator, namely „longevity‟.  
 These five indicators each highlight a different though important 
element of IJV performance. However, there is some overlap in these indicators. 
Consider, for example, the case in which the goal of one of the partners to a 
joint venture is to make a profit, while profit is generated in accordance with 
these expectations. This performance would register both on the indicators 
„effectiveness‟ and „IJV achievement‟. Another overlap may occur with respect 
to „longevity‟ and „quality of the relationship‟: when a manager‟s perception on 
trust is negative, (s)he may also have a negative perception about how long the 
joint venture will last. 
  Notwithstanding this overlap, it is apparent that IJV performance is 
actually multi-dimensional. Consequently, in order to obtain a true 
understanding of IJV performance, researchers must incorporate each of the five 
indicators outlined above. Using just one of the five indicators described may 
not capture the precise circumstances of a particular IJV and therefore the 
overall performance may be evaluated inaccurately. For example, by 
considering just longevity issues such as profitability, trust and the nature of the 
relationship between the partner firms are ignored (Geringer and Herbert, 1989, 
1991; Anderson, 1990; Beamish and Inkpen, 1995). The disadvantage of using 
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the third indicator, „IJV achievement‟ as the sole indicator of performance is the 
short-term character of this measure. 
2.3 FACTORS THAT AFFECT IJV PERFORMANCE  
Having proposed a classification of the various performance indicators found in 
the literature and having considered issues regarding their operationalisation, we 
now turn to the second part of this chapter, which is to categorise the factors 
that are said to affect IJV performance (see Table 2-2). This categorisation is 
based upon models developed by Ariño and De la Torre (1996), Parkhe (1993b), 
and Ring and Van de Ven (1994). The categories identified are the following: 
„partner characteristics‟, „strategies of the partners‟, „need of resources‟, 
„structure of the IJV‟, „behaviour of the parties‟, „dependence‟, „environment of 
the IJV‟ „evaluation‟ and, „trust between the parties‟. In addition, the factors are 
divided into factors with a positive influence and factors with a negative effect 
on the performance of IJVs. 
Table 2-2. Factors significantly affecting IJV performance 
Factor Positive effect Negative effect 
Partner 
charac-
teristics 
 competence of alliance partner 
(Shamdasani and Sheth, 1995); 
 dissimilarity of parent industries 
(Zeira et al., 1995);  
 experience with domestic joint 
ventures (Barkema et al., 1997); 
 experience with International wholly-
owned subsidiaries (Barkema et al., 
1997); 
 growth in experience fit between 
partners (Gomes-Casseres, 1987);  
 longer-term perspective (Madhok, 
1995b) 
 parental differences in Hofstede‟s 
masculinity index (Zeira et al., 1995)  
 politically strong and well-connected 
Chinese partners (Pan et al., 1995); 
 presence of another competing IJV 
between the partners (Park and 
Russo, 1996); 
 prior interaction (Madhok, 1995b); 
 support from top management 
(Spekman et al., 1996) 
 concerns about legal and regulatory 
environment (Pan et al., 1995); 
 concerns about sourcing (Pan et al., 
1995); 
 conflicts between role and interpersonal 
behaviours (Ring and Van de Ven, 
1994); 
 corporate culture differences (Parkhe, 
1991); 
 cultural distance (Barkema et al.; 1997); 
 cultural diversity between the partners 
(Beamish and Inkpen, 1995); 
 differences in partner firms‟ national 
context (Parkhe, 1991); 
 direct competition between the partners 
(Park and Russo, 1996); 
 diversity in the sponsoring firms‟ 
operating characteristics (Parkhe, 
1991); 
 growth in parent firm‟s international 
network (Gomes-Casseres, 1987); 
 knowledge acquisition (Beamish and 
Inkpen, 1995);  
 partner‟s acquisition of new capabilities 
(Gomes-Casseres, 1987) 
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Factor Positive effect Negative effect 
 size differentials (Madhok, 1995b);  
 societal culture differences (Parkhe, 
1991) 
Partner 
Strategy  
 IJV tied to strategic intent of firm 
(Spekman et al., 1996);  
 MNE follows a product 
diversification strategy (Franko, 
1971); 
 shared vision between partners on 
IJV direction (Spekman et al., 1996);  
 strategic compatibility 
(complementary goals, similar 
orientations) (Shamdasani and Sheth, 
1995) 
 strategic fit between partners (Hamill 
and Hunt, 1993)  
 change in strategy (Franko, 1971); 
 divergence in strategic directions 
(Parkhe, 1991); 
 MNE follows a product concentration 
strategy (Franko, 1971); 
 change in structure along geographical 
area lines by one of the partners 
(Stopford and Wells, 1972) 
 
Need of 
re-
sources 
 
 extent of desired partner need (Lee 
and Beamish, 1995); 
 long-term need (Lane and Beamish, 
1990); 
 mutual need (Beamish, 1988; 
Madhok, 1995b);  
 perception of long-term mutual need 
(Beamish and Banks; 1987); 
 recognition of local partner needs 
(Lane and Beamish, 1990) 
 
Struc-
ture 
 
 number of partners in the joint 
venture (Park and Russo, 1996); 
 careful planning out of contract 
(Madhok, 1995b);  
 contracts require binding arbitration 
instead of conferral; when a Japanese 
has to co-operate with an American 
(Sullivan et al., 1981); 
 control-parent strategy fit (Geringer 
and Herbert, 1989); 
 foreign partner control (Killing, 
1983) 
 local control (Lee and Beamish, 
1995);  
 minority or equal share of ownership 
for foreign partner (Lane and 
Beamish, 1990);  
 shared or local management control 
(Beamish and Banks; 1987); 
 size of IJV (Lyles and Baird, 1994) 
 adaptive structure (Luo, 1995);  
 foreign partner control (Beamish; 1988) 
 renegotiations of contracts before 
(Blodgett, 1991); 
 unequal equity shares (Blodgett, 1991)  
 
Beha-
viour 
 
Behaviour of the IJV 
 advertising (Lyles and Baird, 1994); 
 application of HRM practices of the 
 avoidance of conflict (Franko, 1971); 
 centralisation (Franko, 1971); 
 cost cutting (Franko, 1971); 
CHAPTER TWO     19 
 
 
Factor Positive effect Negative effect 
host culture (Zeira et al., 1995);  
 cultivation of good relationships with 
authorities and partners (Hamill and 
Hunt, 1993); 
 employee advantages (Luo, 1995);  
 operation according to clearly stated 
objectives (Zeira et al., 1995); 
 pricing (Lyles and Baird, 1994);  
 product quality (Lyles and Baird, 
1994);  
 R&D intensity (Lyles and Baird, 
1994);  
 sales force expenditure (Lyles and 
Baird, 1994) 
 strong alliance managers (Spekman et 
al., 1996) 
Behaviour between the partners 
 communication quality (Mohr and 
Spekman, 1994);  
 co-operation (Inkpen and Birkinshaw, 
1994);  
 frank and immediate communication 
(Madhok, 1995b);  
 frequent interaction (Madhok, 
1995b);  
 joint problem-solving (Mohr and 
Spekman, 1994);  
 openness (Inkpen and Birkinshaw, 
1994); 
Behaviour of one partner 
 American partner requests mutual 
conferral to resolve disputes rather 
than binding arbitration (Sullivan et 
al., 1981); 
 assistance from the foreign parent 
(Luo, 1995);  
 co-operative attitude of both partners 
(Lane and Beamish, 1990); 
 domestic parent influence (Luo, 
1995);  
 participation (Mohr and Spekman, 
1994) 
 escalating commitments to failing 
transactions (Ring and Van de Ven, 
1994); 
 excessive legal structuring and 
monitoring (Ring and Van de Ven, 
1994); 
 severe resolution techniques (Mohr and 
Spekman, 1994); 
 smoothing over problems (Mohr and 
Spekman, 1994); 
 standardisation of marketing function 
(Franko, 1971) 
 
 
 
 
(Table 2-2 continued) 
Factor Positive effect Negative effect 
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Factor Positive effect Negative effect 
Trust 
 
 commitment (Beamish, 1988; 
Beamish and Banks, 1987; Mohr and 
Spekman, 1994; Shamdasani and 
Sheth, 1995); 
 commitment to international business 
and to working in difficult conditions 
(Lane and Beamish, 1990);  
 commitment towards the IJV (Lane 
and Beamish, 1990);  
 co-ordination (Mohr and Spekman, 
1994);  
 interpersonal ties; which transcend 
the requirements of the business 
(Spekman et al., 1996); 
 personal bonds (Ring and Van de 
Ven, 1994);  
 trust (Madhok, 1995b; Mohr and 
Spekman, 1994; Ring and Van de 
Ven, 1994); 
 trust; embodying a structural part 
(complementary of resources) and 
social glue (Madhok, 1995a) 
 conditions for violation of trust (Ring 
and Van de Ven, 1994) 
 
Depen-
dence 
 non-abuse of power (Hamill and 
Hunt, 1993); 
 IJV dependence on parent company 
resources (Zeira et al., 1995) 
Envi-
ronment 
IJV 
 restrictive investment policy of host 
country (Blodgett, 1991) 
 host government policy (Gomes-
Casseres, 1987) 
Evalua-
tion 
 basis of fair exchange (Lane and 
Beamish, 1990);  
 minority parent satisfaction with 
equity distribution (Zeira et al., 
1995); 
 perception of equity and efficiency 
(Ring and Van de Ven, 1994); 
 satisfaction (Shamdasani and Sheth, 
1995) 
 
 
 The first category, „partner characteristics‟, mainly consists of factors 
derived from the firm characteristics of each partner such as industry, culture, 
size, and learning capabilities. In general, differences in culture between the 
partners (mainly on a country level) are observed to have a negative effect on 
IJV performance. However, when a culture is divided into the several 
dimensions mentioned by Hofstede (1980), differences in masculinity between 
the parent firms positively affect IJV performance. Zeira et al., (1995:15) give 
the following interpretation: 
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one partner should be aggressive [masculine] and competitive and implement 
personnel policies.... . However, the other partner should be more yielding and 
more emotional, emphasising the importance of co-operation, teamwork, job 
security, pleasant human interaction and avoidance of job stress. 
 
Differences in industry are seen to have a similar effect. This is because direct 
competition may lead to conflicts as both partners seek to increase their share in 
similar markets. Another effect is learning when partner firms are in the same 
industry. For example, Park and Russo (1996: 878) state that “learning is 
cumulative, and learning performance is greatest when the object of learning is 
related to what is already known” (see also Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
Learning from a partner via a joint venture is thus more likely to happen when 
the partners are active in the same industry. Furthermore, from a similar 
perspective, learning may influence joint venture performance negatively, in 
particular with respect to „stability‟ and „longevity‟, when the internalisation of 
the resources of one partner make the other partner obsolete (Hamel, 1991). On 
the other hand, it is evident that learning has a positive effect on joint venture 
performance when one of the partners has learned from earlier joint ventures, 
when the partners have had prior interaction or when one of the partners has 
operated in a foreign country by means of a wholly-owned subsidiary.  
 The second category of factors influencing IJV performance focuses on 
the strategies of both partners, in particular, the strategies that prompted the 
search for a partner. Examples of such strategies include product diversification 
strategies and market development strategies (or entering new markets with 
existing products). The strategies of the partners may be different but should be 
complementary, in order for the IJV to be viable. A subsequent change in initial 
strategies of one or more partners may result in less need for the IJV and thus to 
dissolution. However, other effects of incongruous strategies may also occur. 
For instance, a change of strategy may affect the relationship between the 
partners, because when partners change their strategy to a strategy that does not 
correspond to the goal of the joint venture, this may affect the amount of effort 
they put towards the joint venture. This may again negatively affect the other 
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party‟s perception of co-operativeness. Therefore, it is evident that a long-term 
strategic fit between the partners will positively affect IJV performance. 
 A third category proposed is „need for resources‟. Joint ventures are 
created if one partner needs a resource that the other partner holds (Pfeffer and 
Nowak, 1976). Mutual need for resources forms the raison d’être for the joint 
venture (Parkhe, 1991).  
  The fourth category we propose is „structure‟, which refers to all formal 
agreements the partners have made and the structural characteristics of the IJV. 
This category includes the nature of the contract, the formal division of control, 
the share of equity between the partners of the IJV and the structural 
characteristics of the IJV (such as the capitalisation of the venture and the 
number of partners present). Surprisingly, Park and Russo (1996) found a 
positive and unexplainable relationship between the number of partners and the 
performance of the joint venture. In their study of Hungarian joint ventures 
Lyles and Baird (1994) also reported on a surprising result: an adaptive 
structure (i.e. a structure that can change its rules and strategies and is flexible 
and creative) negatively affects joint venture effectiveness. An explanation they 
give for this result is that adaptive structures may be considered as informal and 
creative arrangements that may threaten the former centrally-planned 
institutions, which rely heavily on documentation, and formal procedures. 
Outcomes concerning control are also contradictory. For example, although 
Beamish and Banks (1987) and Lane and Beamish (1990) find that shared or 
local management control systems enhance IJV performance, Killing (1983) 
reports that dominant partner control ventures are more successful.  
 The fifth category of factors that influence joint venture performance 
concerns the „behaviour of the parties and of the management of the joint 
venture‟. This category encompasses all actions carried out by at least one 
partner, or by the management of the joint venture. A group of factors can be 
identified, and divided into factors specific to the joint venture, factors specific 
to the interaction between the parties and factors specific to one partner alone. 
Studies indicate that conflicts have a negative influence on joint venture 
performance. However, with techniques such as joint problem solving, conflicts 
may not necessarily be destabilising to the joint venture, but may instead lead to 
resolutions that are beneficial to all parties involved. Harsh words and 
domination only lead to less satisfaction on the part of one of the partners (Mohr 
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and Spekman, 1994). It is likely that, through frequent and open interaction in 
which frank and immediate communication takes place, performance of a joint 
venture will improve. 
 „Interdependence‟ is another category of factors that influence joint 
venture performance. Dependence comes about through a company needing 
resources held by another firm, but distinguishes itself from this category in that 
need of resources will not lead to dependence directly. We will speak of 
dependence when the resources needed by a company are only available (or best 
available) at one particular company. On starting a new joint venture, firms 
attempt to manage this dependence relationship (Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976). 
Power is closely connected with dependence, as the power of one party resides 
implicitly in the subordination of the other (Ghauri, 1983). In the case of an 
imbalance in dependence, it is probable that non-abuse of power will affect joint 
venture performance positively. 
 Just like normal firms‟ profits partly depend on the „environment‟ in 
which they act, the environment plays also an important role in the performance 
of a joint venture. Examples of influences of the environment may be a 
devaluation of foreign currency, which may affect transferred profits, a shortage 
of raw materials reflected in the purchase price, or a decrease in demand 
through the introduction of an alternative good. All these changes will 
negatively affect profitability, and, therefore, IJV achievement. However, also 
the government may influence IJV performance: in some countries joint 
ventures are subject to specific regulations drawn up by the government (Aulin, 
1990). For example, it has long been the case in Russia that foreign companies 
were not allowed to have a majority of equity in IJVs (Boersma, 1995). 
 „Evaluation‟ entails the partners‟ satisfaction regarding joint venture 
performance, based upon both equity and efficiency (Ring and Van de Ven, 
1994). Although efficiency has been the major criterion underlying the 
assessment of performance, fair dealing is seen as an equally important 
criterion. Ring and Van de Ven (1994: 93) assume that “the parties to a co-
operative IOR [interorganisational relationships] are motivated to seek both 
equity and efficiency outcomes because of a desire to preserve a reputation of 
fair dealing that will enable them to continue to exchange transaction-specific 
investments under conditions of high uncertainty”. Evaluation, based on both 
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equity and efficiency, is an important factor that has been included in our model 
because both perspectives will influence managers‟ perceived outcome of the 
joint venture relationship. For instance, different viewpoints about fairness may 
influence the way managers perceive the quality of the relationship or whether 
profits are divided equitably. 
 The final factor that is discussed in this chapter, is „trust‟. Trust is 
defined as the expectation that the delegates of the other partner who are on the 
board of directors will behave co-operatively. Following Sako (1992), such 
behaviour can be divided into keeping promises, performing the role as 
competently as possible, and “open commitment to each other” (ibid., p. 38). 
Commitment in this sense refers to the willingness to do more than is formally 
expected, and matches the operationalisation of commitment used by Beamish 
(1988). As has already been discussed in the introduction, trust plays an 
important role in the reduction of transactions costs, thereby improving 
performance (Buckley and Casson, 1988; Jarillo, 1988; Gulati, 1995; Cummings 
and Bromiley, 1996). Transaction costs occur because the transacting partner 
may behave opportunistically (Williamson, 1975, 1985). In order to protect 
against such behaviour, companies look for reliable partners, negotiate, write 
contracts, and monitor the other party‟s behaviour. However, when there is trust, 
the perceived chance that the other party will behave opportunistically 
decreases. Williamson (1985) states that when the risk of opportunism is 
eliminated, promises can replace the function of contracts. In other words, a 
perception of trust reduces contracting costs. 
  Transaction costs economics (TCE) is, however, rather static because it 
neglects changes in perception of opportunism (Nooteboom, 1996) and, thus, 
ignores the role of trust. Studies, especially from sociology, the IMP group 
(Håkanson, 1982) and economic sociology (Granovetter and Swedberg, 1992; 
Uzzi, 1997) state that trust plays an important role or is even essential to the 
formation and preservation of economic ties between firms. For instance, Uzzi 
(1997: 43) found that in embedded ties that include trust, “there was an absence 
of monitoring devices designed to catch a thief”. He also found that information 
needed to assess the other party‟s trustworthiness (i.e. to find out whether the 
other party will behave opportunistically) was not systematically compiled. In 
other words, no special time and energy was devoted to evaluate the other‟s 
trustworthiness, which reduced ex ante transaction costs. Zand (1992) shows 
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that when trust is absent, managerial problem-solving effectiveness is much 
lower than when trust is present. Hence, trust reduces ex post costs of 
renegotiations and conferral. Corazzini (1977) states that trust is very much 
related to the effectiveness and efficiency of group processes, which also saves 
ex post costs. In addition, trust facilitates open and honest interaction (Buckley 
and Casson, 1988), thereby affecting the quality of the relationship. Nooteboom 
(1996) is another scholar who has made important contributions to a theory on 
trust in interorganisational relationships. He also stresses that in addition to an 
economic dimension (extrinsic utility), exchange often has a social dimension 
(intrinsic utility). In his view, transaction cost economics has largely neglected 
this latter dimension.  As he states: “People may prefer to transact on the basis 
of trust and its concomitants of ethics, kinship, friendship or empathy” (ibid., p. 
992). He also believes that these ethics and friendship may motivate actors to 
behave trustworthy, which goes “beyond material interest in the form of 
maintaining a reputation as a basis for future material benefit” (ibid., p. 993). 
Therefore, he distinguishes between a wide and a narrow concept of trust. “The 
wide concepts includes all sources of trust, … the narrow concept would go 
beyond self-interest” (Nooteboom, 1998: 8). 
 Summarising, trust has been recognised as an important feature 
(whether essential or complementary) in interorganisational relationships. 
Moreover, it is argued that when trust is present all other factors that contribute 
to IJV performance, except for mutual need and the environment, become less 
important. For example, Ring and Van de Ven (1994) state that excessive legal 
structuring and monitoring will negatively affect a joint venture‟s performance. 
Trust may change such behaviour. Likewise, trust may take away suspicion due 
to differences in partner characteristics. 
2.4 TOWARDS A DYNAMIC FRAMEWORK OF TRUST DEVELOPMENT 
The former section concludes with the finding that trust plays an essential role 
in IJVs. It is, therefore, important that partners acquire this feature. However, 
trust is not a property that can be deployed at any moment of time, parties have 
to make a long-term effort to develop it. The question of how partners in IJVs 
can develop trust requires a longitudinal approach. This is exactly the 
perspective that lacks in most of the IJV studies (Hyder and Ghauri, 1991; 
Parkhe, 1993b; Stafford, 1995). In order to build time in IJV research, and thus 
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to understand how trust develops in IJVs, this section places the nine factors 
found into a conceptual dynamic framework. This process is started by 
incorporating a dynamic element into this study. Integrating three paradigms –
namely the resource-based view of the firm (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; 
Hamel, 1991), the transaction costs approach (Williamson, 1975, 1985; Hennart, 
1988; Kogut, 1988) and economic sociology (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997)– 
will enhance our understanding about the development of trust within IJVs 
through time. The integration of these three paradigms is also proposed by De 
Jong (1999). This model is presented in Figure 2-1. 
Figure 2-1. A conceptual model of trust development in IJVs 
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This model suggest that a firm‟s strategy leads to a need for resources. From a 
resource-based perspective, a company is considered as a unique bundle of 
resources. When implementing such strategies, these resources may sometimes 
lack. For example, when a firm wants to expand internationally, it may lack the 
experience of operating in a foreign country, or more specific, of operating in 
that particular country. Building up this experience is possible, although this 
will be a gradual, time-consuming process. In addition, the firm may lack the 
time and money to invest in these extra capabilities (e.g. due to first mover 
advantages or turbulent environments). In such cases, co-operating or merging 
with another firm that possesses this unique combination of resources the firm 
itself lacks may be an option (Kogut, 1988). Hence, the resource-based view 
seems particularly relevant in explaining why firms enter an alliance such as an 
IJV rather than developing the resources themselves. This view also helps to 
explain why joint ventures may be dissolved at a certain time – for example, 
when one of the partners has obtained the resources of the other partner or when 
one of the partners has altered its strategy and no longer requires the resources 
for which the IJV was established. 
 Why firms may choose an equity joint venture can, however, not be 
explained by the resource-based approach, as this approach only points out why 
firms start to co-operate, but not why they choose a certain mode or structure. 
Transaction costs economics (TCE) may be of help here. In general, TCE 
explains why firms choose for market transactions or hierarchy. IJVs may be 
viewed as an intermediate or hybrid form of organisations (Lorange and Roos, 
1992; Lu and Björkman, 1997); however, they are closer to a hierarchy than a 
market while non-equity joint ventures are closer to a market structure than to a 
hierarchy (Powell, 1990). Hennart (1988) and Kogut (1988) have used TCE to 
explain why some firms choose an equity joint venture while others favour a 
contractual, non-equity joint venture (including license agreements, distribution 
and supply agreements, and other kinds of contracts). The basic question from a 
TCE perspective is why hierarchical control is preferred over transactions via 
spot markets. To answer this question, standard reasoning of TCE can be used: 
when the costs of producing a resource internally are less than the transaction 
costs of buying this resource on the market, a hierarchy (and thus an IJV) will 
be chosen, whereas in the opposite situation (production costs are higher than 
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transaction costs), the resource will be obtained on the market. Another 
argument for internalising a resource instead of transferring it via the market is 
the tacitness of the resource, as “this intangible know-how typically needs 
ongoing, future co-operation from the seller to obtain the full benefit of the 
know-how purchased, since all of the learning and experience of the developer 
of know-how cannot be captured in the codified descriptions, drawings, and data 
that are amenable to physical transfer” (Teece, 1981: 90). This tacit part of 
technology is more efficiently transferred if the transferor and the recipient are 
linked through common ownership (Hennart, 1988). 
 The selected structure (the extent of the hierarchy and the formal 
agreements), together with partner characteristics and dependence, in time leads 
to a particular behaviour on the part of both partner firms and the management 
team of the equity joint venture (Zand, 1972). Both behaviour and 
interdependence affect trust. By including Economic Sociology (ES), „social 
embeddedness‟ of economic relationships can be incorporated (Granovetter, 
1985). ES tries to explain economic action by including a sociological 
perspective (Granovetter and Swedberg, 1992). By including the social aspect of 
human actors, latitude is created to explain economic human behaviour from a 
sociological perspective, thus giving leeway to the concept of trust (Madhok, 
1995b). The behaviour (which, from an ES perspective is not driven by material 
gain only) of the parties involved leads to a certain performance on the part of 
the IJV, which in time is evaluated in terms of efficiency and equity (Ring and 
Van de Ven, 1994). Equity may also be considered as a concept from ES. 
Evaluation may take place jointly or individually. Naturally, evaluation may be 
both negative and positive. If the evaluation is negative (for example, when one 
of the parties or more is dissatisfied with the performance), several outcomes 
are possible. First, one of the partners or more may decide to change their 
strategy and leave the IJV. Second, both partners may decide to change the 
structure of the IJV. Third, one of the partners, or the management team of the 
IJV may decide to modify their behaviour. If the evaluation is positive, the 
partners and the management of the IJV may decide to maintain a status quo, 
but they may also change their behaviour in order to improve performance. 
During these iterative cycles of interaction, trust may develop or may be 
destroyed. This model, presented in Figure 2-1, suggests that behaviour and 
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interdependence directly affect trust. For this reason, these two variables will be 
dealt with in more detail in chapter 3. 
2.5 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has provided a structured overview of the literature on joint 
ventures. It has shown that the literature is very fragmented, which obscures the 
overview. This chapter has shown that IJV performance is a multi-dimensional 
concept that includes five indicators. The factors that influence IJV performance 
can be classified into nine main categories. The chapter has shown that the most 
important factor affecting IJV performance is trust. It was found that trust plays 
an important role in the reduction of transaction costs, and hence contributes to 
the performance of the IJV. Moreover, it can be argued that when trust is 
present, all other factors become less important, except for interdependence, 
mutual need and the environment. The first two factors –interdependence and 
mutual need– form the raison d’être of the joint venture, the latter –the 
environment– is beyond the control of the partners. In other words, when trust is 
present, partners will find ways to work out difficulties that may arise from 
differences in partner characteristics, diverging strategies, and structural 
configurations. Trust will also facilitate co-operative behaviour and positive 
evaluations. Therefore, it is worthwhile to focus on trust in IJVs, because it is a 
factor that overrules all other factors.  
 However, trust is not a factor that can be deployed at any moment of 
time; it requires a long-term effort of parties to develop it. About how parties 
can develop this feature only little is known. This is due to a rather static 
approach to IJV research. Therefore, some researchers propose a more 
longitudinal approach (Hyder and Ghauri, 1991; Parkhe, 1993b; Stafford, 1995). 
In order to include a time perspective in IJV research, this chapter is concluded 
with the presentation of a dynamic framework of trust development in IJVs. 
This model suggests that interdependence and behaviour are two variables that 
directly influence trust. Hence, to understand how trust develops, 
interdependence and behaviour need to be included in this study. Together with 
trust these two factors will be defined in chapter 3. Table 2-3 summarises the 
major key concepts of this chapter.  
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Table 2-3. Key concepts of chapter 2 
Key concepts Explanation 
Performance of 
an international 
joint venture 
a latent variable which can be measured by five dimensions, namely: 
 longevity: (expected) duration of the joint venture; 
 quality of the relationship: perceptions about trust and co-
operativeness; 
 effectiveness: extent to which set goals are or will be achieved; 
 achievement: financial performance of the joint venture; 
 stability: changes in equity and/or the contract 
Factors affecting 
performance 
nine main variables which positively or negatively affect IJV 
performance, namely: 
 partner characteristics: distinguishing features of the partner 
companies, like culture and size; 
 partner strategy: the strategic direction of the partner; 
 need of resources: the extent to which the partners need each 
other‟s resources; 
 structure: key characteristics of the joint venture; 
 behaviour: conduct of the partners or of the MIJV; 
 trust: the expectation that the delegates of the other partner who 
are on the board of directors will behave co-operatively; 
 interdependence: the extent to which the partners need each 
other‟s resources and the number of alternatives available; 
 environment: factors that are outside the direct influence of the 
joint venture, such as earth quakes and currency devaluation; 
 evaluation: partner‟s appreciation of IJV performance based on 
both equity and efficiency 
 
 3  
MODEL FOR ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The previous chapter indicated that trust plays an important role in IJV 
relationships. With trust being so essential in IJV relationships, building and 
sustaining trust becomes a main activity for partners in IJV relationships. How 
trust develops is the main question of this thesis. To build on former research, 
chapter 2 presented a conceptual dynamic framework of trust development in 
IJVs. This conceptual model suggests that interdependence and behaviour 
directly influence trust. Hence, to understand how trust develops, we need to 
include interdependence and behaviour in this study, because changes in trust 
may come about through changes in interdependence and behaviour. In addition, 
focusing on the interaction between these three variables helps to study the 
development of trust in-depth. Therefore, this chapter concentrates on the three 
variables of trust, interdependence and behaviour. Figure 3-1 presents this 
focus. 
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Figure 3-1. A conceptual model of trust development in IJVs: the focus of this 
study 
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This chapter starts by defining trust and elaborates on sources of trust. Next, it 
defines interdependence and behaviour. The chapter concludes with evidence 
from literature about the relationships between these three variables. 
3.1 TRUST 
Trust has been looked upon as a vague and elusive concept. Porter et al., (in: 
Klein Woolthuis, 1996: 6) formulate this very clearly:  
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Trust... tends to be somewhat like a combination of the weather and motherhood; 
it is widely talked about, and it is widely assumed to be good (for organisations). 
When it comes to specifying just what it means, in an organisational context, 
however, vagueness creeps in. 
 
Defining trust leads to some difficulty. The first discussion is about whether 
trust is a subset of risk taking (Corazzini, 1977; Gill and Butler, 1996; 
Luhmann, 1988) or has a moral undertone (Hosmer, 1995; Craswell, 1993). This 
discussion focuses on trust explaining particular behaviour. For example, “X 
loaned some money to Y. What might explain X‟s behaviour?” (Craswell, 1993: 
487). Deutsch (1962) argues that it would only be a matter of trust when the 
expected loss was greater than the expected gain, while otherwise “trust would 
be a matter of simple economic rationality” (Hosmer, 1995: 381). This is in line 
with Williamson (1993) who states that actors who take an apparent leap of 
faith, most of the time act in line with their calculated self-interest. He argues 
that trust is not the right word to use in such cases. In his opinion, trust should 
be reserved for family and other close relationships. Craswell (1993), however, 
also recognises instances in which persons take leaps of faith because they trust 
the other party. Thereby, he acknowledges that actors do not always act on the 
basis of calculative reasons although this may seem to be the case. 
 Second, trust may be a variable that has to be explained. For example, 
“X trusted Y and, therefore, X loaned some money to Y. What explains X‟s 
trust?” Discussions in this context focus on whether trust is trust when there is a 
belief in the other party acting trustworthy for other than moral reasons (Hardin, 
1990; Nooteboom, 1998). For example, when we know it is in the other party‟s 
interest to behave trustworthy, the question arises whether or not trust is the 
right word. Nooteboom (1998) argues that trust based on non-egotistic sources 
corresponds more closely to common sense intuitions of trust: “it is proposed 
that you „really‟ trust someone when you are willing to forego guarantees on the 
basis of coercion or self-interest” (ibid., p. 8). Related to this are debates about 
trust and whether or not trust is similar to a belief, confidence, faith, hope or 
expectation (cf. Rempel et al., 1985, Luhmann, 1988). 
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 Third, definitions differ in their focus. Some definitions only emphasise 
(the absence of) negative behaviour of mankind (e.g. Nooteboom, 1996), 
including cheating, while others focus on more positive conduct, such as doing 
more than is expected (e.g. Sako, 1992). 
 Although a conceptual, interpretative debate about trust is interesting 
and necessary in order to come to a acceptable definition of trust
1
, it is not 
within the scope of this chapter to elaborate on this discussion in more detail. It 
is, however, not my intention to pass over this debate. The case studies that are 
presented in this thesis may shed a new light on trust, which may help us to 
reach more agreement about a definition in the near future. For the moment, 
trust will defined as the expectation that the delegates of the other partner who 
are on the board of directors will behave co-operatively. This chapter will 
elaborate on three aspects of trust. The following section (3.1.1) will deal with 
trust as an expectation or, put differently, a perception. Section 3.1.2 will 
discuss the various dimensions of trust. Section 3.1.3 deals with trust and the 
perception on the motives for the other party to behave co-operatively. 
3.1.1 Trust and perception 
Perception comes from the Latin word percéptio, related to the word per-
cápere, which literally means „to take in‟. In other words, perception refers to 
the absorption or assimilation of an environment that consists of objects and 
happenings. Considering this definition, it can be concluded that perceptions are 
blank. In fact, it is data that reach us through our five senses without any 
judgement. Hence, perceiving can be compared to the way in which children 
absorb their environment: they see, hear, taste, touch, and smell without 
recognising and labelling their environment. As adults, most will have lost this 
open and clear mind. Through experiences, adults gradually learnt to see 
situations and objects in a certain way, and lost the ability to really perceive, 
(i.e. sensing without presupposed expectations and judgements).  
 Examining definitions of trust, it can concluded that trust is one of those 
expectations that changes our perception from an open to a specific one. Hosmer 
(1995) comes to the conclusion that in most definitions “trust is generally 
                                                     
1
 Hosmer (1995) has written an excellent article, including an overview of 
literature on trust and an attempt to come to a synthesizing definition. 
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expressed as an optimistic expectation on the part of an individual about the 
outcome of an event or the behaviour of a person” (ibid., p. 390). And: “it is the 
expectation of generous or helpful, or, at the very least, non-harmful behaviour 
on the part of trusted person, group, or firm” (ibid., p. 392). Thus, trust changes 
our blank perception into a positive one: we expect the outcome of an event or 
the behaviour of a person to be positive rather than have no expectation or a 
negative one. Following from this, it can be stated that trust is a construction of 
the mind, since it does not change an unfolding situation in itself, but only the 
perception of an individual of this situation. Therefore, “trust can vary between 
individuals, even in otherwise identical conditions” (Nooteboom, Berger and 
Noorderhaven, 1995: 3).  
3.1.2 Trust in co-operative behaviour 
Hosmer (1995), who compiled definitions by other researchers, characterises 
trust as a positive expectation about the outcome of an event or the behaviour of 
a person. Because this thesis focuses on trust between partners within IJVs, we 
will focus on the latter part of Hosmer‟s definition, that is, the behaviour of 
persons. While behaviour has many dimensions, trust in this behaviour needs to 
be demarcated, since otherwise the concept remains too vague and too broad. In 
this, we follow Sako (1992) because of her clear distinction between different 
dimensions of trust in interfirm relationships. The three dimensions she 
distinguishes are contractual-based trust (later renamed by Butler and Gill 
(1996) into promissory-based trust), competence-based trust
2
 and goodwill-
based trust. 
 Promissory-based trust occurs due to explicit written or oral agreements 
partners make during the joint venture relationship. When making such 
agreements, it should be possible to rely on a party to stick to this agreement. 
Agreements may vary in scope. For example, contracts may be regarded as a 
promise with a large scope, while agreements made during a chat down the 
corridor may be regarded as agreements with a small scope. This study will take 
into account all kind of agreements that are made, both large and small in scope. 
                                                     
2
 Ganesan (1994) combines both promissory-based trust and competence-based 
trust in the label „credibility‟. 
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Promissory-based trust will be defined as follows: „the expectation that a party 
can be relied upon to keep a verbal or written promise‟. 
 The second dimension of trust is competence-based trust. It refers to 
„the expectation that a party will perform its role competently‟. The role of the 
partner will often be related to the contribution of the partner in the joint 
venture. For example, a company may be chosen as a joint venture partner 
because it has a network of consumers who will buy the joint venture‟s 
products. In such a case, its role may consist of maintaining this client base. 
Especially when parties cannot comprehend the expertise of the other party, 
performance of the other may be controlled by trust (Barber, 1983: 15). 
 The third dimension Sako (1992) mentions is goodwill-based trust
3
. 
“The key to understanding goodwill-based trust is that there are no explicit 
promises which are expected to be fulfilled, as in the case of contractual trust, 
nor fixed professional standards to be reached, as in the case of competence 
trust” (Sako, 1992: 39). Comparing Sako‟s definition of goodwill-based trust 
with others (Barber, 1983; Hosmer, 1995; Nooteboom, 1996), it may be noticed 
that Sako‟s definition does not allow for a belief in absence of negative actions 
of the partner. Therefore, this thesis applies a broader definition of goodwill-
based trust and, hence, refers to “the expectation that the other party will take 
care of the interests of ego (Hosmer, 1995) and may be willing to do more than 
is formally expected” (Sako, 1992). Taking care of the interest of the other party 
may entail that a party will engage in actions which benefit the other or refrains 
from actions which will work at the disadvantage or will damage the interests of 
the other party (Butler and Gill, 1996: 4). 
 The question arises of what is a promise, what is competent, and what is 
taking care and doing more than that is expected. People within IJV 
relationships may have different norms concerning these issues. For instance, a 
person may regard an agreement following from a chat down the corridor as a 
promise, whereas others will regard the words of someone else as meaningless, 
unless they are written down. In order to avoid confusion, this thesis takes the 
norm set by the person who trusts as the starting point. This refers back to our 
                                                     
3
 Other labels for this type of trust are, amongst others, character-based trust 
(Gabarro, 1978), behavioral trust (Nooteboom, 1996) and benevolence 
(Ganesan, 1994). 
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statement in section 3.1.1 that trust is a construction of the mind. Table 3-2 on p. 
46 summarises this definition of trust. 
3.1.3 Major sources of trust 
Section 3.1 discussed the main problems associated with defining trust. One of 
the arguments about trust is whether trust is really trust when the person who 
trusts believes the other will act co-operatively for other than moral reasons 
(Hardin, 1990; Hosmer, 1995). Most authors ignore this discussion, including 
every motive of the other to behave co-operatively. For example, when X 
believes Y will keep her promise, it may be that X trusts Y because X thinks Y 
has a clear self-interest in keeping her promise. Can we really call this trust? In 
other words, we need an insight into the drives behind people‟s co-operative 
behaviour, while determinants of co-operative behaviour may also be seen as 
sources of trust. Nooteboom‟s (1996, 1998) definition of trust inspired me to 
classify the drives behind co-operative behaviour into three groups. His 
definition of (goodwill-based) trust is the following (Nooteboom, 1996: 993): 
X trusts Y to the extent that X chooses to co-operate with Y on the basis of a 
subjective probability that Y will choose not to employ opportunities for defection 
that X considers damaging, even if it is in the interest of Y to do so. The 
trustworthiness of Y depends on Y‟s true propensity to employ those 
opportunities. 
 
Thus, Nooteboom speaks of trust when Y has a self-interest to defect, when Y 
has opportunities to defect, but has no propensity to use these opportunities to 
satisfy her self-interest. The propensity to behave untrustworthy is restricted by 
two main factors, namely, 1) ethics, norms/values, bonds of kinship or 
friendship and emotions; 2) the parties‟ self-interest in the relationship. Whereas 
the latter is egotistic, the former is related to the other party‟s interest, and is 
based on emotions. Hence, three main motives explain parties co-operative 
behaviour: a) they have no opportunity to do otherwise (Deutsch, 1962); b) it is 
in their own self-interest; c) it is in the other party‟s interest. Combinations of 
these three main motives of behaviour are also possible; they are visualised in 
Table 3-1. 
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Table 3-1. Combinations of motives for behaviour and their outcome 
No 
opportunity 
Self-
interest 
Partner’s 
interest 
Outcome 
+ - - Neutrality 
- + - Advantage/ Possible opportunism 
- - + 
Possible altruism/ ethics, norms and 
values 
- - - Satisfaction/ Mutual forbearance 
+ + - Incapacity 
+ - + Incapacity 
- + + Joint gain 
+ + + Incapacity 
Source: based on Nooteboom (1996) 
 
Incapacity (rows 5, 6, and 8) occurs when X has no opportunity to behave co-
operatively, although such conduct would benefit X (row 5), or Y (row 6), or 
both (row 8). Neutrality appears when there is no opportunity to be taken, where 
neither party has the interest to behave differently. It is a status quo at that 
particular moment. Satisfaction, on the other hand, is a situation in which an 
opportunity arises to change things, but where both partners have no interest to 
take that opportunity. It is also the mutual forbearance situation described by 
Buckley and Casson (1988). Mutual forbearance occurs when both parties are 
vulnerable to actions carried out by the other party and are taking into account 
the longer term. Hence, although the opportunity to be taken may satisfy X‟s 
self-interest in the short-term, her action will be unfavourable in the longer term. 
Advantage/opportunism occurs when the opportunity to be taken will benefit X 
but not Y or will even harm Y. The opposite situation is that of altruism/ ethics, 
norms and values, which arises when an opportunity for X is not beneficial for 
X but for Y. Joint gain is the ideal situation, because of the win-win situation 
for both parties. This is the situation where an opportunity arises which, if 
taken, will benefit both parties.  
 In this thesis, trust refers to trust in co-operative behaviour. Hence, X 
may trust Y to behave co-operatively because X believes that:  a. Y has no 
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opportunity to behave differently; b. Y has a self-interest to behave in such a 
way or has no self-interest to behave differently; c. Y takes care of X‟s interest, 
because of emotions. Trust based on perceived self-interest and/or emotions 
corresponds with Nooteboom‟s (1998) wide concept of trust, whereas a narrow 
concept of trust goes beyond self-interest and is based on emotions. 
3.2 THE TWO VARIABLES AFFECTING TRUST 
Figure 3-1 indicates that trust may be affected by two other variables: behaviour 
and interdependence. Together with trust they form the scope of this study. This 
section defines these two variables. 
3.2.1 Behaviour 
In section 3.1.2 it was explained that the definition of trust contains a 
behavioural element (Cummings and Bromiley, 1996). Therefore, this definition 
presents indications for defining behaviour, since we can use similar 
dimensions. Thus, members of the Board of Directors of the IJV behave co-
operatively when they keep their word (promissory-based behaviour), when they 
execute their role as competently as possible (competence-based behaviour) and 
when they take care of the other party‟s interest and may be willing do more for 
the joint venture than is formally expected (goodwill-based behaviour). On the 
other hand, people may behave competitively (Deutsch, 1962). In this thesis this 
is the case when parties do not keep their word, when they do not perform their 
role as competently as possible, or when they do not take care of the other 
party‟s interests or do not more than what is formally expected of them.  
3.2.2 Interdependence 
International joint ventures are created because the partner holds particular 
resources the focal firm needs. This need for and control over particular 
resources indicates a dependence relationship from the focal firm on the partner. 
IJVs are, usually, characterised by mutual interdependence: both partners need 
the other partner‟s resources. Hence, interdependence forms the economic 
justification for the existence of joint ventures (Parkhe, 1991). Furthermore, 
firms form joint ventures to manage this interorganisational interdependence: 
“in order to manage resource interdependence with other organisations, linkages 
are used to stabilise exchange relationships” (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978: 157). 
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Being dependent, however, requires something else: the partner must control 
resources that are unique or of a higher value than similar resources that are 
held by other firms. Nooteboom (1996) calls this the relative value of the 
partner
4. „Relative‟ indicates that other firms hold similar resources, but that the 
partner‟s resources are valued higher than these alternatives. If not, the focal 
firm could obtain the resources elsewhere, which would make it independent of 
its partner. Uniqueness of resources may apply to one or more resources. For 
example, several firms may control one particular resource, but additional 
resources can make this company more attractive than other firms. The more 
unique the (bundle of) resources and the more the partner needs these resources 
(i.e. the more important these resources are), the more dependent this company 
will be on its partner, and therefore on the joint venture. 
3.3 EVIDENCE FROM THE LITERATURE ABOUT THE RELATION BETWEEN 
THE THREE VARIABLES 
This section provides more theoretical and empirical evidence for the 
presupposed relationships between trust, behaviour and interdependence. Each 
of the following sections will deal with two of the three variables.  
3.3.1 Trust and behaviour 
Empirical evidence on the relationship between trust and behaviour comes from 
several studies. Anderson and Weitz (1989) and Good (1988) found that the 
extent of two-way communications (extensive and intensive communications 
between the two parties) increases the level of trust within this relationship. On 
the other hand, the more trust, the greater the extent of this two-way 
communication. Madhok (1995b) found that interaction facilitates trust and 
commitment within IJVs. This is in line with Zucker‟s study (1985), which 
presents three modes of trust production, process-based trust being one of these. 
Also Blau (1992) and Gabarro (1978) identify this mode. Process-based trust is 
“tied to past or expected exchange such as in reputation or gift-exchange” 
(Zucker, 1986: 60). In such past exchange, parties have been able to show their 
trustworthiness through co-operative behaviour. For example, both reputation 
and gift-exchange are manifestations of behaviour. Concerning gift-exchange, 
                                                     
4
 Switching costs also contribute to interdependence. This thesis leaves this 
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reciprocity plays an important role (Blau, 1992). Reciprocity requires trust, in 
that the person who has done another person a favour, may expect something in 
return, yet when and what is not stipulated in advance. This type of exchange 
requires one actor to take the first step. Therefore, such exchange relations 
“evolve in a slow process, starting with minor transactions in which little trust is 
required because little risk is involved” (Blau, 1992: 94). Zand (1972) 
investigated the interaction of trust with information flow, influence, and 
control. He found that when a group was told to expect untrustworthy behaviour 
from the other group, managerial problem-solving effectiveness was much lower 
than when a group was told to trust the other group. Distrust frustrated the belief 
that the other party would act sincerely; therefore, a lot of discussion took place 
to find out the hidden agenda of the other group. Sullivan et al., (1981) 
investigated whether the manner in which conflicts were resolved influenced the 
level of future mutual trust in Japanese-American joint ventures in Japan. They 
distinguished two modes of conflict resolution, namely, mutual conferral and 
arbitration. They found that Japanese partners perceive a high level of trust 
when conflicts are resolved trough mutual conferral, albeit, only when the 
person in charge of operations was non-American. If American, arbitration was 
the preferred mode. 
 Particular behaviour, though, may also lead to trust. Ganesan (1994), 
Williamson (1985) and Gundlach and Cadotte, 1994) found that making 
transaction-specific investments (also called credible commitments or pledges) 
signals the intentions and expectations of the firm regarding the quality of the 
relationship, thus increasing trust.
 
Finally, Ring (1993) made a distinction 
between fragile and resilient trust. He suggests that over time repeated 
successful transactions based on fragile trust will enable trust relationships 
between economic actors to evolve to resilient trust. However, resilient trust 
may facilitate information sharing during negotiations and frequent exchanges 
of tacit know-how in networks. 
 In sum, we can say that trust facilitates, amongst other things, open and 
direct communication, more effective problem-solving, informal conflict 
resolution (which are all manifestations of behaviour), and that trust may come 
about through repeated, successful prior interaction. 
                                                                                                                                   
factor out of consideration. 
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3.3.2 Interdependence and trust 
Gill and Butler (1996) found that the pattern of interdependencies affects the 
development of trust between the partners in joint venture relationships. Within 
sequential interdependence relationships (i.e. the output of partner A is the input 
for partner B) both partners may be competitive, which reduces the degree of 
trust between the partners. On the other hand, they found that in pooled 
interdependence relationships direct competition is less likely, which may 
stimulate the development of trust. Kumar, Scheer and Steenkamp (1994) found 
that when dependence asymmetry increases, trust and commitment between 
partners in channel relationships decreases: “as asymmetry increases, the more 
powerful firm has no need to be trusting or committed, as it can use its relative 
power to obtain co-operation” (ibid., p. 5). This imbalance of power affects the 
less powerful party. For example, Anderson and Weitz (1989: 315) indicated 
that “when one party possesses inordinate leverage over the other party, the 
weaker party becomes mistrustful”, (i.e. they will be afraid that the stronger 
party will take advantage of their dependence). On the other hand, increasing 
total dependence enhances trust and commitment, as both partners are likely to 
strive to build and strengthen the relationship given the relatively high exit 
barriers (Kumar et al., 1994: 5). They conclude that in case of asymmetry of 
interdependence, increasing the less dependent party‟s dependence is a better 
option than decreasing one‟s own dependence. In the latter case total mutual 
dependence decreases, reducing relational cohesion (i.e. trust and commitment). 
 In sum, it can concluded that sequential and asymmetric dependence 
may lessen the degree of trust, whereas pooled, symmetric and high-magnitude 
(the sum of dependence) interdependence increases the amount of trust. 
3.3.3 Interdependence and behaviour 
In a situation where both partners are (highly) dependent on the joint venture 
relationship, it is more likely that neither firm will cheat, since they both are 
equally vulnerable. “A party is vulnerable if some course of action that might be 
chosen by another party would significantly reduce its welfare” (Buckley and 
Casson, 1988: 35). Any action against one of the partners may stimulate an 
adverse response, and may thus reduce their own welfare. This gives both 
partners the incentive to forbear on a reciprocal basis. Gundlach and Cadotte 
(1994) come to a similar conclusion: “Each party‟s possession of power, 
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coupled with benefits obtained from the relationship, fosters an atmosphere of 
co-operation and curbs the potential for conflict” (ibid., p. 517). In addition, 
higher total dependence on the other party may also affect people behaving 
trustworthy because of affective reasons (Geyskens et al., 1996: 306): 
“increasing total interdependence demonstrates to a channel member that efforts 
to maintain the relationship are reciprocated by its partner”, which may increase 
the willingness to continue the relationship because of loyalty and a sense of 
belonging. Gundlach and Cadotte (1994) found that when joint dependence 
increases, parties will use non-coercive strategies, such as rewards, promises 
and information persuasion, earlier than coercive strategies (such as threats, 
demands, and negative normative strategies). In case of asymmetry in 
dependence, the company with the most bargaining power can use this power to 
influence the behaviour of the other party. “The more power an organisation 
has, the more influence it has to determine the nature of the inter-organisational 
exchange; that is, to determine the form of the interaction and the ratio of 
exchange” (Cook, 1977: 66). Whether or not a company will transform this 
power into coercive rather than noncoercive actions to attain its goals remains 
the question. Williamson (1975) has argued that when interdependence is 
asymmetric, the more powerful party will often use ideology as a unifying and 
co-operation-inducing force. While these noncoercive strategies are perceived as 
fairer by the more dependent party, the atmosphere of the relationship will stay 
in tact. The party that remains dependent on the joint venture relationship will 
probably have more incentives to sustain the relationship and will thus refrain 
from non-trustworthy behaviour. Trustworthy behaviour may also increase one‟s 
dependence on the relationship; by making transaction-specific investments a 
party will make itself more dependent on the relationship (Ganesan, 1994; 
Williamson, 1985; Gundlach and Cadotte, 1994). However, such actions require 
one party to take the first step, which again requires trust. When the other party 
reciprocates X‟s behaviour, i.e., makes itself more dependent on the relationship 
as well, total mutual dependence may increase, which in turn may lead to more 
trust. 
 Summarising, when both partners depend equally on the relationship, 
both will refrain from cheating since both are equally vulnerable. In addition, 
high total dependence leads to efforts and noncoercive strategies. Asymmetric 
dependence leads to situations in which the more powerful party has 
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possibilities to determine actions and in which the less powerful party will 
refrain from behaving opportunistically because of their vulnerable position. 
Investments may increase a party‟s dependence on the relationship, because it 
may lead to sunk and switching costs. 
3.4 CHANGE IN TIME 
This chapter defined trust and two other factors that are assumed to affect trust. 
The interrelatedness between these three variables is presented in Figure 3-2. 
Figure 3-2. Trust, behaviour and interdependence interrelated 
 
Need of resources X (Y)  Perceived availability 
                of resources by X (Y) 
 
 
 
Relative value of partner Y (X)  
 
 
PERCEIVED INTERDEPENDENCE 
     
 
  
 TRUST     (PERCEIVED) BEHAVIOUR 
 - promissory-based   - promissory-based 
 - competence-based   - competence-based 
 - goodwill-based    - goodwill-based 
 
 
Source: based on Sako (1992), Butler and Gill (1996), Cummings and Bromiley 
(1996), Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), Nooteboom (1996) 
 
 
However, what lacks in this model is a process dimension. In other words, we 
need a process framework on the basis which we can describe the development 
of trust. Because a time perspective lacks in IJV research, this thesis combines 
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the work of Ring and Van de Ven (1994), and Larson (1992)
5
. These authors 
presented a process framework for the development of interorganisational 
relationships, in which economic as well as social dimensions are central. 
Model M0, presented in Figure 3-3, combines their work. 
Figure 3-3. Model M0: A process model of trust development in IJV 
relationships 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 : time relationship 
 : causal relationship 
Source: based on Ring and Van de Ven  (1994), Larson (1992) 
 
 
Previous history is the stage before the parties meet to negotiate the joint 
venture. During this stage parties may construct an initial mental image of the 
party with whom they will start the joint venture. The parties come together in 
order to negotiate the joint venture during the negotiation stage. “In the 
commitment stage, the will of the parties meet, when they reach an agreement 
on the obligations and rules for future action in the relationship” (Ring and Van 
                                                     
5
 I am grateful to Rosalinde Klein Woolthuis for bringing these models to my 
attention. 
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de Ven, 1994: 98). “In the execution phase, the commitments and rules of action 
are carried into effect” (ibid., p. 98). During this phase the joint venture is 
managed and meetings are held between board members and the management of 
the IJV (MIJV) in order to discuss strategic, tactical and operational issues. This 
execution stage ends when the joint venture ceases to exist.  
3.5 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter defined trust, behaviour and interdependence. It stated that trust is 
a perception of the behaviour of the other party. It provided three sources of 
trust. It also gave evidence from existing literature on the relation between the 
three variables. Figure 3-3 presents the model of analysis, M0. This model yields 
the basis for the empirical work. Table 3-2 addresses the major concepts of this 
chapter.  
Table 3-2. Key concepts of chapter 3 
Key concept Explanation 
Trust 
the expectation that the delegates of the other partner who are on 
the board of directors will behave co-operatively. Trust entails 
three dimensions, which are: 
 promissory-based trust: the expectation that a party can be 
relied upon to keep a verbal or written promise; 
 competence-based trust: the expectation that a party will 
perform its role competently; 
 goodwill-based trust: the expectation that the other party will 
take care of the other party‟s interests and may be willing to 
do more than is formally expected 
Behaviour 
any kind of actions that the board members of the IJV may carry 
out. Might be co-operative or competitive. Has the same 
dimensions of trust. 
Interdependence 
the degree to which a partner is of value to the other partner. 
Entails two dimensions, namely the need for particular resources 
and the availability of these resources elsewhere. 
Process 
framework 
the stages through which trust develops in IJVs. Consists of four 
stages, namely previous history,  negotiations, commitment, and 
execution. 
 4  
METHODS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the methods used in this study. Section 4.1 
elaborates on the research strategy; it explains why a particular strategy was 
considered most appropriate for answering the research question. Section 4.2 
explains how the research was designed;  this implies the choices to be made 
regarding the nature of the cases, the number of cases, the unit of analysis and 
how the data should be collected. Finally, section 4.3 shows the method of data 
analysis. 
4.1 RESEARCH STRATEGY: CASE STUDY APPROACH 
The strategy a researcher can follow depends on the type (i.e. goal) of the study. 
First, the aim of the research might be to describe certain events. In this case, 
the researcher aims to systematise and categorise particular information, without 
preceding expectations (Baarda and de Goede, 1995). Appropriate research 
strategies to use in these instances are archival analysis or the survey method 
(Yin, 1989). The survey method or experiments are appropriate if the aim is to 
test expectations (i.e. hypotheses). In between descriptive and testing research is 
the explorative type of research (Baarda and de Goede, 1995). If only little is 
known about the subject, and the researcher aims to build new theories, 
exploration rather than testing hypotheses is recommended. Case studies can 
serve this purpose in particular (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1989). 
 This study can be characterised as an explorative type of research, and it 
follows a case study approach. A case study is the investigation of a temporary, 
empirical phenomenon within its real context (Yin, 1989). In this study, trust is the 
phenomenon to be investigated, the joint ventures are the cases. Case research 
differs from other qualitative methods in that it involves numerous other data 
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sources, some of which are quantitative (Bonoma, 1985; Hartley, 1994). There are 
three major issues that lead to this choice (Yin, 1989; Ghauri, 1985; Eisenhardt, 
1989; Marschan, 1996; Parkhe, 1995b; Stafford, 1995), namely: 
1. the research question, 
2. the depth of analysis, 
3. a process perspective. 
Each of these points will be discussed in the following paragraphs.  
 Recapitulating from chapter 1, the main research question of this thesis 
is „how does trust develop between partners in international joint venture 
relationships?‟ Yin (1989), who is an authority on the field of case research, 
poses that experiments, histories and case studies are particularly suitable to 
answer such „how‟ questions, in contrast to surveys and archival analyses, 
which are appropriate for answering „who‟, „what‟, „where‟, „how many‟ and 
„how much‟ questions. This is because such questions are more explanatory, and 
do not try to describe the incidence or prevalence of a phenomenon. In addition, 
Yin (1989: 16) poses two other conditions that determine the type of research 
strategy. These are: 
 the extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioural events, and 
 the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events.  
First, I do not want to control the behaviour of its respondents but aim at 
investigating the development of trust between partners in a real-life context. 
Second, this study focuses on contemporary events, rather than on a „dead‟ past. 
Therefore, a case study approach is the best strategy to choose. Table 4-1 
summarises these selection criteria. 
Table 4-1. Relevant situations for different research strategies 
Strategy 
Form of 
research 
question 
Requires control 
of behavioural 
events 
Focuses on 
contemporary events? 
Experiment how, why yes yes 
History how, why no no 
Case study how, why no yes 
Source: Yin, 1989 
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 Second, this study aims at investigating in depth the development of 
trust. Case studies are particularly suitable for this, because they allow for 
greater flexibility during the inquiry (Eisenhardt, 1989). As Ghauri (1983: 49) 
states: “one of the advantages [of case studies] is that it is possible to make 
intensive studies of the object”. This is less true for quantitative studies, which 
require predetermined questions and fixed categories of answers. Especially 
when only little is known about a subject, set questions and answers are not 
possible. In other words, when exploration and theory building rather than 
theory testing are the aim of a study, a qualitative approach is recommended 
instead of a quantitative one. The choice for exploration stems from the lack of 
a time perspective in IJV research. Although chapter 2 identified two factors 
that directly affect the development of trust, this research aims at identifying 
more factors that might influence the development of trust. 
 Third, this study focuses on the development of trust, therefore it needs 
a longitudinal approach. “The case study is a research strategy which focuses on 
understanding the dynamics present within single settings” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 
534). “A major methodological strength of case studies is that they are not 
limited to static assessments, but rather permit the tracing of changes over time” 
(Parkhe, 1993b: 250). Stafford (1995) also recommends a case study approach 
for studying dynamics within IJVs. 
4.2 CASE STUDY DESIGN 
There are several choices to be made before collecting data. In other words, the 
case study has to be designed first. Four major choices can be inferred from the 
literature, which have to be made before entering the field (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Ghauri, 1985; Hartley, 1994; Van der Meer-Kooistra, 1993; Yin, 1989), namely: 
1) developing a theory/definition of the research question;  
2) selecting cases (including nature of the companies and amount of cases); 
3) choosing the unit of analysis  
4) designing a data collection protocol. 
 Chapter 1, 2 and 3 provided the theoretical base for this study. The 
following three sections elaborate on each of the remaining three steps. 
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4.2.1 Selecting cases 
Hartley (1994) poses several questions a researcher should address when 
selecting cases. Typical questions are, for example, what kind of organisation is 
the researcher looking for?; is it intended to be typical of the phenomenon to be 
studied, or should it be an extreme example?; what are the resources available? 
 This research aims at investigating the development of trust in IJVs. 
Hence, the cases should be joint ventures. A joint venture is defined as a co-
operative relationship between at least two firms that contribute resources to a 
newly formed, legally independent, joint subsidiary. This means that one case 
involves at least three companies, i.e., the joint venture and two or more parent 
companies. In addition, there are three other criteria. First, the focus of this 
study is on international joint ventures in particular. Hence, at least one parent 
should be headquartered outside the joint venture‟s country of operation. 
Second, in order to ease access to the parent companies and the IJV 
management, one of the parent companies should have its location in the 
Netherlands. Furthermore, the focus is on Dutch multinationals, since they are 
involved in most of the joint ventures. I contacted the following companies: 
Philips, Shell, DSM, Akzo Nobel, Hoogovens, Cap Gemini (at that time Cap 
Volmac), Océ, and Nutricia. Third, it is important that I can speak to all the 
board members of both partners and to the management of the IJV. Only in this 
way can this study explore how trust develops between parties. One-sided 
information will not give an accurate, synthesising understanding of this 
development. Only some Dutch companies allowed me to contact their joint 
ventures. These joint ventures were (the first joint venture wants to remain 
anonymous): 
 ABG, an IJV of Alpha,  Beta (the Netherlands) and Gamma (Scandinavia); 
 Kemax, an IJV of Akzo Nobel (the Netherlands) and Kemira Oy (Sweden); 
 Lusosider Aços Planos, an IJV of Hoogovens (the Netherlands) and Usinor 
(France); 
 DSM BASF, an IJV of DSM (the Netherlands) and BASF (Germany). 
 The cases were selected before the investigation began. I studied four 
cases in total. In this I followed Eisenhardt (1989: 545) who states that “while 
there is no ideal number of cases, a number between four and ten cases usually 
works well. With fewer than four cases, it is often difficult to generate theory 
with much complexity”. Within the given time frame (one year for data 
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collection) and because the aim of the study is to have an in-depth investigation 
on trust in IJVs, this study was restricted to four cases, which meant that 13 
companies would be involved in the study (joint venture ABG has 3 parents).  
 In the first two cases, I called the general manager of the joint venture 
and asked for an interview. In the other two cases, an acquaintance introduced 
me for a first interview. This first interview mainly served the purpose of 
introducing myself and finding out whether the joint venture was suitable for 
investigation. If this was the case, and if the general manager was amenable to 
the study, he would ask his superiors (i.e. the board of directors) if I could  
interview them. If they were willing to participate, I would receive their 
telephone numbers in order to make an appointment. The case studies were 
carried out sequentially, in the above order. The interviews were carried out 
between April 1997 and January 1998. Each case took about 9 weeks for 
interviewing and first analysis. Chapter 5 gives more information about the 
background of the joint ventures. 
4.2.2 Unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis entails the hierarchical levels and persons to be involved in 
the study. In order to understand the development of trust between partners in 
IJVs, it is necessary to approach those delegates from the partner companies, 
who form the Board of Directors of the joint venture. Mostly, they manage the 
strategic level of the IJV. The delegates come together twice or three times a 
year in order to discuss and approve the plans and budget of the joint venture. In 
some joint ventures their role is pure ceremonial, while in others their influence 
may be stronger. The management team of the joint venture (mostly represented 
by delegates from the mothercompanies) control the daily issues of the joint 
venture. I interviewed both board members and management team members. 
The latter were included to obtain a completer picture of the joint venture and to 
verify answers given by board members. Concluding, this study explores the 
development of trust from the parents‟ perspective and, more specifically, from 
the delegates who are on the board of directors of the IJVs. 
4.2.3 Data-collection 
I carried out pilot interviews before I did the case study interviews (see Table 
4-2). These interviews served three purposes. First, they gave me the 
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opportunity to experience what was going on in IJVs in general and whether the 
variables selected were relevant for in-depth analysis. It turned out that two of 
the three variables were interesting for detailed investigation. The third variable, 
behaviour, was added on the basis of the literature (see chapter 2). Second, the 
pilot interviews gave me the opportunity to formulate the questions that should 
be used in the case study interviews. Third, I wanted to see whether the joint 
ventures of Dutch multinationals were suitable for in-depth case research. For 
example, during some of the interviews it turned out that what the newspapers 
called a joint venture was in fact a participation. The interviews had an open 
character, so that the respondents could address issues they considered to be 
important. The main question in these interviews was what they found important 
factors improving performance. In total, I carried out 20 pilot interviews 
(including five interviews at the case companies), with a total time of about 32 
hours (see Table 4-2). The pilot interviews were carried out during the period 
January 1996 – January 1997. 
Table 4-2. The pilot interviews 
Date 
IJV/Com-
pany 
IJV’s 
birth year 
Function of the 
respondent 
within the IJV 
Number 
of inter-
views 
Number 
of inter-
view 
hours 
96/01/18 
Unicharm-
Molnlycke 
1993 
General manager 
(GM) 
1 1 
96/02/16; 
09/12 
Delamine 1976 
Manufacturing 
manager 
2 3 
96/02/20 Delesto 1983 GM 1 1 
96/06/26; 
09/10; 
10/01 
PMBC 1969 ex-GM, staff 3 6.45 
96/07/09 Nutricia - Division manager 1 1 
96/07/09 Wavin - Controller 1 1.30 
96/09/10 
BW-
Nichibei 
1991-1993 
Director 
Corporate 
Development 
1 1.30 
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(Table 4-2 continued) 
Date 
IJV/Com-
pany 
IJV’s 
birth year 
Function of the 
respondent 
within the IJV 
Number 
of inter-
views 
Number 
of inter-
view 
hours 
96/09/19 
Strikolith 
B.V. 
negotia-
tions 
Financial manager 1 1.45 
96/09/23 Twinsoft 1989 
Director 
Corporate 
Development, 
GM 
2 4 
96/10/04 Sara Lee/DE - Director R&D 1 1.45 
97/01/23 
Shanghai 
Oce Yang-
zhong Office 
Equipment 
Ltd. 
1996 Division manager 1 1.30 
Total    15 24.45 
 
 During the case studies I mainly obtained information by interviewing 
the respondents. Interviewing is “one of the most important sources of case 
study information” (Yin, 1989: 82). The interviews were focused (rather than 
open-ended), because I already had particular ideas about how trust could 
develop (i.e. through interdependence and behaviour). A focused interview 
allowed me to study in detail the selected phenomenon and also facilitated 
comparison between the several cases. 
 In order to keep the focus, I developed two questionnaires: one for the 
partners and one for the members of the management team (see appendix 1). 
Whereas the former focused on the relationship between the partners, the latter 
emphasised the relationship between the joint venture and its parents. In 
addition, the questionnaire for the members of the management team was 
designed to crosscheck the answers given by the board members, thereby 
increasing the reliability of the data. 
 Although the interviews were carried out following predetermined 
questions, I liked the respondents to elaborate on these questions. This gave me 
the opportunity to discover unexpected matters related to the three variables  
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(i.e. trust, behaviour, and interdependence). Therefore, I did not hand out the 
questionnaire but used it as a guideline during the personal interview. In 
retrospect, this choice proved to be a good one, because the respondents felt free 
to elaborate on items that would not have come to light when they had sticked to 
the questions. 
 The questionnaires were designed on the basis of the pilot interviews, 
the literature review, and my own creativity. The model for analysis formed the 
structure of the questionnaire: it contained three main parts, which were 
questions on interdependence, trust and behaviour. The contents of the 
questionnaire for the parents was as follows (the questionnaire for the MIJV 
differed slightly): 
 
I) INTERDEPENDENCE 
1) Dependence of the focal firm on its partner and vice versa 
a) Relative value of the partner and change in time 
(i) Importance of the resources for A and for B, as perceived by A 
(ii) Availability of the resources for the focal firm 
II) BEHAVIOUR AND TRUST 
1) Competence-based behaviour of A 
2) Competence-based trust in B at the moment and change in time 
3) Promissory-based behaviour of A 
4) Promissory-based trust in B at the moment and change in time 
5) Goodwill-based trust in B and behaviour of A at the moment and change 
in time 
 
 The structure of the questionnaire corresponded with the variables as 
defined in chapter 3 (see Figure 3-2). I pre-tested the questionnaire with experts 
in order to see whether the questions were clear and whether they addressed the 
right issues. Since I was not allowed to follow the joint ventures over time, the 
questions focused on personal experiences regarding interdependence, 
behaviour, and trust. Such a retrospective approach is appropriate when 
studying trust, because trust is built on images from the past
1
. By interviewing 
                                                     
1 A drawback of this method is that people might forget about initial distrust as 
soon as they trust the other. 
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several members of the board of directors and members of the management 
team, the reliability of the stories was checked. Especially when the joint 
venture was quite old, it was important to talk to people who had been involved 
right from the beginning. Some stories were also cross validated with written 
histories (e.g. public relation material). In total, I interviewed 29 people; the 
interviews lasted about an hour and a half  on average (Table 4-3). 
Table 4-3. Cases and respondents 
Place/ Company Respondent Years 
working for 
the IJV
2
  
Number 
of 
interviews 
Hours of 
interviews 
Case 1: ABG (1976
3
)   8 13.45 
Alpha GM
4
 
BM 
ex-BM 
7 
3 
17 
2 
1 
1 
3 
1.45 
2.5 
Beta BM 
BM 
7 1 
1 
2 
1.5 
Gamma BM 
ex-BM 
9 
17 
1 
1 
1.5 
1.5 
Case 2: Kemax (1993)   8 11.45 
Delfzijl/ Akzo Nobel & 
IJV  
Grootendorst 
(GM) 
Jessen (new 
GM) 
Kruizinga 
(process 
controller) 
Prins (BM) 
3 
 
1 
4 
 
4 
2 
 
1 
2 
 
1 
2 
 
1.45 
2 
 
1.45 
Amersfoort/Akzo 
Nobel 
Scheffers (BM) 4 1 2.15 
Helsingborg, Sweden 
/Kemira 
Christensson 
(BM) 
4 1 2 
 
                                                     
2
 Until December 1997 
3
 Starting year of the joint venture 
4 
GM: general manager of the IJV, BM: board member 
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(Table 4-3 continued) 
Place/ Company Respondent Years 
working for 
the IJV  
Number 
of 
interviews 
Hours of 
interviews 
Case 3: Lusosider Aços 
Planos (1995) 
  10 17.15 
Beverwijk/Hoogovens Candel (BM) 
Doeleman (BM) 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2.45 
2 
Paris, France/Usinor Depardon (BM)  
Cornier (BM) 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1.5 
1.5 
Seixal, Portugal/IJV  Soury-Lavergne 
(GM) 
Ypenberg 
(financial) 
Almeida 
(commercial) 
Figueredo 
(production) 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
1 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
1.5 
 
5 
 
1 
 
2 
Case 4: DSM-BASF 
(1996) 
  9 12.15 
Zwolle/DSM & IJV Seitz (GM & 
marketing ) 
Prooi (BM) 
Koning (R&D) 
Slooff (sales) 
1 
 
1 
1 
1 
2 
 
1 
1 
1 
3 
 
1.45 
1 
1 
Ludwigshafen,  
Germany/BASF 
Eckhardt (BM) 
Keck (control) 
Schanninger 
(production) 
Wurmb 
(initiator) 
1 
1 
1 
 
- 
1 
1 
1 
 
1 
2 
1.5 
1.5 
 
0.5 
Total   35 55 
 
 All interviews were recorded and transcribed. The transcribed 
interviews were sent to the respondents for factual data verification. The 
purpose of this data verification was to allow the respondents to verify what 
they had said, to add information or to indicate passages containing sensitive 
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information. One week later the respondents were asked to send back their 
comments. 
 In addition to this factual data verification, I wrote an overall report 
about the first case (i.e. ABG). This report was sent to two former board 
members, who were two of the three initiators of the joint venture, and to the 
current general manager. The two former board members discussed this report 
and reported the outcome of this discussion to me during a follow-up letter and 
conversation. 
 During the writing of the case reports, however, it turned out that there 
was a risk interpreting too rashly. Therefore, concerning the other three cases, I 
verified my interpretations by means of open coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). 
The following format was used: 
 
Label Quote 
Cell 1 Cell 2 
XX-I:                                              Cell 3 
 
Cell 2 contained a quote from the original transcribed interview. Cell 1 showed 
the key concepts of the quote. Cell 3 summarised the quote, using the key 
concepts from cell 1. These code reports were sent to the respondents for 
comments. This format was also the first step in the data analysis. 
 In addition to the data obtained from the interviews, I used other 
material to obtain a completer image of the joint venture. The use of different 
data sources is called triangulation:  “The triangulation of data by multi-method 
approaches is essential to answer many of the most important questions in 
organisational research, where we are concerned with very complex processes 
involving a number of actors over time” (Cassell and Symon, 1994: 4). In 
addition, “extensive data-collection offers the possibility of gaining an in-depth 
and holistic understanding of the [phenomenon]” (Marschan, 1996: 43). First, I 
obtained a section from a book on the history of Gamma, and in particular on 
ABG. A second source of additional information was interview material about 
ABG from a colleague. Third, I read the minutes from most of the board 
meetings. These minutes gave me an insight into what had happened over time. 
58     METHODS 
 
Fourth, I used public information, such as annual reports, public relations 
material, press releases, and information from the World Wide Web.  
4.3 METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
One of the biggest concerns regarding qualitative research remains the analysis 
of the data (Miles, 1984). “Qualitative research methods are often criticised for 
lack of rigour in analysis, as the evaluation methods tend not to be equally well-
formulated as, for instance, the statistical data manipulation for quantitative 
analysis” (Marschan, 1996: 59). In order to provide a clear insight into the 
analysed data, this thesis presents the steps that were taken during the analysis. I 
will elaborate on each of these steps in the following sections. 
4.3.1 Open coding 
Open coding was the first step in our analysis (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Open 
coding entails the labelling of phenomena as they are actually present. In this 
research, open coding was done in the following way. The transcribed 
interviews were read and divided into meaningful segments. Next, I coded the 
segments and summarised each segment in one or two sentences, using the 
codes. Section 4.2.3 presented the format already. The interpretation of the 
segments was verified by sending the list to the respondents. The revised lists 
were used during the following step. 
4.3.2 Grouping the codes 
After the relevant segments were coded, I grouped them into the categories 
specified in chapter 3 (Miles and Huberman, 1994) (for more details, see 
appendix 2). When a sentence (i.e. code) did not match any of the specified 
categories, I introduced a new category. For example, the first step generated the 
following quote with codes: 
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social 
relationship, 
effect, 
consensus 
(SR-EFF-
CONS) 
You have become a very good friend of the other board member. Do 
you see him during the board meetings as an Alpha man, or as a 
friend. No, we talk about business and about everything. But you 
forget that you have to defend Gamma’s side? No, we are open about 
it. We don‟t need that. Because when you are open from the beginning 
you continue. And you know that when there is a conflicting business 
interest, you talk about that: how you see it, how they see it and then 
you make a deal. It is not difficult to distinguish between being friends 
and disagreeing on a business matter. So you can have different 
interests indeed, but because you are friends you can make it to a good 
deal which is profitable for both parties. Yes, that is the whole idea. It 
may be a little naive to talk that way, and a lot of people will not agree 
with me, but it is a matter of temperament. That you give in. Yes, very. 
AHA-XI: During official meetings, the delegates defend the interest of their 
mother company when the interests are conflicting. This is their role. A personal 
friendship, however, means that differences in interests can be solved in 
consensus, so that the outcome is profitable for both parties. 
 
Because the quote did not fit into any of the categories presented in chapter 3 
(i.e. trust, interdependence and behaviour), a new category was introduced: 
„social relationships‟. The codes were grouped in a table that had the following 
format: 
 
Category (e.g. Social Relationship) Abbreviation (e.g. SR) Quote 
Cell 1 
(e.g. effect-consensus) 
Cell 2 
(e.g. SR-EFF-CONS) 
Cell 3 
(e.g. AHA-XI) 
 
Cell 1 contained the codes by which the relevant segment of the interview was 
summarised. Cell 2 contained the abbreviations of these codes. Cell 3 referred to 
the quote in the interview, so that the segment of the interview could be found 
quickly. The result of this second step was a convenient arrangement of the 
segments of the interview. With a quick glance, the contents of the interviews 
would be clear. In addition, the coding provided subcategories within the main 
categories. These subcategories formed the building blocks for chapter 5, 
containing the results. The codes are listed in alphabetical order in the third 
column of appendix 2. 
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4.3.3 Identifying themes 
After I coded one case, I picked out a category and wrote a section of chapter 
five to test if the subcategories were meaningful. Subcategories were 
meaningful when they a) discriminated between the cases; b) gave an overview 
over time; c) linked or combined several quotes. Especially b) was important, 
since this study aims at providing an insight into how trust develops over time. 
It appeared that some subcategories had to be substituted in order to make the 
arrangement more convenient. Subsequently, I coded the interviews of the other 
cases and grouped them in line with the steps specified above. When all 
interviews were coded, I looked for similarities between the subcategories. 
Similar subcategories would be categorised under one theme. The last column 
of appendix 2 presents these themes. Ultimately, thirteen themes were 
identified. Chapter 5 describes these themes. The steps of data analysis can be 
summarised as follows (Figure 4-1): 
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Figure 4-1. Model for qualitative data analysis 
 
SELECT MEANINGFUL FRAGMENTS 
 
 
CODE THE FRAGMENT 
 
 
(SUMMARISE THE SEGMENT IN ONE OR TWO SENTENCES)
5
 
 
 
GROUP THE SEVERAL FRAGMENTS ACCORDING TO THEIR CODING 
 
         
         NO 
ARE THE SUBCATEGORIES MEANINGFUL? 
- do they discriminate between the cases? 
- do they give an overview over time?  
- do they combine several quotes? 
 
 YES 
 
IDENTIFY THEMES 
 
 
WRITE THE RESULTS 
 
Sources: based on Miles and Huberman (1994) and Strauss and Corbin (199) 
4.4 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter described the method of research. Four international joint ventures 
were selected. Data was obtained by interviewing most board members and 
members from the IJV management team. The data was analysed by means of a 
combination of techniques developed by Miles and Huberman (1990) and 
Strauss and Corbin (1994). Table 4-4 presents the major concepts of this 
chapter.  
 
                                                     
5
 This step is important for data verification 
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Table 4-4. Key concepts of chapter 4 
Key concept Explanation 
Case study 
the investigation of a temporary, empirical phenomenon within its real 
context. In this study, trust is the phenomenon to be investigated; the four 
joint ventures are the cases. 
Case 
selection 
the joint ventures are all equity-based and international. At least one 
partner is a Dutch multinational. Access to both parties was an 
additional criterion for selection. 
Unit of 
analysis 
the delegates who are on the board of directors of the IJV. 
Method of 
data 
collection 
mainly using the interview technique. Other sources of data are a part 
of a book, additional interview material from a colleague, minutes, 
annual reports, information from the WWW and other public available 
material. 
Method of 
data analysis 
a combination of open coding, categorising and identifying themes. 
Open coding coding fragments of the interview. 
Categorising 
grouping the codes according to predetermined categories. In this 
thesis, these categories were trust (promissory, competence and 
goodwill) and behaviour (promissory, competence and goodwill). Two 
categories were added, namely social relationships, and contract and 
other agreements, because some fragments did not fit in any of the 
other categories. The interdependence relationship between the partners 
was described and verified by the partners or general manager of the 
IJV. 
Identifying 
themes 
similar subcategories are grouped under a similar theme. This process 
resulted in thirteen themes, which formed the basis for chapter 5. 
 
 5  
RESULTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter presents the results of the case studies. Section 5.1 presents a 
background description of the cases. Section 5.2 shows how trust may be built 
and sustained. This section presents ten of the thirteen themes –that were 
identified during the data selection– in four stages: „previous history‟, 
„negotiations‟, „commitment‟ and „execution‟. These stages were defined in 
chapter 3. Section 5.3 reveals sources of trust and how these sources may 
change. These sources of trust are the remaining two themes. Section 5.3 also 
presents the remaining factor that affects the development of trust. 
5.1 BACKGROUND INFORMATION ABOUT THE CASES 
This section presents background information about the case companies. It 
highlights the interdependence relationship between the partners. Discussing the 
interdependence relationship gives us the motives for starting a joint venture. 
5.1.1 ABG 
ABG is an IJV producing an intermediate chemical product (ICP). The joint 
venture is situated in the Netherlands and has two Dutch parents, Alpha and 
Beta, and one Scandinavian partner, Gamma. The joint venture was created in 
two steps: in 1970 Alpha (50%) and Beta (50%) created the joint venture called 
AB; in 1976 a second joint venture was created between AB (55%), Gamma 
(40%) and Delta (5%), called ABG. This study focuses on the second joint 
venture: ABG. However, to understand the interdependencies between Alpha 
and Beta the establishment of the first joint venture will also be explained. 
 In the 1970s, Alpha owned a plant for the production of ICP in the west 
of the Netherlands and wished to expand and modernise its technology. By 
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starting a second plant Alpha could utilise the cheap government gas
1
 for their 
production of ICP (gas is a raw material of ICP and fuel for its production). Beta 
was at that time owned by the government and thus involved in the 
industrialisation of the gas. Since Beta was interested in setting up a chemical 
division, it saw an opportunity to utilise the gas for the production of ICP. Both 
parties used ICP as a raw material for some of their other products. In 1970 
Alpha and Beta decided to construct a plant at Alpha‟s site in the north-east of 
the Netherlands. 
 In 1976, a joint venture was created between AB, Gamma, and Delta, 
called ABG. In the early 1970s, Gamma‟s government discovered gas fields in 
the North Sea. Gamma saw an opportunity to utilise this gas and planned to 
build an ICP plant in the north-west of Germany (the foreign gas pipe line 
would go ashore here). ICP would be one of Gamma‟s most important raw 
materials for the future. Such a plant, and thereby securing supply, became even 
more necessary when oil from the OPEC was rationalised and prices rocketed. 
Security of supply was also the reason why Delta joined the group.  
5.1.1.1 Relative value of the partner 
Why did the involved parties choose for co-operation instead of a greenfield 
investment? Economies of scale determined Beta‟s value for Alpha and vice 
versa. Their prospective plant had to produce at least 300.000 tons of ICP a year 
in order to be competitive. Co-operation guaranteed a fixed amount of sales, 
since both partners would then have captive use. So although starting an ICP 
plant was rather an opportunity than a necessity, when the decision was taken a 
partner was required. Alternative partners for Alpha and for Beta were not really 
considered: 
[Q 1] The motive to co-operate with Beta was the supply of gas. Beta was entirely 
owned by the government. The Dutch government did not really know what to do 
with the gas, so they thought Beta could utilise it. In addition, it would be good if 
this were to happen in the north of the Netherlands because of the high 
unemployment rate in that area. Well, Alpha had a site over there, so Beta thought 
they should talk to Alpha.  
                                                     
1
Because the Dutch government wanted to stimulate economic activities in the 
north of the Netherlands, it supplied gas against a lower price to firms that were 
willing to start activities in this region. 
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Sharing the risks of building an ICP plant set AB‟s value for Gamma and for 
Delta. Gamma looked for a partner in Germany and Scandinavia to share the 
financial risk; however, there were no firms willing to participate. Eventually, 
AB turned up. By joining AB, the financial risk were reduced, and Gamma and 
Delta could use the facilities already present on the Alpha site in the 
Netherlands. In addition, Gamma‟s need for ICP did not justify a plant of its 
own. Co-operation with AB would mean an increase in sales. In the spring of 
1975, AB contacted Gamma for information on Gamma‟s plans in the northwest 
of Germany. They had been thinking about expansion but lacked sufficient 
captive use to implement their plan. Co-operating with a potential competitor 
meant a double advantage: they would prevent the entrance of a rival and they 
would be able to expand. 
 Summarising, the value of the partners was determined by:  
 captive use. Economies of scale determined the amount of output (Alpha for 
Beta and vice versa); 
 captive use, sharing of financial risks, facilities already existing at Alpha‟s 
site (AB for Gamma and Delta); 
 sharing financial risks, captive use, supply of gas (Gamma for AB). 
5.1.1.2 Change in time 
The interdependence relationship between the parties has decreased over time. 
This change has two main reasons. First, ICP has become more available on the 
world market. Due to the rise of the cheap gas countries, like Trinidad, Chile 
and Venezuela and the low transporting costs of ICP, many small scale ICP 
plants in Europe were forced to shut down. Not many new plants are built in 
Europe, as they have to be very large-scale to be competitive and the price of 
gas is relatively high. This increased availability (has) decreased the necessity 
for backward integration for Gamma and Delta, as ICP can be obtained on the 
market for prices similar to the joint venture‟s prices. However, without the 
joint venture the companies would loose the additional profits (or losses). 
Therefore, Delta decided to leave the joint venture after about four years. The 
other three parties agreed to AB taking over Delta‟s share. Second, firms have 
also changed their policy regarding their activities. From diversification during 
the 1970s the focus has shift to core competencies since the 1990s. An 
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evaluation of the activities has led to the conclusion that the production of ICP 
is not a core business. However, since performance is still high, all partners 
have decided to keep the plant at least until the year 2000. 
5.1.2 Kemax 
Kemax is a joint venture between Kemira Oy (Kemira), Finland and Akzo 
Nobel, the Netherlands. Kemax was established in 1993, is located in Delfzijl, 
the Netherlands and produces calcium chloride. Calcium chloride is used for a 
variety of products, like dog food and defrosting activities. Kemira holds 51% 
of the joint venture‟s equity, Akzo Nobel owns the remaining 49%. 
 In 1993 a German company called CFK stopped its calcium chloride 
production. Kemira Chemicals Oy (Kemira) in Sweden, part of the group 
Kemira Oy in Finland, saw an opportunity to take over this market in Europe. 
As calcium chloride is one of the core businesses of Kemira, taking over CFK‟s 
market meant a great opportunity to expand. Needing additional production of 
calcium chloride, they looked for a partner who could supply this. It was 
important to find this additional production capacity as quickly as possible, 
since Kemira had to stop its clients from looking for another supplier. Five firms 
were approached, namely Akzo Nobel, Rhone Poulenc, ICI, Solvay, and 
BASF/Kalli & Saltz, CFK‟s parent company. Eventually, they chose Akzo 
Nobel as the best partner. Akzo Nobel produces soda ash, amongst other things. 
A by-product of soda ash is calcium chloride. 
 Until Akzo Nobel was approached by Kemira, they already had calcium 
chloride as a by-product of their main product soda ash. This by-product was, 
however, dumped in the sea. Akzo Nobel did not sell it, since the market was 
already full with players. Obtaining a market position in calcium chloride was 
not a priority of Akzo Nobel, however, co-operation with a strong market player 
would yield the following advantages. First, Akzo Nobel would obtain a 
position without having to build it themselves. Second, the joint venture would 
contribute to the environmentally friendly image of Akzo Nobel, while the by-
product would now be used rather than be dumped in the sea. Third, the calcium 
chloride production would contribute to the profitability of the soda ash plant. In 
August 1993 both partners agreed on the creation of a joint venture; in April 
1994 building activities started in Delfzijl, the Netherlands. The first tons of 
calcium chloride were produced in October 1994.  
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5.1.2.1 Relative value of the partner 
Why did Kemira look for a partner when they were one of the biggest producers 
of calcium chloride themselves? Was it not possible to expand their business in 
Sweden? Or they could have taken over CFK‟s production facilities. 
 The choice for a partner was mainly determined by the type of product. 
Theoretically, Kemira could have done the following: 
a) Kemira could have set up an extra production facility for the production of 
calcium chloride. In practice this was however not an option, as the production 
of calcium chloride would also lead to the production of one of the main 
products that have calcium chloride as a by-product. The market for these main 
products had, however, matured. In addition, the plant would need extra people 
to operate the plant.  
b) Kemira could have taken over CFK‟s production facility. This option was 
not preferred, because it would have led to soda ash production, which Kemira 
does not need (Kemira obtains calcium chloride from a different raw material). 
Moreover, the technology of CFK was outdated. 
c) Kemira could have served the market with their own production in Sweden. 
However, substitution did not suit the strategy of expanding business. Moreover, 
delivering from Sweden would lead to extra transport cost, which are crucial to 
the market price of calcium chloride. Moreover, CFK‟s clients would think of 
Sweden as too far away. Also, Kemira mainly produces solid calcium chloride 
in Sweden and Finland; switching to the production of liquid calcium chloride 
would lead to less capacity for the solid type. This option was not preferred, as 
the solid calcium chloride already has an established market. 
 Hence, the best option was to find a partner. The partner should already 
produce one of the main products and have calcium chloride as a by-product; 
the partner should be located  near to CFK‟s market. Co-operation would take 
away the need for extra people, because the personnel of the soda ash plant 
would also work for the calcium chloride plant (as these two plants are highly 
integrated). From the five alternatives, Akzo Nobel was chosen mainly for 
logistical reasons: the plant of Akzo Nobel in Delfzijl has a good harbour and 
other infrastructure facilities; a harbour near the site matched the philosophy of 
Kemira. Besides, the site of Akzo Nobel was close to CFK‟s market. The second 
reason for choosing Akzo Nobel was the personal contact between the initiators 
of the joint venture. They had met four years ago, since they were both selling 
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sodium sulphate for their companies. A third reason for choosing Akzo Nobel 
was that the culture of Sweden and the Netherlands were felt to be quite similar, 
which would ease co-operation. Fourth, Kemira was in a hurry as they had taken 
over the market already before having guaranteed extra production. This hurry 
influenced the attractiveness of ICI, since taking the decision to co-operate with 
Kemira would take at least six months. Thus, although calcium chloride was 
available at several locations, a dependence relationship was created with Akzo 
Nobel since they were considered the most attractive option. 
 Akzo Nobel chose to co-operate rather than sell the calcium chloride 
itself, because now they did not have to build up a market position first. 
Creating a market position was not a desired option before or during the request 
by Kemira, as it was too risky to diversify. Especially nowadays firms focus on 
their core competencies, which makes it rare to diversify outside one‟s core 
business. Moreover, it would have taken a lot of time and money to build up a 
market position. Taking over CFK‟s market was not an option, as it would 
require specific market knowledge which Akzo Nobel lacked. Also, if Akzo 
Nobel had tried to build up a market position, it would have lacked an additional 
plant as a back-up, necessary for a reliable supply to clients. 
 Summarising the findings on the relative value of the partner, the 
following is concluded. Whereas taking over CFK‟s market was an opportunity 
for Kemira, finding a partner was absolutely necessary. From five firms, Akzo 
Nobel was selected. Therefore, the value of Akzo Nobel for Kemira was and is 
relatively high. To Akzo Nobel, joining Kemira was just an opportunity: there 
was no real need for a partner. However, by committing itself to the joint 
venture, Akzo Nobel created a dependence relationship with Kemira. Therefore, 
the value of Kemira for Akzo Nobel was relatively low but increased when the 
joint venture was created.  
5.1.2.2 Change in time 
In December 1997 Akzo Nobel announced the sale of their soda ash production 
to an English company. Since the soda ash plant and the calcium chloride plant 
are highly integrated, the question was what the effect on the joint venture 
would be. Until now (November 1998) no decision has been taken. 
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5.1.3 Lusosider Aços Planos 
Lusosider Aços Planos (LAP) is a joint venture between Usinor, France, and 
Koninklijke Hoogovens, the Netherlands. LAP was established in 1995, is 
situated in Seixal, Portugal, and transforms hot rolled coils into cold rolled 
sheets, galvanised sheets, and tinplates. These products are used in, for example, 
tin cans and constructing. Usinor and Koninklijke Hoogovens each hold 50% of 
the joint venture‟s equity. 
 The joint venture has its foundation in the privatisation of a Portuguese 
steel company, Siderurgia Naçional (SN). Since the 1980s, the Portuguese 
government tried to privatise this company. As Hoogovens supplied to this 
company, the government saw Hoogovens as a serious candidate to take over 
SN. SN had three production sites: a rolling-mill for flat products in Seixal (SN 
Planos); an integrated steel plant plus a rolling mill for long products in Seixal 
(SN Longuos); and an electric arch furnace plus rolling mill for long products in 
Maia. As Hoogovens was only interested in SN Planos, Hoogovens looked for a 
candidate that could take over the rest of SN. Because no attractive partners 
were available in Portugal, they looked in Spain and found two serious 
candidates, namely Megasa en Celsa, of which Celsa was most attractive. The 
problem was, however, that Celsa was already committed to the French 
company Usinor. These two companies had set up a joint venture, called 
Lusosider Projectos Siderurgicos (LPS). This joint venture had only one goal, 
which was the investigation of steel projects, and there was only one serious 
project, SN. The deal in this joint venture was that Usinor would take over the 
flat rolling mill of SN (i.e. SN Planos). Celsa would take over SN Longuos. 
Thus Usinor and Hoogovens were in fact competing for SN Planos. 
 Hoogovens initiated a meeting with Usinor because it was impossible to 
talk with Celsa without talking with Usinor. During this and follow-up meetings 
Usinor and Hoogovens discovered that their goals were not competitive. For 
Hoogovens, the main goal was to secure their supply to SN Planos; Usinor‟s 
main goal was to increase their hold and thus stabilise the Iberian market 
(providing higher quality and prices). After lengthy negotiations, the parties 
agreed to co-operate in order to take over SN Planos. The initial construction 
was that LPS would buy SN, and Hoogovens would take a 50% stake in 
Usinor‟s flat part. However, the bid then made by LPS was not accepted by the 
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Portuguese government. Next, in 1995, Celsa decided to leave the joint venture, 
and Hoogovens took over Celsa‟s 50% share. 
 By this time, the Portuguese government had decided to split SN. Now 
it was possible for both parties to take over SN Planos only under the name 
LPS, without having to bother about SN Longuos. Hoogovens and Usinor made 
a second bid on the 90% of SN Planos‟ shares that then were put on sale. 
Hoogovens financed two third, Usinor one third, to reflect the differences in 
supply rights (for Hoogovens, securing supply was most important). LPS made 
the highest bid and won the tender on January 1996. SN Planos was renamed 
Lusosider Aços Planos (LAP). The result is that in the end Usinor and 
Hoogovens have equal rights in LPS, which owns 90% of the shares of LAP, 
while Hoogovens two third holds of the rights to deliver hot rolled coils to LAP. 
5.1.3.1 Relative value of the partner 
The main reason for Usinor to choose Hoogovens was their uncertainty about 
winning SN. Hoogovens had a very good relationship with the Portuguese 
government, which was less true for Usinor. Having Hoogovens in their joint 
venture „Lusosider Projectos Siderurgicos‟, meant Usinor would not have to 
compete with Hoogovens for SN. Besides, Usinor could share the risk of buying 
SN Planos. As a due diligence (fact finding of the company) was not allowed 
before the sales of SN, there was a risk that the purchase would be „pig in a 
poke‟. In a word, the main things Usinor needed from Hoogovens were goodwill 
from the Portuguese government and sharing financial risk. Additional resources 
were contributed to the joint venture by Hoogovens; these were a security in 
supplying hot rolled coils (Usinor was unsure whether they would have been 
able to supply SN without the supply of Hoogovens), technical and commercial 
assistance. Other partners were not available and not considered. 
 The Portuguese government approved of Hoogovens buying SN. Then 
why would Hoogovens co-operate with Usinor? During their initial co-operation 
in the joint venture with Celsa, Hoogovens had learnt that Usinor financially 
participated in important clients of SN Planos. Without continuing with Usinor 
in the conquest for SN Planos, SN Planos would have difficulty selling their 
products. Developing such positions would take much time and without Usinor 
SN would have to start without clients. This is reflected by the fact that at the 
time of the take-over, the order book of SN Planos was completely empty. 
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Mainly, the Usinor network, and to a lesser extent the Hoogovens network, was 
needed to sell. Another attractive partner for Hoogovens would have been CSI, a 
Spanish steel company. They were, however, less attractive, because Hoogovens 
believed CSI would not be accepted by the Portuguese government. 
5.1.3.2 Change in time 
The relative value of Usinor for Hoogovens has not changed in time. The main 
resource, the client participations of Usinor, is still needed, although LAP has 
been able to develop and restore some client relationships itself. However, the 
two main clients are still partly owned by Usinor. The relative value of 
Hoogovens for Usinor was high, due to Hoogovens‟ contacts with the 
Portuguese government. However, now that the plant has been purchased and is 
owned for almost 100% by LPS, Usinor is no longer dependent on the goodwill 
of Hoogovens. Therefore, Usinor would be able to continue LAP without 
Hoogovens. A failed participation of 35% in CSI looked like it would have an 
effect on Usinor‟s interest in the joint venture. Considering their strategic 
orientation towards the Mediterranean region, this participation meant an 
important step for Usinor. The failure could have led to a strategic re-
orientation, and could have implications for their participation in SN. However, 
they confirm: “The Usinor Group will continue to actively strengthen its 
position in the Spanish market, building on the relationships established with its 
partners” (http://www.usinor.com/english/com 300797.htm). 
5.1.4 DSM BASF Structural Resins 
DSM BASF Structural Resins (further referred to as DB) is a joint venture 
between DSM, the Netherlands, and BASF, Germany. The joint venture was 
created in 1996, is located in the Netherlands and produces unsaturated 
polyester resins. These resins are used in a variety of products since the 1950s, 
for example in the production of sailing boats, sanitary products and white 
goods. DSM holds 60% of the joint venture‟s equity; BASF owns the remaining 
40%. This division reflects the strategic importance of the business to both 
partners. Whereas structural resins are one of the core products for DSM, the 
joint venture has merely an outlet function for BASF. 
 By the late 1980s, the market for structural resins experienced a slow-
down. Questions about their recyclability were raised and the market had 
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become so fragmented that none of the suppliers had the wherewithal to develop 
new, innovative solutions (brochure joint venture). Moreover, DSM had to 
contend with an overcapacity of 30-40%. Furthermore, clients became larger 
(e.g. the automobile industry), which put pressure on the profit margins. One of 
the solutions for these problems was economies of scale. Hence, in order to 
survive DSM planned to grow, either internally or through acquisition. At the 
same time, BASF faced similar problems. BASF and DSM knew about each 
other‟s problems since two delegates had talked to each other on exhibitions. In 
1994, the delegate from BASF contacted a delegate from DSM in order to 
discuss any type of co-operation. (“People from your competitor, you meet them 
at exhibitions, so you get their business card, which gives you all the 
information needed to call”). After having studied the possibility of co-
operation, the two men discussed their ideas with their mother companies. In 
1996 both parties signed the contract; the official start of the joint venture was 
on 1 January 1997. 
5.1.4.1 Relative value of the partner 
Expanding the business in order to attain economies of scale without combining 
several businesses did not seem an answer to the above mentioned problems. 
However, one of the parties could have taken over the business of the other 
party. A joint venture was preferred over an acquisition in order to keep as many 
clients as possible. There was a chance that the acquiring party would loose 
customers when the business was sold. Furthermore, DSM wished to have the 
commitment of BASF to develop the joint venture. 
 Why did DSM choose for BASF? DSM preferred to co-operate with 
BASF because of several reasons. First, considering the product BASF was their 
strongest competitor. Second, their geographical position was the most 
complementary to the positions of DSM. Third, BASF‟s had a three-party 
alliance in R&D; co-operation with BASF allowed DSM to participate in this 
alliance too. Finally, the business philosophy and size of BASF matched those 
of DSM best. Using public information, BASF made a list in order to select a 
partner. Seven parties were screened on, amongst other things, their market 
share in several countries, the extent of R&D, and production costs. The list 
used a three-point scale ranging from good, to satisfactory to unsatisfactory. 
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Two companies were selected, one of which was not willing to co-operate. DSM 
was left. 
5.1.4.2 Change in time 
No major changes in the interdependence relationship have taken place from 
January 1996 to January 1997. 
 
Table 5-1 highlights the major characteristics of the four joint ventures. 
Table 5-1. Survey of the four case joint ventures 
 ABG Kemax LAP DSM BASF 
parents 
Alpha, Beta & 
Gamma 
Akzo Nobel 
& Kemira  
Koninklijke 
Hoogovens & 
Usinor/Usinor 
DSM & 
BASF 
year of creation 1976 1993 1995 1996 
country of the 
joint venture  
the Netherlands 
the 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
the 
Netherlands 
country of the 
parents 
the Netherlands; 
the Netherlands; 
Scandinavia 
the 
Netherlands;  
Sweden 
the 
Netherlands; 
France 
the 
Netherlands; 
Germany 
division of 
equity 
30/30/40 51/49 50/50 60/40 
branch of 
industry 
chemicals chemicals steel chemicals 
motives to enter/ 
continue 
business 
opportunity; 
diversification 
opportunity; 
expansion 
current 
business  
securing outlet; 
geographical 
expansion 
expansion; 
securing 
outlet 
motives to start 
joint venture  
economies of 
scale, sharing 
financial risk 
obtaining 
market 
position; 
need for 
calcium 
chloride 
securing outlet 
for SN; 
increasing 
chance of take-
over, sharing 
financial risk 
economies of 
scale, 
survival 
pattern of 
interdependence 
pooled sequential sequential pooled 
 
5.2 BUILDING AND SUSTAINING TRUST 
This section presents the results of the interviews that were held during the 
period April 1997-January 1998. The section follows the stages as they are 
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defined in chapter 3. Each section describes factors that partners use to build 
and sustain trust. Hence, it aims at answering subquestion 1 (see Table 1-1, p. 
7). 
5.2.1 Previous history 
The previous history proved to provide valuable information on the prospective 
partner. All four cases revealed factors that established a basic level of trust. 
These factors are: 
 the overall reputation of the company; 
 prior exchange between the companies on organisational level; and 
 direct personal contact between the initiators. 
The following subsections will discuss each of these factors separately. 
5.2.1.1 Overall reputation 
The overall reputation of the company was an important, general factor that 
mainly contributed to the building of competence-based trust in the prospective 
partner. Thereby, it contributed to the perceived value of the partner in the joint 
venture. For example, a respondent of Akzo Nobel states: 
[Q 2] We trusted Kemira to be a good partner to manage the market, based on the 
manner of how they reacted on the closure of CFK and their market position in 
calcium chloride (KK-II). 
 
This quote shows that general information set an initial expectation about the 
competencies of the prospective partner. Delegates from DSM in the case DB 
had similar experiences: 
[Q 3] BASF was our best competitor. They had particular resources that we liked 
to have. In this way, we gained an insight into their competencies (DP-IX). 
[Q 4] We tried to gain access to particular clients and that did not work. It 
appeared that BASF was the supplier. Furthermore, we were the numbers 1 and 2 
on the European market: together we had 30% of the market. Then you have to 
know each other. In this way, we had a positive feeling about BASF‟s sales 
organisation  (DSF-XI). 
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BASF made a comparison between several potential partners, based on general 
information about the other‟s reputation. DSM was selected because they 
seemed to be the best choice. Thus, BASF immediately had the expectation that 
DSM would perform their role competently. The case of ABG also shows 
examples of knowledge being available about the prospective partners. For 
instance, Gamma knew Alpha and Beta as leading companies in the 
petrochemical industry. Alpha and Beta believed Gamma to become a strong 
party. Proof of this is Alpha‟s and Beta‟s reaction to Gamma‟s plans to build an 
ICP plant in the northwest of Germany: in order to prevent competition they 
contacted Gamma about possible co-operation. 
 In a word, the overall reputation gives an initial idea of the 
competencies of the possible partner, hence it builds competence-based trust. It 
also gives information on the partner‟s activities and whether these activities 
match.  
5.2.1.2 Prior exchange 
Prior exchange means that both parent companies interact before coming 
together to negotiate the joint venture. There are two cases where the 
respondents indicate that such prior exchange contributed to the mental image 
of the other party. The data suggest that the information obtained is still quite 
general, second-hand and company-related. However, it may stimulate or 
confirm ideas based on the perceived reputation of the other party. For instance, 
before Akzo Nobel acquired Nobel (1994), Kemira made also a bid on Nobel. 
This contributed to the image Kemira‟s delegate had about Akzo Nobel‟s 
competencies. Usinor also indicates that such prior experience contributed to the 
building of competence-based trust. To the question „Please indicate how 
important the following sources were for your perception of Hoogovens‟ (non-) 
reliability regarding its resources/ competencies‟, they answered: 
[Q 5] It is a huge company, we‟ve known them for years. We bought raw 
materials from them before we started the joint venture (LU-X). 
5.2.1.3 Direct personal contact 
The third factor that contributed to the building of trust, is of a more distinct 
nature than the other two. Whereas the former two types of information 
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constitute a kind of trust that is rather company-specific, trust that comes about 
through direct personal contact is much more focused on the persons that 
represent a specific company. In other words, direct personal contact establishes 
trust in a person rather than trust in the company as a whole. Because of the 
difference in focus, this factor had more effect on the building of promissory-
based trust and goodwill-based trust than on competence-based trust. Two cases 
(i.e. Kemax and LAP) provide this insight. Both cases show that congruent 
industries increase the likelihood of prior interaction, since delegates of similar 
industries may meet on trade fairs. For the Akzo Nobel delegate these meetings 
provide an insight into the promissory-based behaviour of Kemira‟s delegate: 
[Q 6] We already knew each other before we started this joint venture; we were 
competitors. Then we also met and I noticed that he kept his word (KP-II).  
 
A delegate of DSM had also met his counterpart from BASF before the joint 
venture started, which gave him insight into the character of the other: 
[Q 7] I already knew Seitz before we started negotiations, we had had contact 
frequently. It is a chemical organisation setting, so we had already met several 
times. Then I thought that he was a person with whom one could co-operate well. 
So there was no unpleasant previous history (DSF-IX). 
 
Hence, prior interaction between the delegates gave an insight into the character 
of the other and that they would keep their promises. 
 Summarising, it can be concluded that initial information about a 
potential partner‟s trustworthiness is obtained during the previous history. 
Altogether, the partners use this information to assess the other‟s partner 
potential economic interest in a joint venture and their emotional commitment. 
5.2.2 Negotiations 
It appeared from the interview data that trust that was built during the previous 
history played a role in selecting a partner. Naturally, the companies selected the 
corporation with the largest added value to the joint venture. Largely, the 
perceived qualities of the prospective partner, and to a lesser extent the 
perceived trustworthiness of the people involved, set the perceived value of the 
prospective partner. Since firms would not enter a joint venture with a partner 
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they did not trust, negotiations would already start with a basic level of trust. 
That trust and respect are important to gain business is explained by a 
respondent from Kemira:  
[Q 8] In order to gain credibility you should be reliable. I think reputation in 
business is extremely important. Don't try to be too smart in business, because you 
will lose in the end. You shouldn't make promises that you can't keep, although 
that doesn't mean that you shouldn't take risks. Also, the community as such is not 
very big, we all know each other very well. So what you mean is that you keep a 
promise because your reputation would otherwise be at stake. I'm not that afraid 
of my reputation, but many deals are done on the basis of respect, and I see a lot 
of people who try to be too smart, and it always fails in the end. A lot of the 
people I know have been in the business for almost 20 years, so I know who I can 
trust. And a lot of business emerges from the fact that people trust each other. You 
get a lot of extra credits when business is based on this (KC-XI). 
 
Negotiations started after the companies had selected a potential partner. In the 
case of ABG, AB contacted Gamma to consider co-operating. In the case of 
Kemax, Kemira took the initiative. Hoogovens took the initiative in the case of 
LAP, and it was BASF who called DSM for a first meeting. The interview data 
show several factors that built and/or developed trust. These factors are:  
 putting yourself in someone else‟s shoes; 
 starting with trust; 
 the actual behaviour of the other; 
 befriending. 
The following sections discuss each of these factors. 
5.2.2.1 Putting yourself in someone else’s shoes 
In order to find out whether the other party was long-term oriented, was open 
and did not have a hidden agenda, most of the interviewees stressed the 
importance of mutual economic advantage. To illustrate this, typical responses 
included: 
[Q 9] I personally would not trust the other party without any economic interest, 
as if I wonder whether I can be trusted if our economic interest were to change a 
lot. Hence, from an  economic viewpoint you have to understand whether the 
other party will be loyal (LC-XXIV). 
78     RESULTS 
 
[Q 10] How can you know that the other party is entirely open? You never know 
that for sure, especially when the other party is new to you. However, I think you 
can make an assessment in the case you know the market and your partner a little; 
for example about their motivation, although they don‟t tell everything. Through 
critical questions you should be able to find out. In our case, we know Kemira, we 
know how they behave in the market, we know their strategy. In such case you 
should be able to develop a feeling about whether the joint venture matches or not 
(KS-IV). 
[Q 11] You always have to try to understand the position of your partner (DW-VI) 
 
The above comments demonstrate the importance of the other party‟s economic 
self-interest in a potential joint venture. The belief that the other party will 
benefit from a joint venture strengthens the belief that they will be trustworthy, 
because such behaviour will be in their own interest. In order to find out about 
the other party‟s interest, the parties tried to put themselves in the other party‟ 
shoes. Based on knowledge about the market and the partner (from annual 
reports and their activities), in combination with answers from the partner‟s 
delegates to critical questions, they created a picture of the other party‟s 
economic self-interest in a potential joint venture. 
 An exception to these answers is the reaction of a board member of 
ABG, who read one of my publications (Boersma & Ghauri, 1997): 
[Q 12] Can you understand that when you have particular expectations, that you 
are mainly occupied with finding out whether those expectations can be met? Do I 
have to put myself in the other party‟s shoes? I think, the wish to implement an 
idea, the over-capacity problem, that is what you focus on. And I am not busy 
finding out whether the other party has a hidden agenda. First, I always assume 
that I can trust those people. And when this is not the case, I will kick those 
people far away, and I will not try to make something of it (AW-V). 
In other words, the delegate started with trust rather than distrust. The following 
section discusses this factor in more detail. 
5.2.2.2 Starting with trust 
The parties of ABG started without any experience with each other before this 
joint venture. Only general knowledge about the company as a whole was 
available. Hence, promissory-based trust and goodwill-based trust between the 
people had to be build up. This was done in a variety of ways. The following 
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quote illustrates how a delegate from Gamma tried to asses whether the other 
party could be taken at their word and whether they were sincere:  
[Q 13] You have to make up your mind whether the fellows on the other side of 
the table are just like yourself. First class fever, ha ha, I am joking but I think it is 
very important. I said to myself, I am open, I can stand for what I am saying, I am 
always truthful, I do not try to put in some snares. We are like that, so why 
shouldn‟t the people on the other side of the table be of the same kind. And that 
you find out fairly quickly (AHA-VII) 
 
Thus, the respondent used his own attitude as a reference towards his partner 
and trusted them until the opposite was proved. In other words, he started with 
trust rather than distrust. Such an attitude also emanated from the belief that 
only by acting in good faith good long-term business deals could be made: 
[Q 14] You have to be trustworthy from the beginning, since when you are not, 
how can the business be successful in the long run. When you start to hold back 
information or to not tell the entire truth, it is sure that you can‟t live together for 
a long time. And if you have that feeling, most probably they will think along the 
same line. This is long term co-operation, it is not a question of making a quick 
deal with a lot of money and then goodbye. ...You get more out of business when 
you trust people then when you distrust them. My mother always said: “nothing 
will come into a closed hand”. I don‟t know how other people think about this, but 
this is my philosophy (AHA-X). 
 
The previous section also showed that the Alpha delegate started with trust. His 
attitude resulted from considering himself as being naive, from lessons from 
other (Japanese) joint ventures, and from the idea that the joint venture was a 
business opportunity rather than a necessity. Hence, when he would not trust the 
people (he would use his own judgement and intuition in order to find this out), 
he would quit negotiations. 
5.2.2.3 Perceived behaviour 
In contrast to ABG, the people of Kemax already started with a basic level of 
promissory-based trust, which has been built up during the previous stage. 
Therefore, as one respondent noted, the psychological process of constructing a 
perception of the other party‟s trustworthiness took less time. During this stage 
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promissory-based trust increased due to the actual behaviour of the other, as the 
following remark by Akzo Nobel‟s initiator of Kemax reveals:  
[Q 15] When somebody says „I will sell a 100.000 ton‟, you can only check this 
after three years. So maybe it starts with small things, that somebody says he will 
be somewhere at 8 and he is there at 8. In this way somebody gets a certain 
reputation of „a man a man, a word a word‟ (KP-II). 
 
Similarly, two board members of Usinor explained: 
[Q 16] You know, it is gradually built up. When you started deciding on who 
would do what, and when you progress, you notice that they do what they have 
said, that is the way trust develops. I think that it would have been different if we 
had noticed that it looked like they didn‟t care about us. Or that they promised 
things they didn‟t prove. Then we would have said, guys: we have problem. But 
this did not happen (LU-XI). 
 
The above comments show that keeping one‟s promises in situations of minor 
importance gradually leads to reputation of trustworthiness. A similar pattern of 
developing competence-based and promissory-based trust was identified at 
Hoogovens: 
[Q 17] You try to assess whether you can trust the man or woman. For instance, 
personally I had not much in common with my counterpart from Usinor with 
whom I mainly created this joint venture. However, gradually I became aware that 
he was a person with whom you knew where you were at. He keeps his word, 
internally he is a person of some weight and he does not change ideas quickly. I 
can understand and trust what he is like, and thus how he will behave in the future 
(LC-IX). 
 
When asked to elaborate on this issue of assessment, he answered: 
[Q 18] He gave his opinion about what he saw at Hoogovens very correct and 
very to the point. Due to this, I knew for sure that it was a man who knew what he 
was talking about (LC-X). 
 
Hence, the actual behaviour of the other party contributed to a specific 
perception of the other party. Keeping to minor agreements yielded an image 
that the other party would keep his word in the future, competence-based 
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behaviour led to competence-based trust. However, the interview data also 
demonstrate that trustworthy behaviour is not always necessary in order to raise 
trust. A management team member of DB, who was also involved in the 
negotiations and preparations of the joint venture reveals this in the following 
comment: 
[Q 19] And do you trust your counterpart from BASF to be open and honest from 
the beginning? Well, look, you know from the beginning that every party wants to 
strengthen or weaken specific positions. Against that background you talk with 
each other. However, I have been open with the information I had, and in 
hindsight I can say that I never had the feeling that I was cheated (DSF-IX).  
 
In other words, the DSM delegate did not believe that his colleague from BASF 
would be entirely open from the very start. The quote, however, suggests that 
this did not lead to goodwill-based distrust, because the delegate understood the 
role of the other party. The respondent also mentioned the effect of a previous 
history with the counterpart (see [Q 7] on p. 76). In order to learn about the 
actual behaviour of the other party frequent face-to-face meetings were very 
important. During such meetings, the people could experience and get a feeling 
for each other. In addition to such business meetings, social meetings were 
important in order to develop a certain degree of trust.  
5.2.2.4 Befriending 
The final factor the data reveal is the factor of befriending the delegates of the 
other party. Befriending refers to the process of getting to know each other 
personally and professionally. The data demonstrate that business meetings as 
well as social meetings play an important role in this process. This is revealed in 
the following comment: 
[Q 20] We had some common interests, but you need something more to be able 
to make the joint venture, you must trust the people. We met many times, and of 
course we dined together, had a few drinks, and we came to know each other 
(AHA-VII). 
 
Another board member of Gamma mentioned the following effect: 
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[Q 21] You get to know people better, including their body language. I am better 
able to understand the way the other person thinks and feels. The people know 
each other by now, and when mister X says something, you know that that is the 
truth (AT-IV). 
 
The above comment shows that non-verbal communication was as important as 
verbal communication in order to understand and learn about the other party. 
Getting to know each other created understanding. This, in turn, created trust. A 
BASF board member supports this view: 
[Q 22] It is certainly different when you deal with Chinese people. Personal trust 
is important, but it is much more difficult to understand the way Chinese people 
think than to understand how people from the West think. Why? Because we have 
the same education, same background. However, with Chinese people it always 
difficult to understand what they are really thinking (DW-XI).  
 
In addition to these social events, for the development of such personal 
relationships it was important that the characters of the people involved matched 
and that there was mutual respect and appreciation. This is revealed in the 
following comments: 
[Q 23] So, that friendship between you and Gamma’s delegate, that was there 
right from the beginning? Yes, immediately I liked that man. And what did you 
like about him? On the one hand, he had much appeal for me personally, and I 
always had to laugh because of his writing during our meetings (AW-III, AW-
VIII). 
[Q 24] It depends on the personality, but I must say that the people I know at 
ABG are all very social people; they can get along with the others fine. Otherwise, 
of course, they would not have such a high position within the company. In 1994 
one of the board members left, he had too many activities. He is great with 
people, he is a good manager (AT-VI). 
[Q 25] And, what was very essential was that we liked each other a lot. We 
appreciated and respected each other, and when such a basis lacks you can simply 
forget about the whole thing (DP-II). 
[Q 26] The whole process towards the joint venture has a strong influence on the 
development of personal relationships. Our process towards the establishment of 
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the joint venture took a long time, so we grew close. And in such a process an 
important factor is that people get on with each other (LD-I). 
 
In other words, these meetings facilitated a setting in which the delegates could 
learn about each other, and discovered that they can get along with each other. 
The match between characters could be start of a personal bond. One case 
shows, however, that getting on with each other personally is not a necessary 
condition for the development of trust. [Q 17] on p. 80 already showed that the 
two initiators could not really get on with each other personally. However, 
Hoogovens‟ delegate discovered that he was highly professionally skilled, 
which created promissory-based and competence-based trust. 
 To sum up, the interview data show that the negotiation stage is 
important in order to built trust. It was shown that when trust had been created 
during the previous history, the negotiation process could strengthen this trust. 
The four cases do not show any decrease in trust during negotiations
2
. The 
above comments demonstrate that trust may come about or may be strengthened 
due to four main factors: putting yourself in someone else‟s shoes; starting with 
trust; actual behaviour of the other party; and befriending. All of these factors 
mainly strengthen the image of the other party‟s economic self-interest, but also 
insight is gained into the character of the persons representing the company. 
5.2.3 Commitment 
The commitment stage is the stage “in which the will of the parties meet, when 
they reach an agreement on the obligations and rules for future action in the 
relationship” (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994: 98). Two kinds of safeguards appear 
to influence the development of trust during this stage. The first safeguard is the 
contract. Although the respondents mention many other functions of the contract 
and other written documents, one of the functions is still making the other party 
stick to the agreement. This security yields trust in the other party. A second 
factor that proved to establish trust is the mode of co-operation. In other words, 
it made a difference whether the parties set up a joint venture or a non-equity 
alliance. It can be stated that this stage confirms the expectations raised during 
                                                     
2
 This is not surprising, since any negotiations characterised by a decrease in 
trust would probably not have resulted in a joint venture   
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the former stage. While the partners have to find out whether the other party 
will have an economic advantage during the negotiation stage, the other party 
confirms this perception by signing the joint venture contract. The following 
two sections discuss these two factors into more detail. 
5.2.3.1 Contracts and minutes 
Contracts and other written documents appeared to be useful documents to make 
sure that the other party would keep to the agreement. It was felt that in the end 
they could use these documents in order to force the other party to keep to the 
agreement, because the documents were legally binding
3
. The following quotes 
are illustrative for the trust-building function of the contract and other written 
documents: 
[Q 27] An example: Kemira thinks we will sell a lot, so we put this objective in 
our minutes. We have to invest for this amount of sales, so it cannot be that when 
these investments have been made that Kemira says “yes, we have said that but 
that was then and this is now…”. That is the reason why you put these things on 
paper; as a piece of evidence. If something goes wrong, we need to know who is 
responsible (KJ-III). 
[Q 28] Do you believe Gamma or Beta will keep to their promises and if so, why? 
Yes, and I think for the same reason that we keep to our promises. ..When you 
start to cheat, the relationship will not last long. In addition to the fact that when 
you do not keep to essential matters, you can make someone legally liable. 
However, when the conflicts are about small issues that are minor concerning the 
contents, such legal action will be fatal to the relationship (AM-VI). 
[Q 29] So without the minutes you would trust them less to keep their side of the 
deal? Yes. And because they would forget about this agreement or because of 
unwillingness? Well, the former, and it may be that priorities are put differently in 
time. The chance of sliding down is too big. We are all human (LC-XV). 
 
One respondent also mentioned this function of the contract, although he 
refused to accept this function: 
[Q 30] Putting things on paper is like a protection, normally legal. However, when 
things function you could discuss them over a cup of coffee as well as at a formal 
                                                     
3
 The awareness that contracts could be incomplete was not mentioned. 
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meeting. I feel it is more because of a lack of confidence, that you would like to 
have things on paper, because then you have your back covered. I don't have that 
need and I think that is there is nothing wrong with a failure sometimes (KC-
XIII). 
 
In other words, when the matter is essential and cannot be solved in another 
way, partners have the feeling that they can fall back on the contract and make 
someone legally liable. Therefore, they put major issues that involve a large 
perceived risk on paper. However, partners will not often use the contract to 
enforce decisions, as [Q 28] showed. Partners rather try to work things out in 
other ways than by pointing at the contract. Using the contract in order to make 
the other party keep to the agreement is perceived to be damaging to the 
relationship. The following two quotes illustrate this point:  
[Q 31] We never have to use our documents after we have signed them. But that is 
not unique for ABG, we have this in all our joint ventures. We are of the opinion 
that when a problem arises, we have to solve it in a friendly way, and to discuss it 
irrespective of what has been written in the legal documents. And this has turned 
out very well. You‟ll become friends, and you‟ll have a baby (i.e. joint venture) 
together. What happens to a marriage when you start to discuss legal matters, you 
start separating (AHA-III). 
[Q 32] If you don‟t keep to the agreement, you can be held legally liable. 
However, in practice this will never happen in such a way, because you are 
together on one ship and it is a matter of give and take. When there is one who 
often falls by the wayside or when you have conflicts many times, the relationship 
will not work (AM-IV). 
 
Hence, although the contract built trust in the sense that partners perceived the 
contract as a „last resort‟, the partners were hesitant to use it. The data reveal the 
following other functions of putting things on paper: 
 Remembering. Most of the respondents stressed that writing things down 
had the function of remembering on which they had agreed. It appeared that 
most of the interviewees had more roles than just being on the board of the 
joint venture, and therefore it was difficult for them to remember everything 
on which they had agreed.  
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 Documentation. Writing things down gave a record of the history of the 
joint venture. With this documentation board members who leave the joint 
venture could pass on some continuity to their successors. 
 Creating understanding. The respondents mentioned that writing things 
down contributed to the understanding about of matters on which parties 
had agreed, thereby avoiding misunderstanding. It could, therefore, save 
negotiation time, since they did not have to discuss matters on which parties 
had agreed. 
 Keeping the superiors informed. 
 Formality. It appeared that some of the interviewees wrote things down, 
simply because the law required them to do so. Moreover, in Portugal the 
MIJV was obliged by law to have hand-written minutes of all the meetings.  
5.2.3.2 Mode of co-operation 
A second factor that built trust appeared to be the mode of co-operation. For 
Akzo Nobel, starting a joint venture instead of a non-equity agreement gave an 
extra foundation of trust, as the following comment reveals:  
[Q 33] We have started a joint venture because we wanted to create commitment 
towards both processes (production and marketing). … Kemira has several 
production locations. Therefore, it would be relatively easy for them to drain this 
plant in case of a bad supply agreement and to deliver from their own production 
locations. And you never know how such things develop in the future (KP-I). 
 
Hence, the creation of a joint venture aligned the interest of the parties and 
therefore the parties trusted each other to do their best for the joint venture, 
since it was in their own interest to do so. Starting a joint venture also meant 
joint ownership of investments made. This also built goodwill-based trust of 
Akzo Nobel in Kemira:  
[Q 34] Did you trust Kemira not to misuse you? Yes, they committed themselves 
to an investment, with a synergy effect. Then you trust that it will not be a short 
relationship (KK-IV). 
 
Summarising this section, we can state that during the commitment stage trust 
develops mainly because of two typical safeguards, namely the contract and 
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other written documents (i.e. articles of association, minutes), and the mode of 
co-operation. These two factors confirm the partners‟ ideas about the other 
party‟s interest in a joint venture. This section also showed that partners prefer 
to work things out without threatening with the contract. 
5.2.4 Execution 
5.2.4.1 Monitoring 
The data suggest that trust built during the previous phases gets a chance to 
prove itself during this stage. The data show one additional factor through 
which trust is maintained. This is monitoring (through management positions 
and audits). The following four quotes illustrate this point. To the question “Do 
you have an evaluation system to review the activities of your partner in this 
joint venture?”, several respondents answered: 
[Q 35] No, except that we share the same reporting documents. They receive the 
same reports from the management team as we do. So for example when 
Lusosider is unable to produce because they did not receive the raw material from 
Hoogovens, I would pick up my telephone and call Hoogovens. But it is not a 
formal report. It is not in the interest of the management to hide this information, 
since delay in production would give bad results. So it is much better to explain 
such results when Hoogovens is not performing well. And we are aware of this 
(LU-VII). 
[Q 36] In the operational relationship Usinor supplies to the joint venture. We 
monitor this activity through the joint venture. It is not the nature of our 
relationship to set up an independent monitor system (LD-VII). 
[Q 37] No, we only monitor Alpha‟s performance through the management team 
of the joint venture. For example: maintenance was not carried out well under the 
supervision of Alpha. The management team reports this to us (AA-IX). 
[Q 38] We have allowed each other to have an audit every year. This has been 
done until now. And would you trust the other party without this audit? It is not a 
matter of trusting the man or not. Such an audit confirms that the process is 
carried out carefully. It is nothing more than business-like distrust, not personal 
(KP-VII).  
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Hence, through constant indirect monitoring the partners remain posted on 
changes in their partner‟s behaviour, strategy, or environment. Changes may be 
an indication of a changing self-interest in the joint venture. Since an economic 
self-interest is one of the main sources of trust (section 5.3 elaborates on this 
point), it is important to check whether this interest changes. Furthermore, I 
found similar factors that were also present in the previous phases. Especially 
behaviour confirmed the image that was already built during the former phases, 
as the following two comments show: 
[Q 39]  The Gamma board member is open and faithful. His behaviour contributes 
to such an image. When you co-operate with somebody, you constantly 
communicate. And during this communication you get a feeling whether or not 
this man can be trusted. This is not different from private life (AA-III). 
[Q 40]  Do you think Kemira will be able to develop their future competencies in 
such a way that the joint venture will keep in line or ahead of its rivals? if yes, 
why do you think so? They are the leaders in their market segment, and under 
normal circumstances they will defend that position. They look like that. I don‟t 
have any reason to question that; however, I can‟t look into the future. But all 
their actions, their orientation, give trust (KP-IX). 
 
Summarising, the execution stage shows that trust is maintained through 
constant indirect signals that the other party can be trusted. These signals are 
given by the management of the joint venture and the accountants. In addition, 
the partners use the factors mentioned to maintain trust.  
5.3 SOURCES OF TRUST AND HOW THEY MAY CHANGE 
This section addresses the second part of our research question (subquestions 2 
and 4, presented in Table 1-1 on p. 7). The data reveal that economic self-
interest and emotions are two main sources of trust. The following two sections 
discuss these sources in more detail. The first section discusses trust based on 
economic self-interest. LAP is used as an example that is emblematic of both 
Kemax and DSM BASF. Section 5.3.2 will elaborate on trust based on 
emotions. 
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5.3.1 Sources of trust: economic self-interest 
The data suggest that economic self-interest is one of the main sources of trust. 
This economic self-interest emanates from interdependence. This section 
discusses this proposition. The data reveal two dimensions of interdependence 
that yield trust, namely interdependence between the partners and 
interdependence on the joint venture.  
5.3.1.1 Interdependence between the partners 
The following quotes indicate that Hoogovens‟ trust in Usinor is mainly based 
on Usinor‟s economic interdependence relationship with Hoogovens: 
[Q 41] You have to know whether the joint venture partner has an interest in the 
agreement made. If they have no self-interest, you should not trust them. So their 
welfare is important to us. We have to strive for win-win situations (LC-XIX). 
[Q 42] But how can you trust this man’s words? Do you trust him because it is in 
his own interest to behave that way or do you feel he cares about you? The latter. 
You really need signals that he considers his relation with you as important. And 
that he makes an effort for that relationship. But suppose the long-term 
perspective will eliminate, will you still trust him? No, there should be an 
economic interest that makes you realise that it is important for them to keep the 
relationship in the right direction. If you had to rely on the good will of other 
persons only, I think the basis is too weak (LC-XXIV). 
[Q 43] I believe they will keep to the agreement since this is in the best interest of 
all parties. So according to me, a motive of Usinor to keep to the agreement is to 
sustain the business relationship. Not keeping the agreement may ruin the 
relationship. And that will be at the expense of the joint venture and thus at the 
expense of Usinor (LD-XII). 
[Q 44] So because of a huge change in the steel industry another attractive partner 
has appeared. And that might be a reason for you to switch partners? No. Two 
reasons. [a] you cannot force the other party contractually to sell their share. [b] 
you cannot say „go away‟; that is not the kind of relation we have in this joint 
venture. You can always make someone‟s life a misery. Although, then you risk 
more than this relationship; then you have to question whether you want to 
jeopardise the other relationships you have with similar companies. We also have 
other relationships with Usinor, so you will provoke particular reactions (LD-II).  
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The above comments reveal that Hoogovens‟ delegates trust Usinor to behave 
co-operatively, because they think Usinor has an economic self-interest to do so. 
This corresponds with Usinor‟s real motives, as the following quote illustrates: 
[Q 45] Would Usinor also keep to the agreement if it had not been written down? 
If we don‟t keep to the agreement, it is impossible to say that we trust the people. 
And you should also understand that we have many other relationships. So 
nobody would just spoil the relationship for the sake of a small gain (LU-XIII). 
 
 The interdependence relationship between the companies manifests 
itself in the IJV relationship. However, the comments also show that the 
relationship goes further than the particular joint venture within the chemical 
and steel industry. Because the partners operate in similar markets they support 
each other with technical problems and run into one another at trade fairs. 
Because of this interdependence, people behave co-operatively in order to 
maintain the good atmosphere of the interpersonal relationship. Spoiling such 
relationships makes it hard or even impossible to call upon the other party for 
economic purposes. The delegates are careful about such relationships, because 
they realise they are part of a bigger organisation. Their behaviour may affect 
their company‟s reputation and thus other relationships4. Once co-operating in a 
joint venture relationship, they are careful about the interpersonal relationship, 
because they believe a negative atmosphere will negatively affect the interaction 
process. For example, the partner might become firmer in their demands, give 
less and take more, and might be less willing to sympathise with the other party. 
This will negatively influence the decision-making process. In addition, it will 
be less pleasant to work in a rather negative atmosphere. In other words, it will 
influence a persons‟ job satisfaction negatively.  
                                                     
4
 The data show that people‟s personal motivations to cling to this economic 
reasoning is rather negative: people are afraid to lose their position or job. This 
fear makes them eager to live up to the expectations (i.e. to play their role). 
However, most of the respondents also mention they are not driven by these 
expectations only. They stress that they like to take up the challenge of doing 
their outmost. The eagerness to win, not liking to fail, wanting to create new 
things, taking pride in proving yourself and more job variation are key 
statements in this respect.  
CHAPTER FIVE     91 
 
 In sum, this section shows that trust may be based on the following: 
economic interdependence between companies promotes co-operative behaviour 
of the employees in order to maintain the good interpersonal relationship. The 
partner‟s economic self-interest emanates from this interdependence.  
5.3.1.2 Interdependence on the joint venture 
In addition to interdependence between companies, the data show a second 
dependence relationship in IJVs. The commitment stage already demonstrated 
that the mode of co-operation plays an important role in the building of trust. 
Opting for a joint venture means being part owner of the operation, hence being 
responsible for IJV performance (see e.g. [Q 33] on p. 86). This 
interdependence relationship also promotes the efforts partners put into the IJV 
relationship, since this will directly contribute to the performance of the 
company as a whole. The data reveal that trust in the other party is based on this 
reasoning. 
 A good example is Kemax, where failing to meet expectations did not 
lead to distrust for a long time, because Kemira believed Akzo Nobel to have a 
self-interest to solve the problem. In this case, the calcium chloride plant did not 
perform optimally since the start of the joint venture. This was due to Akzo 
Nobel‟s failure to solve a technical problem. Kemira, however, believed that 
Akzo Nobel made an effort to solve the problem, since it was in the interest of 
Akzo Nobel to solve the problem as soon as possible. After all, low performance 
of the plant directly affected Akzo Nobel‟s performance as a whole. Hence, 
since Kemira understood that Akzo Nobel‟s behaviour was not on purpose and 
that they made effort to solve the problem, Kemira maintained their goodwill-
based trust in Akzo Nobel for quite a long time. Moreover, Kemira did not 
monitor Akzo Nobel‟s endeavours; they trusted the information presented by 
Akzo Nobel. This is a proof of Kemira‟s promissory-based trust in Akzo Nobel, 
which had been developed during the former stages. However, the case also 
shows that trust does not last forever. After four years, Kemira thought about 
sending their own people to find out about the problems. There had been no 
results and Kemira started to think that Akzo Nobel was not competent enough 
to solve the problem. Note that only competence-based trust had decreased and 
that Kemira kept its goodwill-based trust and promissory-based trust in Akzo 
Nobel. Moreover, the partners arranged an extra board meeting to discuss the 
92     RESULTS 
 
problem. However, before this happened, Akzo Nobel managed to solve the 
problem, thereby taking away Kemira‟s worries and distrust. In other words, 
Kemira trusted that Akzo Nobel‟s failure was not on purpose, because Kemira 
believed Akzo Nobel had a economic self-interest to solve the problem. 
 
Summarising, section 5.3.1 discussed trust based on the economic self-interest 
of the partner. This economic self-interest is caused by economic 
interdependence between the partners. Economic interdependence manifests 
itself in two ways. The first one is interdependence between companies. 
Because companies depend on each other (i.e. they need each other‟s resources), 
people behave co-operatively in order to maintain the interpersonal relationship. 
When this relationship is spoiled, calling on the other party for economic 
purposes will be more difficult or even impossible. Once co-operating in the 
joint venture, preserving the interpersonal relationship becomes important 
because it is believed that a negative atmosphere will negatively affect the 
interaction within the joint venture relationship. The second dimension of 
economic interdependence is dependence on the joint venture. It is believed that 
co-operative behaviour will affect the joint venture‟s performance, thereby 
directly contributing to the performance of the company as a whole. Figure 5-1 
presents trust based on economic self-interest. 
Figure 5-1. Trust based on economic self-interest 
A‟s perception of B 
B‟s economic  
interdependence on A     Maintaining the  
and on other companies     relationship 
    B‟s co-operative 
    behaviour 
 
B‟s economic dependence     IJVperformance/ B‟s 
on the joint venture     corporate performance 
         
 
 
A‟s trust in B 
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5.3.2 Sources of trust: emotions 
The data reveal a second source of trust, namely „emotions‟. The case of ABG 
illustrates this point. During the years 1978 and 1979 ABG suffered huge losses 
due to low market prices and high gas prices. Extra financing was needed to 
continue the joint venture. This could, however, get Gamma as a company into 
financial problems. Gamma openly discussed these problems with the Dutch 
partners. It turned out that both Dutch partners were prepared to solve ABG‟s 
problems on their own by financing Gamma‟s part as a loan to ABG.  
 What made Alpha and Beta decide to make this financing? In other 
words, what made them behave co-operatively? Economic self-interest did not 
stimulate the behaviour of Alpha‟s delegate; AB could continue the joint 
venture without Gamma. The gas Gamma contributed was not essential to keep 
the joint venture going. Hence, it was not necessary to keep Gamma in the joint 
venture and therefore, Alpha and Beta could have left the problem with Gamma. 
 Alpha‟s delegate explains that he sympathised with the man and, 
therefore, felt sorry for him. The following quote demonstrates this point: 
[Q 46] I sympathised with Gamma‟s delegate and his colleague: if we had 
followed the rules of the game, they would have gone down. So I made a lot of 
effort to find all kinds of ways to help him, without betraying Alpha and Beta. I 
knew the joint venture was his baby, so I did not want to let him down, because I 
liked him too much for that. ... So, it was not self-interest, but rather pity for the 
other partner (AW-III). 
 
However, this sympathy involved more than „getting on with each other‟. A 
close friendship was the basis of these feelings. This personal relationship 
started during negotiations, when they discovered that they got along with each 
other very well (see e.g. [Q 23] on page 82). Their sympathy for each other grew 
into a friendship that involved feelings of warmth and affection. Moreover, the 
delegates met each other also outside the joint venture relationship
5
. The 
following comment illustrates this: 
[Q 47] I often go fishing in Scandinavia with Gamma‟s delegate, on Gamma‟s 
fishing grounds. And sometimes another ex board member joins us and when I see 
                                                     
5
 Even after their retirement the two delegates kept visiting each other. 
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him again I am overwhelmed with warm feelings. I just like that (AW-III, AW-
IX). 
 
 In order to understand whether this behaviour built trust, the question 
arises of how the Gamma delegate interpreted AB‟s behaviour. As discussed in 
chapter three, „trust can vary between individuals, even in otherwise identical 
conditions‟ (Nooteboom, Berger and Noorderhaven, 1995: 3). Gamma‟s 
delegate interpreted the behaviour as is revealed in the following comment: 
[Q 48] We had a long discussion in Amsterdam and then Alpha‟s board member, 
who has become a good friend of mine, a very good friend, he is coming up next 
week, he said to me: „I see you are in big trouble and we are going to finance on 
behalf of what is needed from your side, so that the joint venture can go on. We 
can find some arrangement, so that you can pay back when you are in a more 
profitable situation‟. Why did he propose this? Well, and then he said something, 
and I will never forget, which he had learned from a Japanese joint venture. They 
had said to him „a joint venture is not an ordinary business arrangement, a joint 
venture should be considered as a sacred thing‟. That is a beautiful phrase! And 
he used that, and as a matter of fact, he lived up to it at that crucial time. But did 
he propose this because he depended on the joint venture? If he had not depend 
on the Scandinavian gas you gave access to, do you think he would also have 
made this proposal? Oh yes, I think it was not necessary for him personally, of 
course it would be a failure for Alpha if ABG had gone into liquidation, so better 
give some money for some time to keep it together. So also from a business point 
of view it was a wise decision. No doubt about that. So there were many motives 
playing at the same time (AHA-II, AHA-IV). 
 
In this case, the perceptions of the parties match partly: whereas Alpha‟s 
delegate says his behaviour was emotional, Gamma believes his behaviour was 
also driven by economic self-interest. However, the quote also demonstrates that 
Gamma did not perceive economic self-interest to be the main motive for AB‟s 
behaviour. This was confirmed after a telephone call on 23/06/1998: he also 
believed that emotions were Alpha‟s delegate‟s main drive to support him.  
 In sum, this section shows that emotions may overrule economic self-
interest. In this case, the delegate helped out the other party, just because he 
liked the other person and not because of economic arguments. After all, AB 
could go on with the joint venture without Gamma, or even end the joint 
venture, which could have been a wise decision at that time because the joint 
venture was making losses.  
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The ABG case shows that the action may develop trust based on emotions. 
Figure 5-2 presents the relationship between trust, emotions and behaviour. 
Figure 5-2. Trust based on emotions 
A‟s perception of B 
 
B‟s emotions   B‟s co-operative  behaviour 
 
 
 
A‟s trust in B 
 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
We started this study with the proposition that trust develops through changes in 
interdependence and behaviour (see chapter 3). The empirical study confirms 
this proposition, yet, it also reveals other factors that contribute to the 
development of trust. 
 First, this study confirms the important role of interdependence as a 
main source of  trust. The partners believe that economic interdependence 
between companies promotes co-operative behaviour of employees in order to 
preserve the interpersonal relationship and to improve IJV performance. This 
way of thinking yields trust, because they believe that their partner has an 
economic self-interest to behave co-operatively. This study could not confirm 
Gill and Butler‟s (1996) finding that different patterns of interdependence (i.e. 
pooled or sequential) affect the development of trust (see section 3.3.2). The 
findings suggest that this is due to the fact that sequential dependent partners 
realise that they might need the other party in the future. This shadow of the 
future may take away direct competition that may arise from sequential 
interdependence. It also diminishes the effect of possible asymmetry at a 
particular moment.  
 In addition to this economic self-interest (which emanates from 
interdependence) as a source of trust, the data reveal a second source: emotions. 
Section 5.3.2 shows that the difference between trust based on emotions and 
trust based on economic self-interest is the intensity of the personal relationship. 
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This study suggests that trust based on emotions means a lot more than „getting 
on with each other‟; it calls for a deep and intensive friendship. 
 Second, this study also confirms the important role of behaviour in the 
development of trust. Several manifestations of behaviour appear in section 5.2. 
For example, partner A monitors changes in B‟s economic self-interest. Also 
B‟s actual behaviour affects trust. For example, quote [Q 16] shows that keeping 
to minor agreements gradually builds a reputation of trustworthiness. This 
confirms Blau‟s (1992) finding that exchange relations “evolve in a slow 
process, starting with minor transactions in which little trust is required because 
little risk is involved” (ibid., p. 94). It also confirms Madhok‟s (1995b) and 
Zucker‟s (1986) findings that interaction builds trust. The study also supports 
Zucker‟s (1986) finding about the effect of reputation as a trust building factor. 
Next, it is shown that perceived interdependence leads to perceived co-operative 
behaviour in order to preserve the atmosphere of the interpersonal relationship 
(Williamson, 1975; Gundlach and Cadotte, 1994; Geyskens et al., 1996). 
 Next to behaviour this chapter presents additional factors that affect the 
building and sustaining of trust; factors that were not included in model M0. 
These factors are presented in Table 5-2 (behaviour included). 
Table 5-2. Building and sustaining trust 
Phase Factors that build and sustain trust 
Previous 
history 
the overall reputation of the company; 
prior exchange between the companies on an organisational 
level; 
direct personal contact between the initiators. 
Negotiations 
putting yourself in someone else‟s shoes; 
starting with trust; 
actual behaviour of the other party; 
befriending. 
Commitment 
contract and other written agreements; 
mode of co-operation. 
Execution 
monitoring; 
developing bonds of friendship. 
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Section 5.3.2 added factor „developing bonds of friendship‟, a factor that 
promotes trust based on emotions. Each of these factors should be regarded as 
an additional factor. For example, managers use information obtained from prior 
exchange especially during the previous history, but they will also take this 
information into account during negotiations and following stages. Thus, each 
phase adds factors that increase the certainty about the other party‟s motivations 
(i.e. an economic self-interest and/or emotions) to behave in a trustworthy 
fashion.  
 
 6  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
International joint ventures (IJVs) are a popular means to penetrate foreign 
markets. Statistical evidence shows that the number of joint ventures in Central 
and Eastern Europe and in China increases rapidly (Dunning, 1994; Buckley and 
Ghauri, 1994; Luo and Chen, 1997). This popularity is due to the fact that they 
offer numerous advantages, like gaining access to the partner‟s expertise, 
obtaining economies of scale, and overcoming governmental restrictions (Lin, 
Yu and Seetoo, 1997).  
 However, joint ventures also have certain disadvantages. Their main 
drawback is that partners have to share control over the joint venture (Killing, 
1982; Geringer and Herbert, 1989). Shared control raises transaction costs. 
Several studies have stressed the importance of trust in reducing these 
transaction costs (Buckley and Casson, 1988; Nooteboom, 1996, 1998; Parkhe, 
1993a, Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). Moreover, most scholars state that trust is 
indispensable for the formation and maintenance of economic ties between 
firms (cf. Granovetter, 1992; Nooteboom, 1998). 
 This thesis provides an insight into the development of trust between 
partners in IJVs. Studying developmental processes requires a longitudinal 
approach. Although some scholars advocate such an approach to IJV research 
(Hyder and Ghauri, 1991; Parkhe, 1993b; Stafford, 1995), only some studies 
have been done on developmental processes (cf. Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; 
Gulati, 1995; Madhok, 1995a; Spekman et al., 1996; Ariño and De la Torre, 
1996). This is the reason why this study has been conducted. This study will fill 
the gap in the IJV literature on developmental processes and will contribute to a 
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theory on trust in IJVs. Furthermore, understanding how trust develops will 
improve the management of IJVs. 
6.2 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS STUDY 
6.2.1 Background and theory 
Chapter 1 explains the role of trust in IJVs and clarifies the importance of 
studying its development. Whatever its sources, trust reduces transaction costs 
(Buckley and Casson, 1988; Nooteboom, 1998). It lowers the costs of searching 
for a suitable partner, the costs of contracting and the costs of monitoring. It 
facilitates open and honest interaction, makes people less secretive, and 
improves managerial problem-solving effectiveness (Zand, 1972). Despite the 
importance of trust, empirical research regarding the development of trust in 
economic transactions has been limited. This thesis aims to fill this gap. To that 
end, the study tries to answer the following research question: 
 
How does trust between partners in international joint venture relationships 
develop? 
 
The research question is divided into four subquestions. First, how can partners 
in IJVs build and sustain trust? This question adds to the literature on factors 
affecting trust by putting these factors into a temporal dimension. Secondly, 
how do perceived sources of trust change in time? To build on former research, 
chapter 1 adds two more subquestions, which are: 3. what is trust?; 4. what are 
major sources of trust? 
 Chapter 2 lays the foundation for answering the first subquestion. It 
summarises international joint venture literature on factors affecting IJV 
performance. The study indicates the significance of trust as a factor influencing 
performance. First, chapter 2 demonstrates that IJV performance is a multi-
dimensional concept, encompassing five dimensions. These are longevity, the 
quality of the working relationship, IJV achievement, effectiveness, and 
stability. Next, chapter 2 presents nine factors that affect IJV performance. 
These factors are partner characteristics, partner strategy, need of resources, 
structure, behaviour, interdependence, environment, evaluation, and trust. Trust 
stands out in this classification, because it overrules most of the other factors. 
CHAPTER SIX     101 
 
For example, when partner‟s trust each other, they will be able to solve 
problems that might arise from differences between them (Zand, 1972). Chapter 
2 ends with a conceptual model of trust development in IJVs (see Figure 2-1 on 
page 26). Among other things, this conceptual model shows that 
interdependence and behaviour directly influence trust. These three variables 
form the basis for the empirical study. 
 Chapter 3 concentrates on trust, interdependence and behaviour, and 
thus elaborates on questions 3 and 4. It shows that trust is a positive perception 
of or expectation about the behaviour of the other party. Trust has three 
dimensions, namely promissory-, competence- and goodwill-based trust (Sako, 
1992; Butler and Gill, 1996). Nooteboom (1996) provides insight into the major 
sources of trust. The chapter distinguishes between a self-interest, care about the 
other party‟s interest (related to emotions), and no opportunity to behave 
untrustworthy. Trust based on economic self-interest and/or emotions refers to 
Nooteboom‟s (1998) wide concept of trust; the narrow concept only includes 
emotions. After having discussed trust, the chapter defines interdependence and 
behaviour. Chapter 3 continues with empirical evidence from literature about 
the relations between the three variables. The last section presents this study‟s 
conceptual model, model M0. 
 The methods for this study on developing trust are discussed in chapter 
4. This study follows a case study approach and concentrates on four 
international joint ventures. This selection involves 13 companies and 35 
interviews. A questionnaire was developed to structure the interviews around 
trust, interdependence, and behaviour. Furthermore, chapter 4 presents the 
method of analysis. The data was analysed according to a three-step approach, 
based on Miles and Huberman (1990) and Strauss and Corbin (1994). First, the 
interview data were divided into meaningful segments. Next, these fragments 
were coded; and finally, the codes were grouped. 
6.2.2 Empirical findings 
Chapter 5 presents the empirical results of this study. First, it describes the 
background of the case companies. Section 5.1 highlights the interdependence 
relationship between the partners. Section 5.2 presents the data that are 
necessary to answer subquestion 1. Section 5.3 discusses two major sources of 
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trust and shows how these sources may change in time, thus presenting data to 
answer subquestion 2 and 4. 
 The following section discusses subquestion 2 and 4. Section 6.2.2.2 
will give an answer to subquestion 1. 
6.2.2.1 Major sources of trust and how they change in time 
The first major conclusion is that economic self-interest and emotions are the 
two main sources of trust (which answers subquestion 4). However, chapter 5 
shows that trust is only based on emotions when a bond of friendship develops. 
Hence, the answer to subquestion 2 (how do perceived sources of trust change 
in time) is: trust based on economic self-interest does not change in time unless 
a bond of friendship develops. The remainder of this section will elaborate on 
this proposition. 
 Trust based on economic self-interest and/or emotions corresponds with 
Nooteboom‟s (1998) wide concept of trust, which was already discussed in 
chapter 3. Chapter 5 shows that most board members find it difficult to fully 
trust the other partner without any perceived economic self-interest for the other 
party (see e.g. quote [Q 41] on page 89). In the end, delegates reason as follows: 
when the partner‟s economic self-interest ceases to exist (i.e. when they are not 
dependent on us through the joint venture), they will loose their motive to 
maintain good, personal relationships, so that every kind of behaviour will 
become possible (see chapter 5, section 5.3.1). Furthermore, chapter 5 shows 
that such economic self-interest goes beyond the joint venture (see quotes [Q 
41] to [Q 45] on page 89). Chapter 5 proposes that perceived network 
interdependence urges delegates to maintain good personal relationships, since 
only then they can use their network in the future. Consequently, a good 
atmosphere has certain long-term economic benefits (cf. Provan, 1993). 
Moreover, the data suggest that opting for a joint venture means being part 
owner of the company, hence being responsible for performance. This 
interdependence relationship also stimulates the efforts partners put into the IJV 
relationship, since this will directly contribute to the performance of the 
company as a whole (see section 5.3.1 and Figure 5-1). 
 Trust is only based on emotions when a bond of friendship develops. 
The case of ABG presents evidence for this proposition. Such a friendship 
means more than „getting on with each other‟. It includes feelings of affection 
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and warmth, and the persons involved meet each other also outside the joint 
venture (see quote [Q 47] on page 93). Chapter 5 reveals that these deep 
emotional feelings may overrule economic self-interest (see e.g. [Q 46] on page 
93). The case of ABG shows that the delegate strove for the other party‟s 
interest, just because he liked the other person and not because of economic 
arguments. The case shows that this action develops trust based on emotions.  
 To summarise, economic self-interest and emotions are the two main 
sources of trust. The difference between trust based on emotions or trust based 
on economic self-interest is the intensity of the personal relationship. This study 
proposes that trust based on emotions requires more than „getting on with each 
other‟; it calls for a deep and close friendship. 
6.2.2.2 How partners can build and sustain trust 
This section answers subquestion 1 (how can partners in IJVs build and sustain 
trust?). Chapter 5 presents empirical material to answer this question. The 
chapter presents eleven factors that affect trust based on economic self-interest 
and/or emotions (see section 5.2.1 to 5.2.4 and section 5.3.2). To summarise, 
chapter 5 presents the following factors (section 6.5, Managerial implications, 
elaborates on each of these factors): 
Table 6-1. Building and sustaining trust 
Phase Factors that build and sustain trust 
Previous 
history 
the overall reputation of the company; 
prior exchange between the companies on an organisational 
level; 
direct personal contact between the initiators. 
Negotiations 
put yourself in others shoes; 
starting with trust; 
actual behaviour of the other party; 
befriending. 
Commitment 
contract and other written agreements; 
mode of co-operation. 
Execution 
monitoring; 
developing bonds of friendship. 
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 These findings contribute to other studies on the factors that affect trust 
by putting these factors into a temporal dimension. Each factor should be 
regarded as an additional factor. For example, the overall reputation of the 
company mainly matters before the partners meet each other to negotiate, but 
delegates will also take this information into account during negotiations and 
following stages. Thus, each phase adds factors that increase the certainty about 
the other party‟s motivations (i.e. an economic self-interest and/or emotions) to 
behave trustworthy. The more positive information available, the more trust 
there will be. 
 Most of the factors presented in Table 6-1 are particularly useful for 
assessing and confirming the other party‟s economic self-interest. For example, 
partners monitor changes in each other strategy, which may give clues for a shift 
in the other party‟s economic self-interest. The contract strengthens the belief 
that the other party has indeed a self-interest (otherwise, the joint venture would 
not have been started up). 
 Chapter 5 and section 6.2.2.1 show that one factor is particularly 
interesting when partners want to develop trust based on emotions. This factor is 
„developing bonds of friendship‟. The joint venture ABG shows how delegates 
can develop bonds of friendship. First, the delegates spend time to build 
personal relationships. Every two years the board member spend a weekend 
together with their spouses. Before and after every official meeting they also 
arrange social events. Second, the friendship develops because of the matching 
characters. Third, the people involved are socially able people (i.e. emotionally 
intelligent). According to Cooper and Sawaf (1997), this includes authenticity, 
empathy, and self-consciousness. 
 To summarise, this study proposes eleven factors that build and sustain 
trust. The factors presented provide information about the other party‟s 
motivations to behave in a trustworthy fashion. These motivations are identical 
to sources of trust (i.e. economic self-interest and emotions). Table 6-2 
summarises the study‟s main questions and answers to these questions. These 
answers fill the gap in the IJV literature on developmental processes and 
contributes to a theory on trust in IJVs. 
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Table 6-2. Answers to this study’s main questions 
Subquestion Answer to the question 
What is trust? Trust is the expectation that the delegates of the 
other partner who are on the board of directors 
will act co-operatively. 
What are the major sources 
of trust? 
Economic self-interest and emotions. 
How can partners in IJVs 
build and sustain trust? 
This study presents 11 factors that build and 
sustain trust (see Table 6-1 on page 103). 
How do perceived sources 
of trust change in time? 
Trust based on economic self-interest does not 
change in time unless bonds of friendship 
develop. 
 
Having answered the main research question, model M0 (presented in Figure 3-3 
on page 45) can be improved. This will be done in the section below. 
6.3 THE NEW MODEL, M1 
Model M0 assumes that partners may build and sustain trust through 
interdependence and behaviour. In turn, trust will affect these variables. 
Through these interactions, trust will develop. Based on the conclusions, model 
M0 can be improved. Figure 6-1 presents an integral model of trust development 
in IJVs (model M1), and links the results to the earlier research model. 
 
  
FACTORS CREATING A PERCEPTION 
PERCEIVED SOURCES OF TRUST 
Figure 6-1. A model for developing trust in IJVs 
 PREVIOUS HISTORY    NEGOTIATIONS  COMMITMENT    EXECUTION 
 
B‟s Overall   Prior     Direct Personal Put Yourself   Start with    B‟s          Befriending Contract  Mode of           Monitor Changes    (Develop Bonds 
Reputation    Exchange    Contact with B in B‟s Shoes    Trust        Behaviour  and Other   Co-operation        in B‟s Economic       of Friendship)1 
    with B        Agreements            Self-Interest   
          
 
 
 
 
A‟S PERCEPTION OF B 
 
  B‟s economic interdependence 
  on A and other companies        Maintaining relationship 
  (i.e. network interdependence) 
       
  B‟s economic dependence           B‟s co-operative behaviour  
  on the joint venture          IJV performance/ 
            B‟s corporate performance 
  (B‟s personal emotions) 
 
 
A‟S TRUST IN B‟S CO-OPERATIVE BEHAVIOUR
                                                     
1
 the factors between brackets are related to trust based on emotions. The remaining factors are relevant for assessing the 
other party‟s economic interdependence (and economic self-interest). 
I 
III 
II 
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Model M1 shows that behaviour and interdependence play an important role in 
the development of trust. Both variables recur in our final model on line II. Line 
II presents people‟s perception on which trust is based. It is a way of thinking 
that causes trust: it says that A believes that B will behave co-operatively 
because of two main reasons. First, representatives of the partner who are on the 
board of the joint venture will behave co-operatively because they have an 
economic self-interest to do so. This economic self-interest has two dimensions, 
namely economic interdependence on other companies, also outside the joint 
venture relationship, and economic dependence on the joint venture. The second 
main reason is personal emotions (these sources were also discussed in section 
6.2.2.1). Co-operative behaviour will keep the interpersonal relationship sound, 
and will affect the joint venture‟s performance and thus corporate performance. 
In order to create this way of thinking, the delegates need input. Line I shows 
several factors that help to create A‟s perception of partner B, discussed in 
section 6.2.2.1. Each phase adds several factors, enriching his or her picture of 
the other partner. The richer and more consistent the picture, the more certainty, 
and the more trust. 
 How do the model M1 and M0 relate to each other? Model M1 confirms 
the importance of interdependence and behaviour in the development of trust. 
Behaviour returns in model M1 as a factor assessing partner B‟s motivations of 
behaviour (e.g. partner A monitors changes in B‟s economic self-interest) and as 
a perception of B. Also B‟s actual behaviour is incorporated in model M1. 
Interdependence is the main drive behind the other party‟s trustworthy 
behaviour, since this interdependence creates an economic self-interest to 
behave trustworthy. 
 The main refinement is that model M1 distinguishes between perceived 
sources of trust on the one hand and factors that increase the certainty about the 
other party‟s trustworthiness on the other hand. Model M1 suggest that, for 
example, the other party‟s behaviour confirms the idea about why the other party 
is behaving in this particular way, rather than that behaviour directly develops 
trust. Put differently, trust is not based on the perception of the other party‟s 
behaviour, as model M0 suggested, but on the perception of the other party‟s 
reasons for behaving that way. The actual perceived behaviour of the partner‟s 
delegate confirms either this idea or does not. Furthermore, the new model adds 
several factors and specifies particular behaviour that shapes a delegate‟s 
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perception of foundations of trust. Moreover, these factors are put into a 
temporal dimension by categorising the factors in four stages (i.e. previous 
history, negotiations, commitment and execution). 
6.4 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Chapter 1 starts with a discussion on the role of trust in IJV relationships. The 
crux of the matter is if trust plays an essential role in economic relationships. 
Whereas Williamson (1993) prefers to speak in terms of risk, other researchers 
have stressed the important or even essential role of trust (cf. Doney and 
Cannon, 1997; Granovetter, 1992). This thesis takes trust as an essential feature 
of IJV relationships (see section 1.2).  
 Nooteboom (1998) gets to the heart of this discussion when he defines 
trust in a wide and narrow sense. Whereas “the wide concepts includes all 
sources of trust, … the narrow concept would go beyond self-interest” (ibid., p. 
8). His definition is related to the question if we can speak of trust when there is 
a belief in the other party acting trustworthy for other than moral reasons 
(Hardin, 1990; see chapter 3). Williamson (1993) states that the word trust 
should be reserved for social relationships. Hence, he implicitly argues that we 
can only speak of trust when trust is based on emotions and other non-egotistic 
sources of trust. Other researchers just speak of trust, whatever its sources (cf. 
Ganesan, 1994). 
 This study shows that managers confirm the essential role of trust, and 
that they speak of trust in a wide sense. Trust is important to gain business (see 
e.g. [Q 8] on page 77) and to maintain good business relationships. In their 
view, trust is based on economic self-interest and/or emotions (see section 
6.2.2.1). These sources of trust are identical to the other party‟s motivations for 
co-operative behaviour. During the life-cycle of a joint venture, they gather all 
kinds of information to form a perception about the other party‟s motivations. 
The study suggests that bonds of friendship can only develop trust that is based 
on emotions. Therefore, this study confirms the importance of studying social 
processes within economic relationships (Granovetter, 1992; Uzzi, 1997), 
because trust and social processes really matter in these relationships. However, 
to clarify the discussion on trust, it is important that in all cases its sources are 
made clear.  
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6.5 MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
The factors, presented in section Table 6-2, provide guidelines for managers on 
how to build and sustain trust in international joint venture relationships. This 
section summarises these categories and explains how partners within IJVs can 
build and sustain trust.  
6.5.1 Phase 1: assessing the other party’s trustworthiness 
The first phase is important to assessing a potential partner‟s trustworthiness. 
Based on this assessment and other criteria, a company should select the partner 
with the highest relative value, which includes the reputation of being 
trustworthy. There are three factors that build an image of potential partners (cf. 
Larson, 1992). 
 The most general source of information is the reputation of the 
potential partner. Examples of such information are advertising and annual 
reports. Because the company itself generates this information, it will give a 
one-sided, mainly positive image of the company. Therefore, the reliability of 
this kind of information can be questioned. Other studies confirm the effect of 
reputation on building trust (Anderson and Weitz, 1989; Zucker, 1986; Ganesan, 
1994; Doney and Cannon, 1997). 
 The perception of the other party‟s trustworthiness can be enriched with 
information that is available internally. Prior exchange (e.g. supply or buy 
relationships, knowledge transfer) with potential partners will provide 
information that is more reliable because it is provided by colleagues. However, 
because the information comes from colleagues rather than from direct personal 
contact, it is still second-hand. 
 A third source of information that may flow from one‟s own experience 
is earlier personal contact with person(s) that will be involved in the future 
joint venture. This information will present a picture about the persons behind 
the company, rather than about the company as a whole. Such personal 
encounters may take place on trade fairs or even in working groups between 
companies that operate in similar industries. 
 Altogether, this information will give an indication of the other party‟s 
potential economic interest in a joint venture and about their emotional 
commitment. Such information is important, as it determines the company‟s 
attraction. After all, companies will not start a joint venture when the initial 
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image is negative (assuming that there are alternative parties). Finally, 
companies select the company with the highest relative value, which includes, 
amongst other things, the reputation of trustworthy behaviour, network 
relationships, and financial resources (Nooteboom, 1996). Summarising, phase 
1 in the process of building trust can be formulated as follows: 
 
PHASE 1: assessing trustworthiness 
 
In order to select a partner for an IJV, you judge several companies on 
their promissory-, competence, and goodwill-based behaviour. Sources 
of information are the overall reputation of the company, prior 
exchange between your company and the other party, and direct 
personal contact between you and representatives of the other 
company. Select the company with the highest relative value for your 
company, which includes the reputation of trustworthy behaviour. 
 
6.5.2 Phase 2: building trust 
Negotiations are the stage in the process at which the initial image can be 
adjusted. What matters during this stage is whether the words of the partner‟s 
representatives can be trusted. After all, a confirmation of these words can only 
be obtained during the following two phases. There are four aspects that 
contribute to a building of trust. 
 The first source of information are the words of the partner‟s delegates 
about their interest in a joint venture. In order to find out whether they are 
telling the truth and are fully open, delegates can put themselves in the other 
party’s shoes. In this way, they can compare the words of the other party with 
information obtained during the former stage. This image can be completed by 
asking critical questions. If the information gained matches, a consistent image 
will appear, which increases trust. Ghauri (1996) also mentions this technique. 
What matters is that delegates try to understand the position of the other party. 
Because they can never collect enough information to be totally sure about the 
other party‟s interest, intuition matters greatly (Bell, 1996). Intuition is related 
to Uzzi‟s (1997) „heuristics‟, which refers to “the decision-making processes 
that economise on cognitive resources, time, and attention processes, but do not 
necessarily jeopardise the quality of decisions” (Uzzi, 1997: 44). Non-verbal 
language, such as facial expressions and body language, also affect intuition. 
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 Starting with trust until the opposite is proved is an attitude that may 
help to set an initial atmosphere of trust. This attitude depends on the character 
of the persons and various notions, like the belief that good business deals can 
be made only with a trusting attitude. Rotter (in: Good, 1988:32) also found that 
“those who are willing to trust other people are likely to be equally trustworthy 
in that they are less likely to lie, cheat, or steal”. 
 Furthermore, the behaviour of the representatives also matters. This 
behaviour mainly provides an insight into the other party‟s promissory-based 
behaviour. Keeping to minor agreements may indicate that the partner will also 
keep to major agreements. This corresponds with Blau (1992: 94), who states 
that “exchange relations evolve in a slow process, starting with minor 
transactions in which little trust is required because little risk is involved”. 
 A fourth important factor that may contribute to the building of trust is 
the development of a personal bond. Personal meetings, both business and 
social, play an important role, as well as the social behaviour of the people 
involved. By developing personal bonds, the people involved get to know each 
other better, including their body language. Due to this, they are better able to 
understand the way the other person thinks and feels. 
 Summarising the negotiation phase, it can be stated that trust is mainly 
built during this phase. Whereas trust focuses mainly on the company as a 
whole during the previous history, during the negotiation phase its focus shifts 
towards the persons behind the company. The following phase can now be 
formulated. 
112     DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
PHASE 2: building trust 
 
The negotiation stage can be used to assess whether or not your initial 
perception of the potential partner is confirmed. Several factors are 
useful to adjust the image that was already shaped during the previous 
history: 
1. put yourself in the other party‟s shoes. Ask yourself questions like: 
what kind of role does the other person have to play; what are the 
economic interests of the other party in a potential joint venture? 
Ask the other persons critical questions and compare their answers 
with facts. Finally, a consistent image should appear; 
2. pay attention to non-verbal language. Use your intuition to judge 
non-verbal, untrustworthy signs; 
3. in order to create an initial atmosphere of trust, start with trust. 
Being critical is fine, but be subtle. Put your social and emotional 
abilities into practice; 
4. pay attention to representatives‟ behaviour. Manifestations of co-
operative/ competitive behaviour may be a sign of such behaviour 
in the future; 
5. build personal relationships. Although this depends on the 
character of the people involved, social events can stimulate such 
a bond. If characters do not match, you can consider to replace 
persons. Again, use your social and emotional abilities. 
 
6.5.3 Phase 3: confirming trust 
The perceptions of  the other party‟s economic interest are confirmed during the 
commitment stage when the contract is signed. Usunier (1996: 115) even states 
that “trust is taken to its highest point when the parties sign a written 
agreement”. Despite the importance of the contract, delegates should regard the 
contract as a last resort. Putting too much emphasis on the contract may destroy 
interpersonal relationships (cf. Ghauri, 1983, 1996; Macaulay, 1963). 
 In addition to the contract and other written documents, the mode of co-
operation is also important. By starting a joint venture the partner will obtain a 
direct interest in the shared subsidiary (see section 5.2.3.2). This makes them 
directly responsible for the joint venture‟s performance. This notion will also 
create trust. Gulati (1995) also mentions the trust-building function of equity 
joint ventures. Summarising, the commitment stage confirms the partner‟s 
economic interest in the joint venture. 
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PHASE 3: confirming trust 
 
Draw up a clear and unambiguous contract that will form the basis for 
the joint venture relationship. Try to use this contract as little as 
possible. Overusing, or threatening with the contract may decrease 
trust. Set up a joint venture instead of a non-equity alliance to increase 
the partner‟s economic interest in the co-operation.  
 
6.5.4 Phase 4: maintaining trust 
During the execution stage, trust that has been build in the former phases has to 
be maintained or strengthened. During this phase, it is important that the 
partner‟s self-interest to behave trustworthy does not decrease. Hence, in order 
to maintain trust, it is important that delegates monitor the partner‟s action. For 
example, a change in strategy may imply a decreasing economic self-interest, 
due to a change in the partner‟s dependence. However, delegates should be 
careful with this. Excessive monitoring may create an atmosphere of distrust. 
Therefore, delegates should use indirect channels, like the management team of 
the joint venture –which includes people from the own company– or through 
audits that have been agreed upon in advance. 
 In addition, it is important to remain attractive to the partner, so that 
the partner‟s economic self-interest will not decrease. Nooteboom‟s (1996) 
model provides tips to maintain the relative value for the partner. An example of 
this model is that companies improve their knowledge base, so that it becomes 
more attractive. 
 Finally, behaving trustworthy yourself is an important aspect in order 
to maintain trust. This implies that delegates live up to the agreements, that they 
perform their role as competently as possible, and that they are sincere. The 
following box summarises these instruments for maintaining trust. 
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PHASE 4: maintaining trust 
 
During the execution of the joint venture trust has to be maintained or 
made sturdier. First, behave trustworthy yourself: keep to your word, 
perform your role as competently as possible, and be sincere. To 
maintain trust in the other party, it is important to monitor changes in 
your partner‟s economic interest. An indication of a shifting self-
interest may be a change in your partner‟s strategy. Remain attractive 
to your partner and keep them interdependent, also outside the joint 
venture relationship. Finally, you can use the techniques and 
information of the former phases and adjust this information. 
 
6.5.5 Phase 5: expanding sources of trust 
If delegates want to build trust based on emotions, this study indicates how this 
can be reached. It is most important that delegates become friends. Friendship 
can take a joint venture relationship through difficult periods, because friends 
will care about and make an effort for the other party‟s interest. 
 First, becoming friends takes time. Delegates should spend time 
together before and after board meetings to really get to know each other. Social 
weekends together with spouses may also contribute to the development of a 
personal relationship. 
 Second, it is important that there is a fit of characters. In case the 
characters of the persons do not match, delegates should consider replacing 
these people. 
 Third, the persons involved have to be socially skilled, which requires a 
high E.Q. (i.e. emotional intelligence). The fact is that building personal 
relationships requires, among other things, respect, empathy, listening skills, 
genuine interest in the other person, and openness. Phase 5 shows how 
economic sources of trust can be expanded with emotional sources. 
 
PHASE 5: expanding sources of trust 
 
Place a lot of emphasis on the personal relationship between you and 
the other board members. This requires: 
1. time for social events after and before official board meetings. Let 
spouses join in on social events; 
2. a fit of characters;  
3. people with social and emotional capabilities. 
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6.6 LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study has several limitations that provide possibilities for future research. 
First, in this study the dimensions of trust are still intertwined. Further research 
on trust may try to distinguish more clearly between the different dimensions of 
trust. This study has shown that especially goodwill-based trust and promissory-
based trust are difficult to distinguish. Furthermore, this study suggest that 
goodwill-based trust and competence-based distrust can go together (see section 
5.3.1). 
 Second, further research on trust should focus on real events, rather than 
on what-if situations, in order to avoid compliance. After all, the question 
remains whether managers give answers that correspond with their role and 
function, rather than with their personal beliefs. This is confirmed by the notion 
that three retired respondents put more emphasis on emotional foundations of 
trust rather than on economic ones. Subsequent research can also ask what-if 
questions and follow the joint venture to see what happens when such situation 
really occur. 
 Third, future research can refine or test the final model (Figure 6-1) by 
means of a qualitative study or quantitative analysis, such as LISREL. LISREL 
allows for a joint estimation of both the measurement model (the indicators that 
measure the same latent variable) and the testing model (the relationship 
between the dependent and the independent latent variables). This approach is 
recommended because it helps to test very complex causal relationships, i.e., 
relationships between variables that lack a one-on-one relationship. Qualitative 
studies can address the question whether or not trust develops differently in 
distinct joint ventures. For example, the question arises if trust is build up 
differently when distinguishing between dominant parent control or shared 
control. 
 Finally, further research may consider investigating the effect of 
biological influences on the development of trust in international joint ventures. 
Recent research (Adolphs, Tranel and Damasio, 1998) has shown that the so-
called amygdala (a nerve junction) plays an important role in assessing an 
unknown person‟s trustworthiness. It was found that if suffering bilateral 
amygdala damage, a person will judge unfamiliar faces as more accessible and 
more trustworthy than „normal‟ people will do. In other words, whether or not 
IJV partners trust each other might depend on biological factors. Moreover, 
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biology instead of, for example, culture might be an important explaining 
variable in how trust starts to develop in IJVs. 
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Q1. QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE PARTNER 
 
 
Name of the joint venture:  ________________________________ 
Name of the respondent:   ________________________________ 
Working for:    ________________________________ 
Function within the joint venture: ________________________________ 
Date of the interview:   _______     Time: _________________ 
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INTERDEPENDENCE 
 
1. Please tell me why the joint venture was created 
 
I. Dependence of the focal firm on its partner 
A. Relative value of the partner and change in time 
1a. Importance of the resources for A and for B, as perceived by A 
1. Why did A/B need certain resources 
 without the joint venture the business unit would not survive 
 we needed the resources to carry out a planned strategy (what was this 
strategy?) 
 we not really needed the resources, but they seemed complementary to our 
activities 
a) Are these motive(s) still valid? 
2. What resources/competencies did A/B need from B/A 
 in terms of tangible resources (raw materials, hardware etc.) 
 in terms of knowledge: 
 in terms of amount of people: 
 other, i.e.. 
a) has the need for these resources changed in time and if yes, how? 
3. How important was it for A/B to obtain these resources 
 0  0  0  0  0 
very important important neutral  unimportant very unimportant 
 
a) why this answer? 
b) has this importance changed in time? If yes, how and why? 
4. Which other resources has B/A contributed, which A/B not really needed at 
that moment, but which were complementary to the contributions of B/A to the 
joint venture? 
 in terms of tangible resources (raw materials, hardware etc.): 
 in terms of knowledge: 
 in terms of amount of people: 
 other, i.e. 
a) has the need for these resources become more or less important in time? 
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5. Was the joint venture intended to strengthen the core-business of A/B or was it 
to be used to expand non-core business 
a) has this changed in time? 
 
2a. Availability of the resources for A and for B, as perceived by A 
1. Why did A/B not develop the resources by itself but did it choose for a partner 
which could complement her/him? 
2. Would A/B be able to develop the resources by itself at this moment 
a) if yes, why has this not been done until now 
3. How many firms were in the possession of the resources wanted by A/B 
a) has this changed in time? Have alternative, more attractive partners than 
B/A appeared in time. If yes, why does A/B stick to B/A 
4. When B/A was the not the only firm in possession of these resources, why did 
A/B then choose for B/A and not for another firm. Please explain your answer. 
5. What should another partner have that B/A doesn‟t have which would make 
A/B switch from partner? How high do you assess this chance? If it is very 
high, does B/A work on it to improve this gap? 
 
BEHAVIOR AND TRUST 
Competence-based behavior of A 
1. For which activities is A/B responsible? Has this changed in time? 
Activities the joint venture A B 
buying raw materials    
production    
logistics    
R&D - product 
   - process 
   
maintenance and repairs of the production 
process 
   
marketing activities/selling    
other, i.e. __________________    
 
a) Is there a difference between responsibility and the actual execution of 
the activities? If yes, why is that? 
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2. Has there ever been a situation in which A has not carried out these activities 
as competently as possible? yes/no 
a) if yes, please tell 
i) what was the reason for not performing as well as possible? 
ii) if not, please indicate why A carried out these activities as 
competently as possible: 
 because A had no opportunity to do otherwise 
 because it was also in A‟s self-interest to carry out these task as 
competently as possible 
 because it was in B‟s interest to carry out these task as competently 
as possible 
 a combination of the above 
b) would A also carry out these activities as competently as possible when 
this would be more in the interest of B than of A and A would have an 
opportunity to not performing as well as possible? yes/no 
i) Can you give examples of such behavior in the past? 
c) idem i), but now that it would negatively affect A, but positive for the 
joint venture relationship? 
3. From which party is the general manager? 
a) why from that party/an external one? What if it would be from another 
party/an external one? 
b) has this changed in time? If yes, why? 
 
Competence trust in the B and change in time 
1. On what base has B been selected? (indien dit nog niet duidelijk is geworden 
uit de afhankelijkheidsvragen). 
2. See the table on page 11. Do you have a kind of evaluation system to review 
the activities of B in this joint venture? 
a) if yes, what are these systems? 
b) how important is it for A to have this evaluation? Why is that? When you 
would not have this system, would you trust your partner to perform well 
within this joint venture? 
c) if not, then how do you get insight into the performance of B in this joint 
venture? 
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d) if you don‟t need such an insight, why is that? 
3. Do you fully understand the activities/expertise of B regarding their 
contribution? 
a) if yes, has this changed in time, or did A have this understanding from the 
beginning. Why then doesn‟t A carry the activity out by itself? 
b) if not, do you think B can give A misleading information regarding their 
activities within this joint venture ? yes/no 
i) If yes, do you belief them to do so? What are you going to do about it? 
ii) If not, why not? 
iii) has this feeling changed in time? If yes, through what? 
4. Do you feel B is underperforming regarding its contributions? 
a) if not, why not? Has this feeling changed in time? 
b) if yes, why do you think so.  
i) do you expect her/him to perform better into the future? If so, why do 
you think so? If not, why not? If not, what are going to do about it? 
5. Do you think B will be able to develop their competencies into the future in 
such a way that the joint venture will keep in line or ahead of its 
competitors? 
a) if yes, why do you think so 
b) if not, why not? What are you going to do about it? 
6. I will now mention several sources which may be important for your 
perception of B‟s (non-) reliability regarding its resources/competencies. 
Please indicate how important these resources were for A: 
a) has the importance of these sources changed in time? 
 
Sources of trust very               neutral                very 
important                       uimportant 
change in 
importance 
prior experience with the 
same company 
 0          0          0         0           0  
kinship ties 0          0          0         0           0  
reputation of the company 0          0          0         0           0  
same background of 
negotiators (e.g. same sex, 
same culture) 
0          0          0         0           0  
personal bond between the 0          0          0         0           0  
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Sources of trust very               neutral                very 
important                       uimportant 
change in 
importance 
negotiators 
information from third 
parties 
0          0          0         0           0  
other sources, i.e.  0          0          0         0           0  
 
Promissory-based behavior of A 
1. Are major agreements, made between A and B, always written down? 
a) if yes, why is that? 
i) is the fact that agreements are written down a motive for A to keep to 
the agreements?  
ii) Would A also keep to the agreement when it was not written down? If 
yes, why?  
b) Has this changed in time? Is there more/less emphasis on minutes etc. then 
in the beginning? If it has changed, why is that? 
2. Has A always kept to its promises? yes/no [deze vraag is misschien dubbel 
na vraag 1.a.i] 
a) please indicate why A kept its promise: 
 because we had no opportunity to do otherwise 
 because it was also in our self-interest to keep the promise 
 because it was in B‟s interest to keep the promise 
 a combination of the above 
b) When A not always kept to its promises, why is that? 
3. Suppose the following: during a meeting with the other partner some 
promises have been made. During the execution of these promises by A it 
appears that keeping the promise will be in the interest of B, but not in the 
interest of A. Will A keep its promise, assuming that they will have an 
opportunity to not keep the promise? Why? 
i) Can you give examples of such behavior in the past? 
b) idem i), but now that it would negatively affect A? 
 
Promissory trust in B and change in time 
1. Is the fact that agreements are written down a motive for B to keep to the 
agreements?  
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[or: why do you think B is keeping to the agreement, although it is not written 
down?) 
a) Would B also keep to the agreement when it was not written down? If 
yes, why does A believe so?  
2. Has there ever been a situation in which B had promised something but did 
not keep to this promise? 
a) if yes, please tell. Why did they not keep their promise? 
i) has this affected A‟s believe in B that it will always keep its promises? 
If not, why not? (dit is de vertrouwen vraag) 
b) can you imagine that B will not keep its promise once? Why (not)? 
3. Suppose the following: during a meeting with the other partner some 
promises have been made. During the execution of these promises by B it 
appears that keeping the promise will be in the interest of A, but not in the 
interest of B. Do you think B will keep its promise, assuming that they will 
have an opportunity to not keep the promise? Why (not)? 
i) Can you give examples of such behavior in the past? 
b) idem i), but now that it would negatively affect B? 
 
Goodwill trust in B and behavior of A at the moment and change in time 
1. Do you think B will be able to develop your competencies into the future? 
a) If yes, do you think A will actually do in the future? Why do you think 
so? 
i) if not, why not? 
b) Will that harm your business? 
2. We have designed some propositions. Please give your opinion: 
a) [behavior] Whenever we have to make an important decision in a 
situation we have never encountered before, we will be concerned about 
the welfare of B 
                          
strongly agree agree       agree/disagree disagree  strongly disagree 
 
i) Why this answer? 
ii) Can you remember situations in which this (not) happened? 
iii) Has this behavior changed in time?  
a) If yes, through what? 
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b) If not, why not? 
b)  [trust] Whenever we have to make an important decision in a situation 
we have never encountered before, I know B will be concerned about the 
welfare of A  
                          
strongly agree agree       agree/disagree disagree  strongly disagree 
 
i) Why this answer? 
ii) Can you remember situations in which this (not) happened? 
iii) Has this feeling changed in time?  
a) If yes, through what? 
b) If not, why not? 
c) [behavior] When it comes to things which are important to B concerning 
the joint venture, B can depend on our support 
                          
strongly agree agree       agree/disagree disagree  strongly disagree 
 
i) Why this answer? 
ii) Has this behavior changed in time?  
a) If yes, through what? 
b) If not, why not? 
iii) Has such behavior ever occurred in the past? 
iv) What would be your answers if I add: „even if it is not in B’s interest 
to do so’ 
d) [trust] When it comes to things which are important to us concerning the 
joint venture, we can depend on B’s support 
                          
strongly agree agree       agree/disagree disagree  strongly disagree 
 
i) Why this answer? 
ii) Has this feeling changed in time?  
a) If yes, through what? 
b) If not, why not? 
iii) Has such behavior ever occurred in the past? 
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iv) What would be your answers if I add: „even if it is not in B’s interest 
to do so’ 
e) [behavior] We will do more for the joint venture than that is formally 
expected of us (Sako 1994:38) 
                          
strongly agree agree       agree/disagree disagree  strongly disagree 
  
i) Why this answer? 
ii) Has this feeling changed in time?  
a) If yes, through what? 
b) If not, why not? 
iii) Have such situations ever occurred? Please give examples. 
f) [trust] We belief that B will do more for the joint venture than that is 
formally expected of her/him (Sako 1994:38) 
                          
strongly agree agree       agree/disagree disagree  strongly disagree 
 
i) Why this answer? 
ii) Has this feeling changed in time?  
a) If yes, through what? 
b) If not, why not? 
iii) Have such situations ever occurred? Please give examples. 
a) why do you think B did this? 
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Q2. QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE JOINT VENTURE ABOUT PARTNER A, B 
 
 
Name of the joint venture:  ________________________________ 
Name of the respondent:   ________________________________ 
Working for:     ________________________________ 
Function within the joint venture: ________________________________ 
Date of the interview:   _____________ Time:  _____________ 
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INTERDEPENDENCE 
 
Importance of the resource for the joint venture and change in time 
1. Which resources does the joint venture need for a proper execution of the 
joint venture? 
 in terms of tangible resources (raw materials, hardware etc.) 
 in terms of knowledge: 
 in terms of amount of people: 
 other, i.e.: 
a) has this changed in time? Have additional resources been added or have 
some resources disappeared? 
2. Which resources are the most important for the joint venture? 
a) Why is that? 
 
Availability of the resource for the joint venture and change in time 
1. Which of the current resources do you obtain from: 
a) your parents (please specify per partner) 
i) has this changed in time? If yes, how 
ii) would the joint venture be able to develop these resource by itself at 
this moment? 
a) if yes, why has this not be done already 
iii) have alternative, more attractive parties than the parents appeared in 
time, from which the resource may be obtained? 
a) if yes, why then does the joint venture stick to its parents? 
b) from third parties (please specify) 
i) has this changed in time? If yes, how 
ii) would the joint venture be able to develop these resource by itself at 
this moment? 
a) if yes, why has this not be done already 
iii) have alternative, more attractive parties than these third parties 
appeared in time, from which the resource may be obtained? 
a) if yes, why then does the joint venture stick to these third parties? 
c) does the joint venture has itself 
i) has this changed in time? If yes, how 
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ii) is it possible to obtain the resources from outside the joint venture at 
this moment? 
a) if yes, why do you keep the resource in-house  
2. Please give your opinion on the following proposition: 
a) If the parents would stop the joint venture relationship, the company 
would be able to continue without the resources of the parents 
 0  0  0  0  0 
completely true  almost true neutral  not true not true at all 
 
Degree of independence in the control of the joint venture and change in 
time 
1. Who is carrying out the following activities? 
Activities the joint venture A B 
buying raw materials    
production    
logistics    
R&D - product 
   - process 
   
maintenance and repairs of the production process    
marketing activities/selling    
other, i.e. __________________    
 
a) has this changed in time? If yes, why is that? 
2. Can you specify the role of the Board of Directors? 
a) how often do they meet 
b) what are the meetings about 
i) has this changed in time (in frequency and time?). Why? 
3. how often does the management team contact the Board of Directors to 
discuss issues concerning the joint venture: 
i) officially: ________ times a year. Change in time 
ii) unofficially: ________ times a year. Change in time 
b) which issues/decisions have to be approved by the Board of Directors? 
Has this changed in time. If yes, why? 
4. From which party is the general manager? 
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a) why from that party/an external one? What if it would be from another 
party/an external one? 
b) has this changed in time? If yes, why? 
5. Has there ever been a difference of opinion between the Board and the 
management of the joint venture on issues concerning the joint venture? 
a) if yes,  
i) on what issue(s)? 
ii) how was this solved? 
b) if not, if this would happen, how then would the difference in opinion be 
settled? 
 
BEHAVIOR AND TRUST 
 
Competence-based behavior and change in time 
1. See the table at page 4 and concentrate on the activities which the joint 
venture has to carry out. What is, in your opinion, a well performance of 
these activities? 
a) has the MIJV always met these performance „standards‟? 
i) if not, can you give some examples? 
ii) if yes, then please indicate why the MIJV carried out these activities 
as competently as possible (let the respondent tell the answer): 
 because the MIJV had no opportunity to do otherwise 
 because it was also in the MIJV‟s self-interest to perform as well as 
possible 
 because it was in A/B‟s interest to perform as well as possible 
 a combination of the above 
b) would the MIJV also carry out these activities as competently as possible 
when this would be in the interest of A/B but not in the interest of the 
MIJV and the MIJV would have an opportunity to not perform as well as 
possible? yes/no 
i) Can you give examples of such behavior in the past? 
c) idem i), but now that it would negatively affect the MIJV 
 
APPENDIX 1     141 
 
Competence-based trust and change in time 
1. Have there been activities in the past which the joint venture should have 
carried out formally, but which the parents carried out actually? Or is this so 
at this moment? 
a) if yes, what were (are) those activities 
b) why was (is) that 
c) how has this affected your belief in their competencies? 
2. Have there been activities in the past which the parents should have carried 
out formally, but which the joint venture carried out actually? Or is this so at 
this moment? 
a) if yes, what were (are) those activities 
b) why was (is) that 
c) how has this affected your belief in their competencies? 
3. Do you have a kind of evaluation system to review the activities of A/B 
regarding this joint venture? yes/no 
a) if yes, what are these systems? 
i) how important is it for the MIJV to have this evaluation? Why is that? 
When you would not have this system, would you trust your parents 
then to perform well within this joint venture? 
b) if not, then how do you get insight into the performance of A/B 
c) if you don‟t need such an insight, why is that? 
4. Do you feel A/B is underperforming? 
a) if not, why not? Has this feeling changed in time? 
b) if yes, why do you think so.  
i) do you expect them to perform better into the future? If so, why do 
you think so? If not, why not? If not, what are going to do about it? 
 
Promissory-based behavior and change in time 
1. Are major agreements, made between the parents and the MIJV always 
written down? 
a) if yes, why is that? 
i) is the fact that agreements are written down a motive for the MIJV to 
keep to the agreements?  
ii) Would the MIJV also keep to the agreement when it was not written 
down? If yes, why?  
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b) Has this changed in time? Is there more/less emphasis on minutes etc. 
then in the beginning? If it has changed, why is that? 
2. Has the MIJV always kept to its promises? [deze vraag is misschien dubbel 
na vraag 1.a.i] 
a) please indicate why the MIJV kept its promise: 
 because we had no opportunity to do otherwise 
 because it was also in our self-interest to keep the promise 
 because it was in A/B‟s interest to keep the promise 
 a combination of the above 
b) When the MIJV not always kept to its promises, why is that? 
c) can you imagine a situation which would drive you away from keeping a 
promise? 
3. Suppose the following: during a meeting with the parents some promises 
have been made. During the execution of these promises by the MIJV it 
appears that keeping the promise will be in the interest of the parents, but not 
in the interest of the joint venture. Will the MIJV keep its promise, assuming 
that you will have an opportunity to not keep the promise? Why? 
 
Promissory-based trust and change in time 
1. Is the fact that agreements are written down a motive for A/B to keep to the 
agreements?  
[or: why do you think A/B is keeping to the agreement, although it is not written 
down?) 
a) Would A/B also keep to the agreement when it was not written down? If 
yes, why does the MIJV believe so?  
2. Has there ever been a situation in which A/B had promised something but 
did not keep to this promise? 
a) if yes, please tell. Why did they not keep their promise? 
i) has this affected the MIJV‟s believe in A/B that it will always keep its 
promises? If not, why not?  
b) can you imagine that A/B will not keep its promise once? Why (not)? 
3. Suppose the following: during a meeting with the A/B some promises have 
been made. During the execution of these promises by A/B it appears that 
keeping the promise will be in the interest of the IJV, but not in the interest 
APPENDIX 1     143 
 
of A/ B. Do you think A/B will keep its promise, assuming that they will 
have an opportunity to not keep the promise? Why (not)? 
i) Can you give examples of such behavior in the past? 
b) idem i), but now that it would negatively affect the joint venture? 
 
Goodwill-based behavior en trust and change in time 
1. Please give your opinion: 
a) [behavior] The MIJV will put the interests of the parents above the 
interests of the joint venture   
                          
strongly agree agree       agree/disagree disagree  strongly disagree 
 
i) Why this answer? 
ii) Can you remember situations in which this (not) happened? 
iii) Has this behavior changed in time?  
a) If yes, through what? 
b) If not, why not? 
b) [trust] The MIJV beliefs the parents will put their own interests above the 
interests of the joint venture   
                          
strongly agree agree       agree/disagree disagree  strongly disagree 
 
i) Why this answer? 
ii) Can you remember situations in which this (not) happened? 
iii) Has this belief changed in time?  
a) If yes, through what? 
b) If not, why not? 
c) [behavior] We will do more for the joint venture than that is formally 
expected of us (Sako 1994:38) 
                          
strongly agree agree       agree/disagree disagree  strongly disagree 
 
i) Why this answer? 
ii) Has this behavior changed in time?  
a) If yes, through what? 
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b) If not, why not? 
iii) Have such situations ever occurred? Please give examples. 
d) [trust] The MIJV beliefs that A/B will do more for the joint venture than 
that is formally expected of him 
                          
strongly agree agree       agree/disagree disagree  strongly disagree 
 
i) Why this answer? 
ii) Has this belief changed in time?  
a) If yes, through what? 
b) If not, why not? 
iii) Have such situations ever occurred? Please give examples. 
a) why do you think A/B did this? 
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COMPETENCE-BASED BEHAVIOUR 
Manifestations of competence by the partner or the management team of the IJV during 
each stage
1
 
Stage IJV
2
 Codes     Major theme 
NEG: D motivation-challenge/part of yourself economic interest 
EXEC:  K motivation-profit/personal challenge  “ 
EXEC:  K motivation-proud/preventing annoyance  “ 
EXEC:  K motivation-self interest/keeping a promise  “ 
EXEC:  L motivation-avoiding failure/(prestige?)  “ 
EXEC:  L motivation-economic goals   “ 
EXEC:  A default-partner     - 
EXEC:  A motivation-relationship    economic interest 
EXEC:  A motivation-self interest/short versus long-term “ 
EXEC: D  different effort-reason-different point of view - 
EXEC: D  motivation-responsibility/reputation/ 
  dedication    economic interest 
EXEC: K default-both partners-effect-preserving  
  relationship/negative effect joint venture 
  performance     “ 
EXEC: K default-reaction-understanding   - 
EXEC: A motivation-self interest   economic interest  
 
 
COMPETENCE-BASED TRUST 
Manifestations of competence-based trust between the partners during each stage 
Stage IJV Codes     Major theme 
PH: D general knowledge   overall reputation 
PH: D market reputation     “ 
                                                     
1 PH: previous history; NEG: negotiations; COMM: commitment; EXEC: 
execution 
2 D: DSM BASF; K:Kemax; A: ABG; L: LAP 
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PH K actual behaviour/market position   “ 
PH: K prior experience    prior exchange 
PH: K reputation (market position)  overall reputation 
NEG: L actual behaviour/management position perceived behaviour 
COMM: K actual behaviour & commitment  mode of co-operation 
EXEC: D self interest    economic interest 
EXEC: K default-reaction-starting distrust   - 
EXEC: K image/actual behaviour   perceived behaviour 
EXEC: K incompetence but no distrust- reason- 
  understanding     - 
EXEC: K presentation of the tasks of the other 
  person/results    perceived behaviour 
EXEC: K reaction-no distrust-reason- 
  transparency/ understanding   - 
EXEC: L actual behaviour    perceived behaviour 
EXEC: L monitoring through management positions monitoring 
EXEC: L self interest    economic interest 
EXEC: L through MIJV/same reporting 
  systems/personal contact   perceived behaviour 
 
 
PROMISSORY-BASED BEHAVIOUR 
Manifestations of promissory-based behaviour of the partners during each stage 
Stage  IJV Codes    Major theme 
COMM:  K motivation-written down  contract and other agr. 
COMM/EXEC: L motivation-written documents  “ 
COMM/EXEC: A motivation-legal sanctions   “ 
EXEC:  D motivation-relationship  economic interest 
EXEC:  D motivation-self interest/ethics  “ 
EXEC:  D motivation-tit for tat   “ 
EXEC:  K default-good reason- 
   no reputation effects   “ 
EXEC:  K default-reaction-give and take/acceptance “ 
EXEC:  K motivation-norms    “ 
EXEC:  K motivation-reputation/long term  
   interest/ feeling of   
   responsibility for employee economic interest 
EXEC:  L default-reaction-understanding  - 
EXEC:  L motivation-ethics/self interest/ 
   policy of the company  economic interest 
EXEC:  L motivation-relationship/ 
   calculated self interest   “ 
EXEC:  L motivation-self interest   “ 
EXEC:  L motivation-self interest/ not spoiling 
   relationship because of a small gain “ 
EXEC:  A default-other interest-latitude of other 
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   partners to discuss-change agreement “ 
EXEC:  A motivation-preserving relationship  “ 
 
 
PROMISSORY-BASED TRUST 
Manifestations of promissory-based trust between the partners during each stage 
Stage IJV Codes     Major theme 
NEG K actual behaviour (keeping minor 
  agreements)/reputation   perceived behaviour 
NEG L actual behaviour (keeping minor agreements) “ 
COMM K written down    contracts and other ag. 
EXEC D relationship    economic interest 
EXEC K knowing what to expect from people  “ 
EXEC K philosophy/similar characters/ 
  care for reputation    “ 
EXEC L actual behaviour-motivation-?  perceived behaviour 
EXEC A legal sanctions-negative effect on  
  atmosphere     - 
EXEC A other party‟s behaviour/communication/ 
  understanding/norms & values   - 
 
 
GOODWILL-BASED BEHAVIOUR 
Manifestations of goodwill-based behaviour of the partners during each stage 
Stage IJV Codes     Major theme 
NEG A motivation-long term success  economic interest 
EXEC D give and take     - 
EXEC D motivation-?     - 
EXEC D motivation-best for both parties  economic interest 
EXEC D motivation-sense of duty/self interest  “ 
EXEC D motivation-success joint venture/ 
  integration people    “ 
EXEC D motivation-success merger/joint venture  “ 
EXEC K default-motivation-balance of interest  “ 
EXEC K motivation-?     - 
EXEC K motivation-depending on credits  
  the partner has    economic interest 
EXEC K motivation-low performance joint venture  “ 
EXEC K motivation-loyalty/pride in proving yourself  “ 
EXEC K motivation-part of the relationship   “ 
EXEC K motivation-reciprocation (give and take)  “ 
EXEC K motivation-will to continue   “ 
EXEC L motivation-broad relationship/no possibility  “ 
EXEC L motivation-reputation/respect/self interest  “ 
EXEC L motivation-self interest    “ 
EXEC L only when not disadvantageous for themselves “ 
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EXEC A assistance     - 
EXEC A consensus-motivation-relationship  economic interest 
EXEC A decision making-maximising self  
  interest within boundaries interest 
  JV-motivation-relationship   “ 
EXEC A decision making-taking care of self interest but  
  taking other party‟s interest into consideration - 
EXEC A decision making-taking care of self interest- 
  consensus by taking into account other‟s interest - 
EXEC A default-acceptance from partner-reason- 
  part of give and take    - 
EXEC A give and take     - 
EXEC A investment-one partner against proposal- 
  non forcing of other parties   - 
EXEC A motivation-integration with other organisations - 
EXEC A motivation-other‟s interest   friendship/emotions 
EXEC A motivation-relationship   economic interest 
EXEC A motivation-relationship-long term interest  “ 
EXEC A motivation-self interest    “ 
EXEC A motivation-self interest (=joint interest)  “ 
EXEC A non openness-confidentiality   - 
EXEC A not open-hindered by hierarchy   - 
EXEC A problem solving-friendly way/ irrespective  
  of legal documents-motivation-relationship friendship/emotions 
EXEC A problem solving-take into consideration  
  each other‟s problems/open discussion- 
  motivation-keeping the joint venture  
  together     economic interest 
EXEC A sacrifices/give and take    “ 
EXEC A selection MIJV-consultation/taking into  
  account other‟s desire-motivation-satisfaction “ 
EXEC A support within extreme boundaries self interest “ 
EXEC A understanding     - 
 
 
GOODWILL-BASED TRUST 
Manifestations of goodwill-based trust between the partners during each stage 
Stage IJV Codes     Major theme 
PH D prior contact/experience   personal contacts 
NEG D default-reaction-no disclosure 
  secret information    - 
NEG D default-reaction-understanding role   - 
NEG K answers to critical questions/ 
  third party information   economic interest 
NEG A actual behaviour-default-colour own 
  behaviour-effect on discussions   - 
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NEG A judgement    economic interest 
NEG A setting-social meetings- insight  
  into other‟s character   befriending/emotions 
NEG A setting-social meetings-getting to know 
  the other     befriending/emotions 
NEG A starting with trust-naivety   starting with trust 
NEG A starting with trust-own behaviour as reference “ 
COMM K contract-evidence    contract and other agr. 
COMM K investments/self-interest   mode of co-operation 
COMM K self interest     “ 
COMM K sunk costs/economic advantage 
  through co-operation    “ 
EXEC L contract and other agreements  contract and other agr. 
EXEC D actual behaviour/understanding   - 
EXEC D building-addressing problems/ 
  looking for solutions    - 
EXEC D effect-overcome difficult situations   - 
EXEC D effect-understanding role of other   - 
EXEC D understanding their reasoning   - 
EXEC K actual behaviour     - 
EXEC K distrust-self interest   economic interest 
EXEC K feeling partner is part of own company  “ 
EXEC K loyalty/pride     “ 
EXEC K management positions   monitoring 
EXEC K monitoring (accountants control)   “ 
EXEC K self interest    economic interest 
EXEC K self interest (longer term)/ norms and values  “ 
EXEC K understanding/personal knowledge   “ 
EXEC L actual behaviour     - 
EXEC L personal relationships (respect 
  and appreciation)    economic interest 
EXEC L default (non openness)-reaction- 
  understanding     - 
EXEC L default-changing market position of Usinor  - 
EXEC L default-own behaviour =guarding own interest - 
EXEC L default-reaction-alertness    - 
EXEC L default-restored through involvement 
  top managers     - 
EXEC L management positions   monitoring 
EXEC L self interest    economic interest  
EXEC L self interest (win-win situation)   “ 
EXEC A actual behaviour (contact with management)  
  understanding-bond/acquaintance  economic interest 
EXEC A actual behaviour (non openness)- 
  understanding-confidentiality   - 
EXEC A actual behaviour (non openness)- 
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  understanding-hierarchy    - 
EXEC A actual behaviour-empathy and support 
  from partner-other‟s interest and 
  self interest    friendship/emotions 
EXEC A actual behaviour-experience/past  economic interest 
EXEC A actual behaviour-experience-effect-feelings friendship/emotions 
EXEC A actual behaviour-experience- 
  understanding-self interest   economic interest 
EXEC A actual behaviour-motivation 
  preserving relationship    “ 
EXEC A actual behaviour-understanding-motives  “ 
EXEC A expected behaviour-role/relationship  “ 
 
 
SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS 
Degree of social relationship between the partners during each stage 
Stage IJV Codes     Major theme  
PH  D building-fairs-effect-easier to  
  get in touch with    personal contacts 
PH  D fairs-getting to know each other   “ 
PH  D working groups-effect- easier to  
  get in touch with     “ 
PH  D personal liking (respect and appreciation) 
  -effect-unofficial negotiations   “ 
PH  K between business people-knowing  
  each other-effect -trust-immersing 
  business from that people trust each other  “ 
NEG  D respect-effect-solving difference of opinion 
  /smoothing neg.     - 
NEG  L frequent contact-learn about the other befriending 
NEG  L no personal liking-still comp.-based trust economic interest  
NEG  L on speaking terms-effect-looking for  
  other solutions     - 
NEG  A building-personal liking-character 
  of the other    befriending 
NEG  A building-social events-effect-liking each other “ 
N/E
3
 K building-diners     “ 
N/E K effect-openness/direct    - 
N/E A building-feeling sympathy/other‟s 
  behaviour    social bond/emotions 
N/E A building-personal attention/social 
  events/diners     “ 
EXEC  D effect-doubt whether you will get  
  everything out of business    - 
                                                     
3
 N/E: Negotiations/Execution 
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EXEC  D between manufacturing director and BASF and 
  manufacturing manager DSM-effect- 
  finding pragmatic solutions   - 
EXEC  D between manuf. director and mark. manager-effect- 
  mediating role mark. manager   - 
EXEC  D meaning-openness/jointly looking for solutions - 
EXEC  K personal contact-effect-more difficult not 
  to fulfil a promise    “ 
EXEC  K personal liking-effect-openness   “ 
EXEC  K effect-listen more carefully/support   “ 
EXEC  L building-diners-effect-feeling more comfortable “ 
EXEC  L no personal liking-role behaviour   - 
EXEC  A building-emphasis on people instead of money- 
  motivation-enjoying life    - 
EXEC  A building-personal liking   friendship/emotions 
EXEC  A building-social skills of partners (EQ)- 
  effect-new people feel welcome and accepted “ 
EXEC  A effect-bond/glue     “ 
EXEC  A effect-communication/give and take/ 
  understanding (if interest are different)  “ 
EXEC  A effect-consensus when interests are different (give in) “ 
EXEC  A effect-co-operation-open/relaxed   “ 
EXEC  A effect-effort/taking care of well-being  
  of the other (other‟s interest)   “ 
EXEC  A effect-goodwill-based behaviour- 
  motivation-other‟s interest    “ 
EXEC  A effect-understanding what others feel and think “ 
EXEC  A friendship     “ 
 
 
CONTRACT AND OTHER AGREEMENTS 
Role of the contract and other agreements 
IJV Codes       Major function  
D between board and MIJV-written-motivation- 
  law/evidence/continuity     legal 
D between operational people-written-effect- 
  worse atmosphere     - 
D written-motivation-large scope of the agreement/ 
  saving negotiation time     remembering 
D changing-disadvantage for partner->specifying 
  advantage for future     “ 
D changing-restricted by procedures and hierarchy  - 
D verbal-motivation-time/trust    - 
D written-motivation-remembering    remembering 
K use       - 
K written-motivation-formality    formality 
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K written-motivation-confirmation    documentation 
K written-motivation-understanding    understanding 
K deviation-motivation-good for the joint venture  - 
K deviation-motivation-more practical   - 
K evidence       legal 
L between board and MIJV-written-motivation- 
  keeping to the agreement     “ 
L between board and MIJV-written-motivation-law  “ 
L between board and MIJV-written-motivation- 
  making situation clear     understanding 
L verbal-motivation-relationship    - 
L written-motivation-back up/continuity/ 
 give account to superiors     superiours 
L written-motivation-remembering/basis for discussions/ 
 avoiding misunderstandings    remembering 
L written-motivation-remembering/keeping other to agreement legal 
L verbal-motivation-basis clear and simple   - 
A between board & MIJV-operational-verbal-motivation-effort - 
A verbal-motivation-disliking paperwork/ waiting for 
 unfolding moment     - 
A written-motivation-evidence    legal 
A written-motivation-reminding    remembering 
A MIJV-non operational-written-motivation-clarity 
 (preventing  misunderstandings)    understanding 
 
  
NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Het strategische belang van internationale joint venture (IJVs) neemt toe. Joint 
ventures zijn samenwerkingsrelaties tussen 2 of meer bedrijven, die bepaalde 
middelen (bijv. grondstoffen, mensen of kapitaalgoederen) bijdragen aan een 
nieuw op te richten, juridisch onafhankelijk, gezamenlijke onderneming. De 
oorzaak van dit toenemende belang ligt in het feit dat bedrijven meer zaken over 
de grens doen en dat bedrijven kiezen om zich te concentreren op hun 
kernactiviteiten. Joint ventures bieden in zulk soort gevallen de mogelijkheid 
om een land te betreden zonder bepaalde kennis te verwerven om de activiteiten 
goed uit te voeren. Immers, de partner kan deze lacune opvullen. Verder kunnen 
joint ventures leiden tot schaalvoordelen of kunnen ze een effectief middel zijn 
om te voldoen aan overheidsrestricties. 
 Joint ventures hebben echter ook hun nadelen. Het belangrijkste nadeel 
is dat de bedrijfsvoering over de joint venture gedeeld moet worden. Deze 
gedeelde controle brengt zogenaamde „transactiekosten‟ met zich mee; kosten 
die voorkomen uit het zoeken naar een geschikte partner, de onderhandelingen, 
het opstellen van een waterdicht contract, het monitoren en verdere interactie 
met de partner. Transactiekosten kunnen nooit geheel worden opgeheven, omdat 
deze kosten inherent zijn aan een joint venture relatie. Partners kunnen echter 
wel proberen ze te minimaliseren. Immers, hoe lager deze transactiekosten, hoe 
beter het resultaat (ceteris paribus).  
 Literatuur over relaties tussen organisaties onderschrijft het belang van 
vertrouwen als factor die transactiekosten minimaliseert en daarom een 
positieve invloed heeft op de gehele resultaat van een samenwerkingsrelatie. 
Vertrouwen is gedefinieerd als de verwachting dat de partner zich coöperatief 
zal gedragen. Indien vertrouwen aanwezig is tussen partners, zal er minder tijd 
en geld gespendeerd hoeven te worden aan het zoeken naar een geschikte 
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partner en zal het contract niet alles hoeven te dekken, omdat je de partner 
vertrouwt dat eventuele lacunes vriendschappelijk zullen worden opgelost als de 
tijd daar is. Verder verwacht je bijvoorbeeld ook dat de partner eventuele 
conflicten in gezamenlijke harmonie oplost indien je die partner vertrouwt.  
 Als vertrouwen zo belangrijk is, rijst de vraag hoe partners in 
internationale joint ventures dit vertrouwen kunnen opbouwen. Over dit 
onderwerp is maar weinig bekend in de literatuur over relaties tussen bedrijven. 
Daarom behandelt dit proefschrift de ontwikkeling van vertrouwen in 
internationale joint ventures. De volgende onderzoeksvraag staat centraal: 
 
Hoe ontwikkelt vertrouwen zich tussen partners in internationale joint 
venture relaties? 
 
Deze vraag omvat twee sub-vragen. Ten eerste probeert dit proefschrift inzicht 
te geven in hoe partners vertrouwen kunnen ontwikkelen. Deze vraag sluit aan 
bij voorgaande literatuur over factoren die vertrouwen beïnvloeden, en zet deze 
factoren in een tijdsdimensie. Ten tweede onderzoekt dit proefschrift de 
bronnen van vertrouwen en zoekt het uit of (en zo ja, hoe) deze bronnen 
veranderen in de loop der tijd. Om voort te bouwen op reeds eerder gedane 
studies, zijn er twee additionele vragen gesteld: (3) wat is vertrouwen; en (4) 
wat zijn bronnen van vertrouwen. 
 
Om tot de conclusie te komen dat vertrouwen een cruciale rol speelt in 
internationale joint venture relaties, zet hoofdstuk 2 de factoren op een rijtje die 
het resultaat van een joint venture positief en negatief beïnvloeden. Hiervoor 
werden 30 belangrijke artikelen uit de joint venture literatuur geselecteerd. Ten 
eerste wordt het begrip „resultaat‟ onder de loep genomen. Het blijkt dat het 
begrip „resultaat van een IJV‟ vijf dimensies heeft. Deze zijn: 
 de levensduur van de joint venture; 
 de kwaliteit van de interpersoonlijke relaties (mate van coöperatie) 
 de interne prestaties van de joint venture (omzet- en winstcijfers, perceptie 
van succes) 
 de stabiliteit van de joint venture (verandering aandelenpercentages, 
frequentie waarin het contract wordt gewijzigd); 
 effectiviteit (het behalen van voorafgestelde doelen). 
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Ten tweede laat hoofdstuk 2 zien dat er negen factoren te onderscheiden zijn die 
het resultaat van de joint venture positief of negatief beïnvloeden. Deze zijn 1. 
partner karakteristieken, zoals cultuur en ervaring; 2. partner‟s strategie; 3. 
behoefte aan de middelen van de partner, 4. de structuur van de joint venture; 5. 
het gedrag van de partners en van het management team van de joint venture; 6. 
de mate van wederzijdse afhankelijkheid tussen de partners; 7. de omgeving van 
de joint venture; 8. de manier van evaluatie; 9. het vertrouwen tussen de 
partners. Vertrouwen springt er in deze classificatie uit, omdat zij alle andere 
factoren (behalve de behoefte aan de resources en de omgeving) beïnvloedt of 
minder belangrijk maakt. Gebaseerd op deze negen factoren eindigt hoofdstuk 2 
met een conceptueel model welke aangeeft hoe vertrouwen zich kan 
ontwikkelen in IJVs. 
 
Hoofdstuk drie gaat dieper op vertrouwen in, en op 2 factoren die vertrouwen 
direct beïnvloeden. Deze factoren komen voort uit het conceptuele model van 
hoofdstuk 2, en zijn wederzijdse afhankelijkheid en gedrag. Allereerst vat het 
hoofdstuk de literatuur over vertrouwen in bedrijfsrelaties samen. Hieruit volgt 
ten eerste dat vertrouwen een positieve perceptie is over het gedrag van de 
ander. Het begrip wordt als volgt gedefinieerd: „de verwachting dat de partner 
zich positief zal gedragen‟. Ten tweede worden er drie dimensies van 
vertrouwen onderscheiden, te weten „het nakomen van afspraken‟ (promissory), 
„het competent verrichten van de taken‟ (competence) en „welwillendheid‟ 
(goodwill). Ten derde presenteert dit hoofdstuk drie bronnen van vertrouwen, te 
weten een eigen belang, het belang van de ander (verbonden aan emoties en 
persoonlijke banden) en geen mogelijkheid om zich onbetrouwbaar te gedragen. 
Het hoofdstuk vervolgt met het definiëren van wederzijdse afhankelijkheid en 
gedrag en vat literatuur samen die de relaties tussen de drie geselecteerde 
variabelen weergeeft. Het hoofdstuk eindigt met het conceptuele 
onderzoeksmodel M0, dat de basis vormt voor de empirische studie. Dit model 
omvat drie variabelen, te weten vertrouwen, wederzijdse afhankelijkheid en 
gedrag. Daarnaast geeft het model een dynamiek in de ontwikkeling van deze 
drie variabelen door fasen te onderscheiden. Deze fasen zijn: de 
voorgeschiedenis, de onderhandelingen, de overeenkomst en de uitvoering van 
de joint venture. 
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Hoofdstuk vier geeft de methoden van onderzoek en analyse weer. Om de 
onderzoeksvraag te kunnen beantwoorden blijken case studies de geschikte 
onderzoeksstrategie. De keuze voor deze strategie vloeit voort uit drie criteria, te 
weten de onderzoeksvraag, de mate van diepgang van het onderzoek, en de 
proces dimensie. Het onderzoek concentreert zich op 4 IJVs, waarvan 3 met elk 
twee partners, en 1 met drie partners. Ik interviewde 35 leden van de Raad van 
Bestuur van de IJV, alsmede leden van het management team. Tijdens de 
gesprekken maakte ik gebruik van een gestructureerde vragenlijst. De 
gesprekken werden hierdoor enigszins geconcentreerd op de drie geselecteerde 
variabelen, maar het gaf ook ruimte voor uitweidingen. 
 De data werd in drie stappen geanalyseerd. Ten eerste werden er 
relevante interview fragment geselecteerd, welke werden samengevat door 
codes. Deze code bestaat uit een aantal (sub-)categorieën. Daarna werden alle 
codes per case samengevoegd, gerangschikt naar hun categorieën. Op basis van 
de subcategorieën werden thema‟s onderscheiden. In dit onderzoek resulteerde 
dat in 13 belangrijke thema‟s, die de basis vormden voor hoofdstuk 5. 
 
Hoofdstuk vijf geeft de resultaten van het empirische onderzoek. Allereerst 
geeft het hoofdstuk de achtergrond van de 4 joint ventures weer. ABG is een 
joint venture tussen Alpha, Beta (Nederland) en Gamma (Scandinavië). De joint 
venture is gepositioneerd in Nederland en produceert een chemisch halffabrikaat 
voor de partners en voor verkoop. Kemax is een joint venture tussen Akzo 
Nobel (Nederland) en Kemira (Zweden). Ook deze joint venture bevindt zich in 
Nederland. Ze produceert calcium chloride voor de markt van de Zweedse 
partner; Akzo Nobel levert de grondstof waaruit calcium chloride wordt 
gedestilleerd. Lusosider Aços Planos bevindt zich in Portugal en is een joint 
venture tussen Koninklijke Hoogovens (Nederland) en Usinor (Frankrijk). De 
joint venture produceert stalen en tinnen platen voor o.a. de 
conserveringsindustrie. Terwijl Hoogovens de joint venture ziet als 1 van haar 
afvoerkanalen voor staal, gebruikt Usinor de joint venture om meer grip te 
krijgen op de Iberische markt. DSM BASF is een joint venture tussen DSM 
(Nederland) en BASF (Duitsland). De joint venture bevindt zich in Nederland 
en produceert harsen. De partners zijn gaan samenwerken vanwege 
schaalvoordelen. 
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 Na deze achtergrondbeschrijving wordt in hoofdstuk 5 de data 
gepresenteerd om antwoord te krijgen op de onderzoeksvraag. Allereerst laat het 
hoofdstuk de factoren zien die partners gebruiken om vertrouwen op te bouwen. 
Deze data zal gebruikt worden om sub-vraag 1 te beantwoorden. De factoren 
worden gepresenteerd per fase zoals die gedefinieerd zijn in hoofdstuk 3. We 
vinden de volgende factoren (tabel 1): 
 
Tabel 1. Het opbouwen en in stand houden van vertrouwen 
Fase Factoren die bijdragen aan het opbouwen en in 
stand houden van vertrouwen 
De 
Voorgeschiedenis 
de algemene reputatie van het bedrijf; 
eerdere interactie tussen de bedrijven op 
organisatorisch niveau; 
direct persoonlijk contact tussen de oprichters. 
De 
Onderhandelingen 
jezelf verplaatsen in de schoenen van een ander; 
beginnen met vertrouwen; 
het werkelijke gedrag van de ander; 
elkaar leren kennen. 
De Overeenkomst 
het contract en andere schriftelijke overeenkomsten; 
vorm van samenwerking (wel of geen 3e nieuw bedrijf) 
De Uitvoering 
monitoren; 
ontwikkelen van vriendschap. 
 
Deze bevindingen dragen bij aan andere studies over vertrouwen door de 
factoren die van invloed zijn op vertrouwen in een tijdsdimensie te plaatsen. 
Elke factor moet worden gezien als een additionele factor, bovenop de 
voorgaande. Bijvoorbeeld, het blijkt dat de reputatie van het bedrijf een 
belangrijke rol speelt tijdens de voorgeschiedenis, maar deze informatie wordt 
ook nog wel gebruikt tijdens de onderhandelingen. Al deze factoren worden 
door de partners gebruikt om inzicht te verwerven in de bronnen van 
vertrouwen. Dit brengt ons bij sub-vraag 2. 
 De belangrijkste propositie aangaande sub-vraag 2 (hoe veranderen 
bronnen van vertrouwen in de loop der tijd) is dat economisch eigen belang en 
emoties twee belangrijke bronnen van vertrouwen zijn. Vertrouwen is echter 
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alleen op emoties gestoeld indien de afgevaardigden een vriendschap hebben 
opgebouwd. Dus, het antwoord op vraag 2 is: vertrouwen gebaseerd op 
economisch eigen belang verandert niet in de loop der tijd, tenzij er een 
vriendschap wordt opgebouwd. Deze propositie wordt nu uitgelegd. 
 De bevindingen laten zien dat de afgevaardigden het moeilijk vinden de 
ander te vertrouwen wanneer die ander geen economisch eigen belang heeft om 
zich vertrouwenswaardig te gedragen. Uiteindelijk redeneren afgevaardigden als 
volgt: „indien het economische eigen belang van mijn partner wegvalt (dus, als 
ze niet meer afhankelijk van ons zijn via de joint venture), zullen ze geen 
motieven meer hebben om een goede persoonlijke band met ons aan te houden. 
Hierdoor wordt elke vorm van gedrag mogelijk‟. Verder laat hoofdstuk 5 zien 
dat zo‟n afhankelijkheidsrelatie boven de joint venture relatie uitstijgt. De 
afgevaardigden zijn zich bewust van het feit dat ze deel uitmaken van een 
netwerk van bedrijven, waarin ze elkaar over en weer nodig hebben. Alleen als 
ze zich „goed‟ gedragen zullen sociale banden in tact blijven, die van belang zijn 
om gebruik te maken van dat netwerk. Met andere woorden: goed gedrag en een 
goede atmosfeer heeft lange termijn economisch nut. Ten tweede leidt de keuze 
voor een joint venture tot een directe verantwoordelijkheid voor het resultaat 
van de joint venture. Deze afhankelijkheidsrelatie stimuleert de inzet van de 
partner, omdat het resultaat van de joint venture een directe bijdrage zal leveren 
aan het resultaat van de eigen onderneming. 
 Zoals gezegd is de propositie van dit proefschrift dat vertrouwen alleen 
op emoties is gebaseerd indien de afgevaardigden een vriendschap hebben 
opgebouwd. Dit houdt meer in dan „met elkaar kunnen opschieten‟. Het vereist 
gevoelens van affectie en warmte, en de afgevaardigden zien elkaar ook buiten 
de joint venture relatie om.  
 
Hoofdstuk 6 vat de theoretische en empirische bijdragen van dit proefschrift 
samen, zoals die ook worden weergegeven in deze Nederlandse samenvatting. 
Tabel 2 geeft nog eens een overzicht van de sub-vragen en de antwoorden 
daarop. 
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Tabel 2. Antwoord op de vragen van deze studie 
Sub-vraag Antwoord 
Wat is vertrouwen? vertrouwen is de verwachting dat de andere 
partij zich coöperatief zal gedragen. 
Wat zijn de belangrijkste 
bronnen van vertrouwen? 
economisch eigen belang en emoties. 
Hoe kunnen partner in IJVs 
vertrouwen opbouwen en in 
stand houden? 
deze studie presenteert 11 factoren die 
partners gebruiken om vertrouwen op te 
bouwen en in stand te houden (zie tabel 1).  
Hoe veranderen 
gepercipieerde bronnen van 
vertrouwen in de loop der 
tijd? 
vertrouwen gebaseerd op economisch eigen 
belang verandert niet, tenzij er een 
vriendschap ontstaat. 
 
Hoofdstuk 6 vervolgt met een verfijning van het model M0 zoals dat is 
weergegeven in hoofdstuk 3. Het nieuwe model, M1 geeft aan dat 
afhankelijkheid en gedrag nog steeds een belangrijke rol spelen in de 
ontwikkeling van vertrouwen. De belangrijkste verfijning is dat model M1 een 
onderscheid maakt tussen gepercipieerde bronnen van vertrouwen en factoren 
die deze perceptie beïnvloeden. Daarna worden de theoretische gevolgen van de 
resultaten besproken. In deze paragraaf wordt voorgesteld dat het juist is om 
over vertrouwen in economische relaties te spreken, ook als dit vertrouwen 
gebaseerd is op economisch eigenbelang. Het proefschrift eindigt met 
beleidsaanbevelingen voor managers en suggesties voor verder onderzoek. 
